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The thesis analyses how to create better conditions for people living with dementia 
to exercise their right to choose on medical treatment. It starts from the numerous 
barriers faced by these individuals in deciding on healthcare matters and seeks to study 
how a legal, policy and practice approach to healthcare decision-making, characterised 
by a stronger focus on support and on accommodating contextual dynamics would 
better enable the person to decide for themselves.  
In addressing such a question, this work adopts the perspective of the social model 
of disability and of Fineman’s vulnerability theory. The social model looks at disability 
and chronic conditions as social, rather than just clinical problems, conceptualising 
them in terms of interaction between an impairment and societal barriers. In this 
regard, it focuses on removing the societal obstacles preventing the person from living 
their life to the fullest. Fineman’s vulnerability theory supports and extends such 
claims in relation to legal personality and the role of the state. Starting from a vision 
of vulnerability as a universal characteristic, it argues that it makes no sense to 
distinguish between autonomous/nonautonomous or capable/incapable individuals 
and advocates for state and social institutions to take action in providing the services 
necessary for people to be more resilient to internal and external jeopardies. Starting 
from this perspective this work argues that the numerous obstacles faced by individuals 
living with dementia in choosing on medical treatment can be overcome or greatly 
attenuated if we adopt a model of healthcare decision-making which makes use of 
social institution’s potential for building resilience and removing disabling barriers. 
Such a model appears embodied by Article 12 UN Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities. Indeed, this Article affirms that all disabled individuals must 
be recognised the right to legal capacity and decision-making, refusing the traditional 
distinction between capacity and incapacity and requiring State Parties to actively 
support disabled individuals in exercising their right to choose. The thesis analyses the 
implications of such provisions with regard to treatment decisions of people living 
with dementia, by studying how European regional organisations such as the Council 
of Europe and the European Union, can contribute to the practical realisation of such 
principles, and how promising initiatives developed in single European countries can 
provide an idea on how they can translate into concrete behaviours and practices. 
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1. Research problem and its importance  
 
This thesis aims to analyse how to create better conditions for people living with 
dementia to exercise their right to choose on medical treatment. It starts from the 
numerous barriers faced by these individuals in this area and seeks to study how a 
legal, policy and practice approach to healthcare decision-making, characterised by a 
stronger focus on support and accommodating contextual dynamics, would better 
enable the person to decide for themselves. Indeed, because of their impairment, 
individuals living with dementia are often judged as mentally incapable to make 
choices on medical treatment and thus deprived of their decisional power.1 However, 
as shown by a number of studies and experiential accounts, often what really prevents 
them from expressing their will is not so much the conditions of their brain, but rather 
the fact that the current approach to consent to treatment does not take into account the 
needs of individuals living with dementia.2 In order to explore how this system can be 
changed, this thesis analyses relevant initiatives put in place in the European continent 
and developed by international, regional and national actors.  
The problem at the centre of this study is of increasing importance in today’s 
health law and policy. The World Health Organisation (WHO) estimates that dementia 
currently affects round 50 million people worldwide,3 of which, according to 
Alzheimer’s Disease International, around 10.5 million live in Europe,4 with 850.000 
based in the UK.5 They are 90-98% older individuals (over 65 years of age) as there is 
                                                          
1 L Pickering Francis, ‘Decision-making at the End of Life: Patients with Alzheimer’s or other 
Dementias’ (2001) 35 Georgia Law Review 539, 542; T Mueller et al, ‘Comparison of Three Different 
Assessments of Capacity to Consent in Dementia Patients’ (2015) 28 GeroPsych 21. See further Section 
3 of this Chapter and Chapter 2. 
2 TM Breden and J Vollman, ‘The Cognitive Based approach of Capacity Assessment in Psychiatry: a 
philosophical critique of the MacCAT-T’ (2004) 12 Health Care Analysis 273, 278-279; F Cowdell, 
‘The Care of Older People with Dementia in Acute Hospitals’ (2010) 5 International Journal of Older 
People Nursing 83, 86-87 < https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/f2a7/ 
f8e1ff4f0e8d012a6f79c87c203cc9c02c56.pdf> accessed 24 April 2018.  
3 WHO, ‘Dementia. Key Facts’ (12 December 2017) <www.who.int/news-room/fact-
sheets/detail/dementia> accessed 31 May 2018. 
4 M Prince et al, World Alzheimer Report 2015. The Global Impact of Dementia (Alzheimer’s Disease 
International 2015), 24. 
5 Alzheimer’s Society, Dementia UK Updated (Alzheimer’s Society 2014), 43-59. 
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a strong correlation between aging and dementia.6 Focusing on Europe, it is calculated 
that the condition affects around 1.5-2.5% of the population aged 60-69, 3-7% of that 
aged 70-79, around 8.5-20.5% of that aged 80-89, and about 30-40% of that aged 
above 90, with a consistently lower prevalence in Eastern Europe compared to Western 
Europe.7 Also due to their advanced age, these individuals are constantly in need of 
medical procedures, therefore collecting their consent to treatment is a frequent task 
for many medical professionals and carers.8 Therefore, the questions of how to manage 
the healthcare arrangements of people living with dementia and of how to guarantee 
their dignity and autonomy in this context is increasingly at the centre of the attention 
of scholars, professionals and governments in the western world.9  
This introductory chapter provides basic information necessary to put the research 
problem in context, such as basic medical, epidemiological and demographic notions 
relating to dementia and background information with regard to consent to treatment 
of people living with cognitive impairments. Moreover, it provides an explanation of 
the aim, scope, methodology, and structure of the study. Section 2 contains an 
overview of what dementia is and its main subtypes and symptoms, while section 3 
sets the scene of the research, explaining the relevance and scope of questions 
regarding consent on medical treatment for people living with dementia. Section 4 
summarises the aims and research question of this work and clarifies its theoretical 
premises, evaluative framework, and methodology. Section 5 details the structure of 
the work and provides a brief outline of the thesis chapters.  
 
2. Dementia: subtypes and symptoms  
 
Before considering the specific issues at the centre of this thesis, it is useful to 
have an overview of the main subtypes and the specific symptoms of dementia. The 
clinical nature of dementia and its impact on the cognitive abilities and behaviour of 
the person play a significant role in determining how society reacts to such dynamics 
and how decision-making on medical treatment is performed in this area.   
                                                          
6 OECD, Addressing Dementia: The OECD Response (OECD Publishing 2015), 20.  
7 Prince et al, World Alzheimer Report 2015, above, 20.  
8 For more information on the relevance of the problem see section 3 of this Chapter. 
9 A sign of this centrality in the public debate is that nearly all European governments and both the two 
major regional organisations of the continent (the EU and the Council of Europe) have established multi-
year dementia strategies. I will refer to some of these plans in Chapter 7. 
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Dementia is an umbrella term which refers to several types of conditions that affect 
the cognitive functioning of an individual. Such conditions are characterised by a 
significant decline in one or multiple cognitive domains such as learning and memory, 
language, executive functioning, complex attention, perceptual-motor, and social 
cognition. The deficit must interfere with independence in everyday activities, not 
occur exclusively in the context of delirium, and cannot be explained by the presence 
of other mental health disorders.10 Moreover, dementia may provoke changes of 
personality and opinions and challenging behaviour such as agitation, restlessness, 
aggressiveness, non-cooperative attitude, or apathy.11  
According to Kaufer and DeKosky, the various subtypes of dementia can broadly 
be divided into two categories: degenerative and non-degenerative dementias.12 While 
non-degenerative dementias represent a heterogeneous group of conditions, with 
aetiologies varying from vascular and endocrine to inflammatory and nutritional,13 the 
processes involved in degenerative dementias are intrinsic to the nervous system and 
dependent on chemical alterations, the deterioration of synaptic processes, and 
atrophic phenomena.14 Examples of non-degenerative dementias include vascular 
dementia, infectious dementia, posttraumatic dementia, and demyelinating disorders,15 
while the main examples of degenerative dementia are Alzheimer’s disease and 
Dementia with Lewy bodies.16 So, under the common umbrella term various 
pathologies can be included with combinations of symptoms quite different from one 
another and the way in which the condition is experienced varies from person to 
person. For this reason, in the latest edition of the American Psychiatric Association 
Diagnostic Statistical Manual (DSM-5) the expression ‘dementia’ has been substituted 
by ‘major neurocognitive disorder’.17 However, the term is still widely used both in 
medical and public discourse, generally designating an acquired, persistent syndrome 
                                                          
10 American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed, 
APA 2013), 602-605. 
11 Ash, EL Ash, ‘What is Dementia?’ in C Foster, J Herring and I Doron (eds), The Law and Ethics of 
Dementia (Hart 2014), 4. 
12 D Kaufer and S DeKosky, ‘Diagnostic Classifications: relationships to the Neurobiology of 
Dementia’ in EJ Nestler (ed), Neurobiology of Mental Illness (Oxford University Press 1999). 
13 EP Flanagan, ‘Nondegenerative Dementias and Encephalopathies’ in KD Flemming and LK Jones 
(eds), Mayo Clinic Neurology Board Review: Clinical Neurology for Initial Certification and MOC 
(Oxford University Press 2015). 
14 American Psychiatric Association, above, 608-609.  
15 Flanagan, above. 
16 See further below. 
17 American Psychiatric Association, above, 602. 
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or cognitive impairment often but not always linked to increasing age and generally 
referring to widespread forms such as Alzheimer’s disease, vascular dementia or 
dementia with Lewy-bodies.18 Also in this study the term dementia is used in this 
sense.  
Alzheimer’s disease and Dementia with Lewy bodies are the most prominent 
examples of degenerative dementia conditions.19 Alzheimer’s is supposedly caused by 
the production of a toxic protein in the brain (amyloid β or τ protein), which creates 
fibrous masses impeding synapses among neurons.20 The onset of Alzheimer’s disease 
is most commonly characterised by an impaired ability to form new memories (which 
includes short term memory loss, difficulties with learning, and episodic memory) and 
decreasing visual memory.21 A person with these problems may struggle with 
remembering tasks and decisions in everyday life, forget appointments, and be 
confused by planning changes.22 The presence of these symptoms alone, however, is 
not sufficient. For the diagnosis of Alzheimer’s disease to be defined in practice, the 
person has to have additional deficiencies in several functional domains, such as 
language, executive function, praxis, visuospatial, or constructional capacities.23 One 
of the most frequent secondary deficiencies in people living with Alzheimer’s Disease 
is difficulty in word-finding.24 Regarding the onset and progression of the condition, 
each case is relatively unique, though it is usual to speak about two types of 
Alzheimer’s: early and late onset.25 The former type affects people under the age of 
60-65 while the second and most prevalent affects people above that age. They are not 
only different in the time of the first symptoms appearing, but also have a distinct 
progression, with early onset having a stronger negative impact on attention and 
executive functioning as well as a quicker deterioration of short-term memory.26 The 
                                                          
18 See Ash, above, 8-10. 
19 American Psychiatric Association, above, 602. 
20 See CL Masters, ‘The Neuropathology of Alzheimer’s Disease’ and CW Ritchie and CL Masters, 
‘The Central role of Aβ amyloid and tau in the Pathogenesis of Alzheimer’s Disease’ both in D Ames, 
JT O'Brien and A. Burns (eds), Dementia (5th ed, CRC Press 2016). 
21 American Psychiatric Association, above, 607-608. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
24 A Martin and P Fedio, ‘Word Production and Comprehension in Alzheimer's Disease: The breakdown 
of semantic knowledge’ (1983) 19 Brain and Language 124. 
25 MN Rossor et al, ‘Neurochemical Characteristics of Early and Late onset types of Alzheimer's 
Disease’ (1984) 288 British Medical Journal 961. 
26 Martin and Fedio, above.  
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late onset individuals show worse outcomes regarding their long-term memory and 
semantic abilities.27  
According to some sources, Dementia with Lewy bodies (DLB) can account for 
as much as 4.6% of all dementia cases.28 It is caused by abnormal masses of alpha-
synuclein protein in neurons, which impede synapses.29 The principal areas of 
cognition affected by DLB include attention, executive functioning, and visual 
perception, the latter specifically including colour vision impairment. 30 The last aspect 
is the defining characteristic of Dementia with Lewy bodies in comparison with similar 
conditions such as Alzheimer’s.31 Other differences between these two conditions 
include gender prevalence (with Dementia with Lewy bodies being more prevalent and 
aggressive in men), significantly shorter course of the diseases and prominent presence 
of other neurological signs such as Parkinsonism (tremors). 32 
The other major category of dementias is vascular dementia. The term is used to 
describe a broad range of problems including reasoning, attention, planning, and 
general judgement due to obstructed flow of blood to the brain.33 One of the more 
prominent examples of the group is Binswanger’s disease, a small vessel vascular 
dementia caused by damages to the white matter areas (responsible for the 
transmission of impulses and communication between the various areas of the brain).34 
Despite the fact that the condition is classified under the dementia umbrella, mood 
changes and neurological signs are the earliest symptoms of the condition rather than 
cognitive deficits.35 Binswanger’s Disease is characterised by manic phenomena, 
obsessions, and fixation on ritualistic behaviours which severely impact everyday 
functioning and eventually result in significant levels of personal neglect.36 Aphasia 
                                                          
27 Ibid. 
28 JP Kane et al, ‘Clinical Prevalence of Lewy Body Dementia’ (2018) 10 Alzheimer's research and 
Therapy 19. 
29 IG McKeith, ‘Dementia with Lewy Bodies’ (2007) 84 Handbook of Clinical Neurology 531.  
30 IG McKeith et al, ‘Consensus Guidelines for the Clinical and Pathologic Diagnosis of Dementia with 
Lewy Bodies (DLB)’ (2006) 47 Neurology 1113. 
31 PM Flanigan, ‘Color Vision Impairment in Dementia with Lewy Bodies: A Novel and Highly Specific 
Distinguishing Feature from Alzheimer Dementia’ (2017) 13 Alzheimer's and Dementia 1460. 
32 WW Barker et al, ‘Relative Frequencies of Alzheimer Disease, Lewy Body, Vascular and 
Frontotemporal Dementia, and Hippocampal Sclerosis in the State of Florida Brain Bank’ (2002) 16 
Alzheimer Disease and Associated Disorders, 203. 
33 Ibid. 
34 V Babikian and AH Ropper, ‘Binswanger’s Disease: A Review’ (1987) 18 Stroke 2. 
35 Barker et al, above. 
36 RM Lawrence, ‘Is the Finding of Obsessional Behaviour Relevant to the Differential Diagnosis of 
Vascular Dementia of the Binswanger Type?’ (2000) 12 Behavioural Neurology 149. 
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and psychomotor problems are also often observed in people living with Binswanger’s 
Disease, while memory impairments are not very prominent.37  
 
3. Dementia and decisions on medical treatment 
 
People living with dementia and medical treatment 
People living with dementia are frequently in need of a number of medications and 
healthcare procedures.38 One could say that medical treatment is an everyday 
component of their lives, having a considerable impact on their habits, daily activities, 
and management of relationships with others. Statistics on various western countries 
show that individuals living with this condition use healthcare services significantly 
more than others, generating even two or three times greater healthcare expenditure 
than the average individual in the same age category.39 Also, according to the World 
Alzheimer’s Report 2016, people living with dementia face a significantly higher 
probability of being admitted to the hospital than other individuals of similar age and 
medical infirmity.40   
This increased use of medications and health services is primarily related to the 
management of symptoms directly deriving from dementia. Many people living with 
this condition and in particular with Alzheimer’s take anti-cholinesterase drugs such 
as Donepezil, Rivastigmine and Galantamine daily.41 These pharmacological 
treatments have the effect of attenuating memory loss or confusion but may cause 
nausea, diarrhoea, vomiting, anorexia, and weight loss.42 Moreover, individuals living 
with dementia may also be administered other medicines for the control of behavioural 
                                                          
37 Barker et al, above. 
38 M Prince et al, World Alzheimer Report 2016. Improving Healthcare for People Living with Dementia 
(Alzheimer’s Disease International 2016).  
39 RL Kane and A Atherly, ‘Medicare Expenditures associated with Alzheimer Disease’ (2000) 14 
Alzheimer Disease and Associated Disorders 187; A Sicras et al, ‘Prevalence, Resource Utilization and 
Costs of Vascular Dementia compared to Alzheimer’s Dementia in a Population Setting’ (2005) 19 
Dementia and Geriatric Cognitive Disorders 305; TC Kuo, ‘Implications of Comorbidity on Costs for 
Patients with Alzheimer Disease’ (2008) 46 Medical Care 839, 841-845; L Schwarzkopf et al, ‘Excess 
Costs of Dementia Disorders and the role of Age and Gender - an analysis of German Health and Long-
Term Care Insurance Claims Data’ (2012) 12 BMC Health Services Research 165. 
40 Prince et al, World Alzheimer Report 2016, above, 58-60. 
41 For a brief summary see N Bregman and O Moore, ‘Clinical Management of Dementia: an Overview 
(1)’ and C Fox et al, ‘Clinical Management of Dementia: an Overview (2)’ both in Foster, Herring and 




symptoms, such as antipsychotics,43 which may again have significant side effects 
including drowsiness, tremors, accelerated cognitive decline, stroke, and increasing 
risk of death.44 Both behavioural problems and cognitive deterioration can also be 
addressed through non-pharmacological interventions. These may consist of physical 
therapy or exercise, face-to-face or group psychotherapy, and various techniques of 
cognitive rehabilitation such as reminiscence therapy (i.e. triggering the recall of 
memories through a variety of stimuli), validation therapy (focusing on building sense 
confidence and self-respect), multi-sensory stimulation, speech therapy, music 
therapy, and support groups.45 These interventions are less controversial and do not 
have the side effects of drugs, but still have an influence on the everyday life of people 
with dementia - occupying part of their time, putting them in potentially uncomfortable 
situations, imposing them to create human relationships they would not have cultivated 
otherwise, or to do activities they would have otherwise not done. Therefore, all forms 
of treatment cited so far can impact the personal freedom, lifestyle, or physical and 
mental integrity of the person, which are all fundamental interests which cannot be 
touched without authorisation of the person.    
Also, dementia appears associated with a significant number of comorbidities 
(other physical or mental health conditions arising in coincidence with it).46 In 
particular, the physical illnesses most frequently coinciding with dementia appear to 
be cardiovascular and cerebrovascular diseases, diabetes, fractures often related to 
falls, osteoporosis, various visual and auditory impairments, cancer, Parkinson’s 
disease, renal conditions, prostatic hypertrophy, and skin ulcers; while the most 
prevalent psychiatric conditions are depression, bipolar, and delusional disorders.47 
The data on the prevalence rate of the various pathologies tend to vary from study to 
                                                          
43 S Banerjee, ‘The use of Antipsychotic Medication for People with Dementia: Time for action’ (UK 
Department of Health 2009), available at < 
http://psychrights.org/research/digest/nlps/banerjeereportongeriatricneurolepticuse.pdf> accessed 27 
May 2018. 
44 C Ballard and A Corbett, ‘Management of Neuropsychiatric Symptoms in People with Dementia’ 
(2010) 24 CNS Drugs 729; Bregman and Moore, above, 49-50; Fox et al, above, 74-75. 
45 Bregman and Moore, above, 50-56; Fox et al, above, 75-78. 
46 M Sanderson et al, ‘Co-Morbidity associated with Dementia’ (2002) 17 American Journal of 
Alzheimer Disease and Other Dementias 73; CC Schubert et al, ‘Comorbidity Profile of Dementia 
Patients in Primary Care: are they Sicker?’ (2006) 54 Journal of American Geriatric Society 104; F 
Bunn et al, ‘Comorbidity and Dementia: a Scoping Review of the Literature’ (2014) 12 BMC Medicine 
192.  
47 Schubert et al, above, 106-108; Kuo, above, 843-844; B Poblador-Plou et al, ‘Comorbidity of 




study and in consideration of the different types of dementia and the social and 
geographical context of the survey. Nonetheless, they depict a landscape characterised 
by rather large numbers. Therefore, people with dementia are very likely to face at 
least one serious surgical intervention such as a heart operation, cancer surgery, hip 
replacement, removal of compromised organs such as kidneys, or eye surgery. 
Moreover, they may have to take medications such as chemotherapy, drugs for 
preventing high pressure, angina, blood clots, arrhythmia, and heart failure, insulin, 
diuretics, or again antipsychotic medications. These are all treatments that can be 
invasive or present significant side effects, ranging from confusion, blurred vision, 
dizziness, or fainting to fatigue, anaemia, appetite changes, nausea and vomiting, 
increased risk of falls, difficulty urinating, or diminished cognition. 48 Such adverse 
effects may also be due to the interaction of different medications.49 Finally, also given 
the high incidence of falls or strokes, people living with dementia appear to be among 
the most frequently admitted to Accident and Emergency50  
In addition to this, because of the prevalence of dementia, a relatively significant 
amount of resources is being invested in research and innovation to try to cure this 
condition or to manage its symptoms.51 Therefore, people living with it may be 
requested to participate in clinical trials or undertake experimental treatments, which 
of course requires an evaluation of the risks and benefits of taking part in the 
research.52  
                                                          
48 JD Curb, ‘Effect of Diuretic-Based Antihypertensive Treatment on Cardiovascular Disease Risk in 
Older Diabetic Patients with Isolated Systolic Hypertension’ (1996) 276 Journal of American Medical 
Association 1886; I Olver, ‘Chemotherapy for Elderly Patients with Advanced Cancer: is it worth it?’ 
(2000) 23 Australian Prescriber 80; Banerjee, above; M Ayan et al, ‘Cardiac Drug Therapy—
Considerations in the Elderly’ (2016) 13 Journal of Geriatric Cardiology 992. 
49 C Mueller et al, ‘Polypharmacy in People with Dementia: associations with Adverse Health 
Outcomes’ (2018) 106 Experimental Gerontology 240. 
50 KE Sleeman, ‘Predictors of Emergency Department Attendance by People with Dementia in their 
Last Year of Life: retrospective Cohort Study using Linked Clinical and Administrative Data’ (2018) 
14 Alzheimer’s and Dementia 20. 
51 Alzheimer’s Research UK, Annual Review (AlzUK 2015), 16 available at 
<www.alzheimersresearchuk.org/ wp-content/uploads/2015/01/ARUK_AnnualReview2015_web.pdf> 
accessed 31 May 2018. See also Alzheimer’s Association, ‘Congress Prioritizes Alzheimer’s and 
Dementia Research Funding in 2018 Budget’ (2018) <https://alz.org/news_and_events_105707.asp> 
accessed 31 May 2018. 
52 E Bettie, ‘Research Participation of Individuals with Dementia: Decisional Capacity, Informed 
Consent, and Considerations for Nurse Investigators’ (2009) 2 Research in Gerontological Nursing 94; 
H Helmchen, ‘Forschung mit Menschen, die an Demenz erkrankt sind?’ (2015) 86 Nervenarzt 1140; M 
Lepore et al, ‘Challenges in Involving People with Dementia as Study Participants in Research on Care 
and Services. Background Paper’ (Research Summit on Dementia Care, Bethesda, March 2017), 2-4 
available at <https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/256696/Session%205%20Background.pdf> 
accessed 31 May 2018. 
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Finally, we have to consider that presently there is no cure for dementia so this 
condition is always fatal, either because of the natural course of the condition or 
because of other causes that occur earlier (e.g. a stroke or a fall). Because of dementia’s 
long development and degenerative nature, the person in the final phases of their life 
is often almost totally paralysed, incontinent, and unable to eat and speak.53 In these 
situations, the question arises of whether to administer artificial nutrition, hydration, 
and ventilation or to apply a number of palliative treatments and end-of-life 
procedures.54 
 
Dementia and consent to treatment 
All medical treatments and procedures require the previous approval of the person 
on which they are performed. All western legal systems recognise the fundamental 
right of every person to not undergo a therapeutic procedure without their prior 
consent.55 This is generally seen as the way in which the law recognises the principles 
of dignity and autonomy in relation to medical treatment.56 In this regard, Faden and 
Beauchamp affirm that ‘informed consent is rooted in concerns about protecting and 
enabling autonomous or self-determining choice by patients’.57 Equally, Randall and 
Downie maintain: ‘it is not difficult to see the connections between the general concept 
of dignity and autonomy and the more specific concept of consent. […] Given that 
people are mind-body unities it follows from the ideas of autonomy and dignity that 
they should have a right to determine what is done to their bodies’.58  
                                                          
53 Alzheimer Society of Ireland, ‘Understanding Late Stage Dementia’ (2015) < 
www.alzheimer.ie/Alzheimer/media/SiteMedia/Helpline%20and%20Information%20Resources/Info
%20Pack%20PDF%27s/Understanding-late-stage-dementia_Section-A6.pdf> 31 May 2018. 
54 See M Gordon, ‘Ethical Perspectives on End-of-Life Care: Euthanasia, Assisted Suicide and the 
Refusal or Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatments in those Living with Dementia’ in Foster, Herring 
and Doron (eds), above. 
55 See for example I Kennedy and A Grubb, Medical Law, (3rd ed, Butterworts 2002), 575; M Brazier 
and E Cave, Medicine Patients and the Law (6th ed, Penguin 2011), 67; N Eyal, ‘Informed Consent’, 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2011) < https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/informed-consent/> 
accessed 25 September 2018. 
56 Kennedy and Grubb, above, 575; B Ademola Bello, ‘Dignity and Informed Consent in the Treatment 
of Mature Minors’ (2010) 21 Journal International de Bioéthique 103;  Brazier and Cave, above, 67; C 
Foster, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Law (Hart 2011), 111.   
57 RR Faden and TL Beauchamp, History and Theory of Informed Consent (Oxford University Press 
1986), 235. 
58 F Randall and RS Downie, The Philosophy of Palliative Care: Critique and Reconstruction (Oxford 
University Press 2006), 59. See also CB Fisher and M Oransky, ‘Informed Consent to Psychotherapy: 




In order to consider consent or refusal of medical treatment or other health 
interventions valid, medical law traditionally requires that: 
- the person has the capacity (or competency) to consent, meaning they are able 
to understand the nature and purpose of the medical treatment or procedure and 
to appreciate the implications and consequences of their decision; 
- the person has been appropriately informed of the treatment before consenting 
or refusing it; 
- the consent or refusal has been voluntarily expressed and the decision is not 
the product of others’ undue influence.59 
-  
On a practical level, the first prerequisite appears to be the most important in the 
case of people living with dementia. Because of their cognitive impairment, these 
individuals may often be seen as lacking the level of intellectual abilities required to 
grasp the nature and implications of their treatment and make conscious choices.60 This 
may also have an impact on how informed they are about a certain treatment or on 
their vulnerability to undue influence. Individuals living with dementia could appear 
to struggle to understand information given in conventional ways and to remember 
their doctor’s explanations, or, because of disorientation in space and time, they could 
be more prone to surrender to the self-interested ‘advice’ of a relative or friend. 
Therefore, as noted by Donnelly, all the problems regarding decisions of individuals 
living with this condition, including those on medical treatment, tend to be seen 
through the lens of capacity.61 As Grisso and Appelbaum note, if the person is judged 
as capable of consenting they are allowed to autonomously decide on their medical 
treatment but if judged as incapable they are stripped of this right and alternative 
decisional mechanisms are sought, such as appointing a third person (doctor, relative, 
deputy or guardian) who will decide for them. 62  For this reason, capacity is defined 
also as the ‘gatekeeping concept for informed consent’.63 
Here the concept displays all its legal weight. It is the framework under which a 
person is conferred or denied the power to make decisions regarding their care. In this 
regard, capacity to consent to medical treatment is a subtype of the more general 
                                                          
59 Faden and Beauchamp, above, 274; Grisso and Appelbaum, Assessing Competence, above, 7. 
60 Pickering Francis, above, 542; T Mueller et al, ‘Comparison’, above. See further Chapter 2. 
61 M Donnelly, ‘A Legal Overview’ in Foster, Herring and Doron (eds), above, 271. 
62 Grisso and Appelbaum, Assessing Competence, above, 1. 
63 Faden and Beauchamp, History and Theory, above, 286. 
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category of legal capacity, which, according to the definition given by Lewis, is the 
construct through which the law recognises and validates people’s decisions and 
transactions such as contracts, wills and indeed healthcare choices.64 In medical law, 
as in all other areas of legislation, this recognition and validation is subordinated to the 
presence of mental capacity in the decision-maker, which is the possession of the 
necessary cognitive abilities to ‘reasonably’ make a certain decision.65 Therefore, the 
term ‘capacity to consent’ refers both to the ability to understand and weigh the nature 
and consequences of a clinical procedure and to the fact that, traditionally, this ability 
is legally necessary for the validity of an individual’s choice. 66 The rationale under 
this construction is explained by Faden and Beauchamp, who affirm that if a person is 
autonomous and able to make conscious decisions, it is morally justifiable that they 
should autonomously decide on the medical treatment. However, if the person is ‘non-
autonomous’, thus unable to make a thoughtful decision, it is morally preferable that 
the power of deciding is transferred to other people as otherwise it may lead to potential 
self-harm for the person. 67  
This approach is grounded on the classical-liberal conception of the individual 
which has strongly influenced the modern approach to consent to treatment.68 This 
view starts from the Cartesian and Enlightenment idea of rationality as the necessary 
and distinctive characteristic of human nature. 69 As such, it advocates that every 
individual of ‘sound mind’ is entitled to plan and shape their own life according to 
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their own personal values,70 having to be let free to choose without pressures from the 
outside. 71 As noted by McLean, here the individual is seen as supreme - but on 
condition that they are rational and mentally capable. 72  
Literature in medical ethics and national legislations has developed criteria which 
a person needs to meet in order to be considered mentally capable of deciding on 
medical treatment (so-called capacity tests). One of the earliest tests in this area is the 
MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool for Treatment (MacCAT-T), developed in 
the late 1980s-1990s by American psychiatrists Thomas Grisso and Paul S 
Appelbaum, which demands that, in order to decide on medical treatment, a person 
possesses (1) the ability to understand information about the treatment, (2) manipulate 
the information rationally, (3) appreciate the significance of the decision for their own 
situation and (4) express a choice.73 Similar criteria are also contained in European 
legislations on consent to treatment and mental capacity. For example, section 3 of the 
English Mental Capacity Act 2005 states that a person is incapable of making any 
decision (including one on medical treatment) when they are unable ‘(a) to understand 
the information relevant to the decision, (b) to retain that information, (c) to use or 
weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision, or (d) to 
communicate [the] decision’. Similar criteria have been developed, for example, by 
German case law and legal scholars which require that a person is able to understand 
‘Art/Wesen, Bedeutung und Tragweite’ (type/nature, significance and implications) of 
a medical procedure and to weigh the pros and cons of the decision. 74 
As already noted, people living with dementia may be judged as not satisfying 
such prerequisites. Doctors and carers may often assume the person incapable only on 
the basis of their diagnosis.75 Moreover, they may find it difficult to understand the 
statements of the individual, judging them as the senseless utterances of an ‘unsound’ 
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mind.76 The idea that people with dementia are individuals devoid of their self and true 
human qualities who are inevitably and constitutively incapable of understanding what 
is going on around them is still widespread in our society.77 As a result, even people 
with mild or moderate dementia are assessed as lacking the capacity to make 
healthcare decisions.78  
However, an increasing number of scholars, professionals, carers and people 
living with dementia are critical of this situation. Studies and experiential accounts 
show that individuals in the early stages of dementia, but also many of those in the 
advanced phases of the condition, are often able to articulate consistent and motivated 
preferences on their care.79 Many statements which may seem incomprehensible at 
first sight, do appear to make sense in relation to the particular life situation of the 
person after more careful consideration. Therefore, it seems often unjust to disregard 
the statements by individuals with dementia. According to some legal scholars, the 
way in which the law on legal capacity and capacity to consent is framed also bears a 
significant responsibility here. In assessing capacity, the law tends to concentrate only 
on cognitive abilities, requiring absolute rationality in the decision-making.80   
The present work tries to address these concerns, showing how they can be 
avoided through a different approach to capacity to consent and a vision of the person 
living with dementia and of healthcare decision-making which is alternative to the 
apparent basis of current health law. In order to do so, it focuses on the theme of 
decisions of people living with dementia, specifically regarding the administration of 
traditionally designed medical treatments such as drugs, surgical operations or other 
smaller interventions performed, for example, by GPs, dentists, opticians, or nurses in 
the context of everyday healthcare of the person. It does not refer only to the strictly 
medical aspects of these treatments, but focuses on the full process of delivering 
healthcare, including the action of non-medical professionals such as informal carers. 
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For this reason, in this thesis the term ‘decision/choice on medical treatment’ is used 
as a synonym of ‘healthcare decision/choice’.   
 
4. Scope of the research, theoretical premises and methodology  
 
Scope of the research  
As already discussed, the focus of this work is on creating better conditions for 
people living with dementia to exercise their right to choose on medical treatment. Its 
thesis is that, in order to achieve this goal, legislation, professionals, and carers need 
to embrace a new approach based on an alternative vision of the person living with 
dementia. Many scholars, doctors, nurses, lawyers, judges, social workers, and 
relatives still tend to look at dementia only as a dreadful malfunctioning of the brain, 
leading to an inevitable loss of reasoning ability, and about which one can provide 
basic care to the person and prevent them from harming themselves.81 Moreover, 
regulations of healthcare decision-making still appear underpinned by an 
individualistic conception which sees personal choices as something that needs to be 
done in isolation and recognises the right to decide only for those who have a sufficient 
mental capacity/capacity to consent, thus risking the exclusion of people living with 
impairments such as dementia.82 Such a system also creates a series of practical 
challenges in the dialogue with the person and the collection of their consent.83  
This research seeks to identify a legal, policy and practice approach which avoids 
or at least attenuates these problems. In doing so it proposes a vision of dementia which 
recognises that the concrete impact of such a brain condition depends, at least to some 
extent, on how society reacts to it or accommodates the needs of the person 
concerned.84 In this vision, an individual’s ability to make decisions is determined not 
so much by the integrity of their brains but rather by the possibility of getting adequate 
opportunities to make decisions for themselves.85 This study explores how adopting 
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this perspective could lead to a more inclusive decision-making system for people 
living with dementia, as the point would not be to prevent them from deciding because 
of their incapacity to consent, but rather to create the necessary conditions for them to 
exercise their power of choice. In doing so it focuses on decisions on medical 
treatment, as this is the kind of health choices that directly and extensively impact the 
life and care of people living with dementia. This focus makes it possible, on the one 
hand, to analyse the whole spectrum of questions arising in this area, and on the other 
hand, to discuss proposals which can really make a difference in the life of people.  
 
Theoretical framework: an alternative view of dementia  
In order to conceptualise the vision of dementia underpinning this thesis, I refer to 
the social model of disability and to Martha Fineman’s vulnerability theory. These 
accounts are analysed in more detail in chapter 3. 
The social model sees disability primarily as a social dynamic rather than solely 
as a medical problem. 86 It defines disability in terms of interaction between an 
impairment, such as dementia, and societal barriers disabling and excluding the person 
living with the impairment. 87 It advocates for the removal of obstacles preventing the 
person from being included in society and living their life to the fullest. 88 With regard 
to treatment decisions of individuals living with dementia, the social model of 
disability can be the conceptual basis for an approach which does not just focus on the 
person’s diminished mental capacity, but rather concentrates on removing the external 
barriers to the exercise of their decisional power and on creating the conditions for 
them to express their will on care. 
Fineman’s vulnerability theory, developed in the context of legal studies, supports 
and extends such claims by putting them in relation to human condition and legal 
personality and providing a more articulate message with regard to the need for state 
and social institutions to engage in removing barriers such as those faced by people 
living with dementia. This account identifies vulnerability as a universal characteristic 
shared by all individuals and advocates for putting the ‘vulnerable subject’ at the centre 
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of legal and policy discourse. 89  Similar to the social model, it claims that vulnerability 
inevitably derives from the interaction between our body, which exposes us to injuries 
and illnesses, and the social structures in which we are all embedded that may 
accommodate or enhance our dependency and vulnerability.90 It emphasises how 
frailty, dependency, or incompetence are not social pathologies or exceptions, but an 
essential and natural part of the human condition. On one hand, this assumption leads 
to challenge the artificial binary distinction between capable individuals and incapable 
individuals that still characterises regulations on consent to treatment.91 On the other 
hand, adopting the vulnerable subject as the paradigm at the centre of legal and policy 
discourse leads to advocate that state and social institutions take responsibility to 
attenuate the various forms of vulnerability experienced by their members.92 
Therefore, in relation to healthcare decision-making, it provides a basis to claim that 
institutions at all levels should actively support the person and create the conditions 
for them to exercise their right to decide.   
 
Realising a new legal approach  
The ideas of the social model and of vulnerability theory have also been circulating 
for several years in the legal debate on the rights and healthcare decisions of disabled 
people and individuals living with cognitive impairments. Moreover, they appear to 
be echoed in the recent UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD).93 Based on its text and negotiation reports, the Convention is strongly 
underpinned by the social model of disability.94 In addition, though vulnerability 
theory does not appear to be among the direct sources of inspiration of the CRPD, 
some of the Convention’s provisions seem in line with Fineman’s vision. For example, 
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in Article 12(2) the CRPD affirms that all disabled individuals must be recognised the 
right to legal capacity and to make autonomous decisions, refuting the traditional 
binary division between capacity and incapacity on the basis of the mental abilities of 
the person. In addition, Article 12(3) states that disabled individuals have the right to 
receive support in exercising their decisional power and in overcoming the difficulties 
that they may face because of their condition.95 Scholars and practitioners have not yet 
extensively analysed the possible implications of this norm in relation to the case of 
people living with dementia. For this reason, this thesis will investigate how Article 
12 CRPD can offer a normative model which addresses the issues emerging from 
literature and practice on healthcare decision-making of such individuals. In doing this, 
it will mainly refer to the interpretation of the Article given in General Comment No 
196 by the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, to which the 
Convention has given the task of monitoring the correct interpretation and 
implementation of the CRPD.97   
However, because of its innovative content and its nature of provision of 
principles, the Article has triggered many controversies with regard to its correct 
interpretation.98 Moreover, it is necessary to establish how its sometimes vague norms 
can be translated into concrete behaviours. Also, as with all international human rights 
provisions, it requires the identification of normative and policy mechanisms to guide 
its implementation. In order to explore what these potential mechanisms could be, I 
will focus on the developments emerging in the European continent.  
This is a particularly interesting context for my topic. First, due to the relevance 
of the phenomenon of dementia, a series of national governments, authorities, care 
structures, research teams, professionals, and NGOs are establishing initiatives 
regarding healthcare decision-making of individuals living with this condition.99 
Moreover, the continent is home to two authoritative regional organisations, the 
Council of Europe (CoE) and the European Union (EU), which have made strong 
official commitments towards the promotion of CRPD principles.100 Therefore, by 
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looking at this area it will be possible both to study the channels available at a 
continental level to advance the implementation of the Convention and to gain a vision 
of how an Article 12-compliant approach to capacity to decide on medical treatment 
of people living with dementia could look like. 
 
The original contribution of the thesis  
This work aims to address the problems emerging in decision-making on medical 
treatment of people living with dementia by insisting on three points: a more inclusive 
vision of dementia, the application of a set of legal principles embodying such a vision 
(i.e. Article 12 CRPD) and the use of the transformative potential of CoE and EU legal 
and policy mechanisms as well as initiatives developed in national jurisdictions. Its 
original contribution consists of bringing together theoretical accounts such as the 
social model of disability and vulnerability theory, which developed following 
different routes and in relation to other problems, and explore their potential in relation 
to the case of people living with dementia. It also shows how legal principles and 
policy initiatives which have not yet been fully applied to healthcare choices of 
individuals living with dementia have the potential to solve or attenuate the dilemmas 
that scholars, activists, and practitioners have been facing for several decades. Finally, 
it provides an analysis of possible initiatives and practices which could be put in place 
in order to empower people living with this condition. 
In doing so, this work does not have the ambition to analyse all the possible 
nuances of regulations in its field or to give detailed instructions on what carers, 
professionals and policy makers should do. Rather, it aims to provide a pathway for 
change. This choice is due to the fact that the link between the problems this work 
focuses on and the principles it uses has not yet been clearly highlighted by scholars 
or activists, a gap which needs to be filled before proceeding to more specific issues. 
Once this gap is bridged it will be possible to further explore how my proposed 
approach can be implemented in the various concrete situations of decision-making 




The particular view of dementia and treatment decisions underpinning this study 
promotes a use of language which does not stigmatise people living with this condition. 
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For this reason, I will avoid terms such as ‘the demented’, ‘dementia sufferer’, or 
‘dementia victim’, preferring instead, ‘person living with dementia’, which poses more 
emphasis on the existential, relational aspect of the condition and does not reduce the 
person to just their condition or diagnosis. 
As this work is based on the social model of disability, I will also adopt a 
terminology which is in line with its vision of this phenomenon as essentially produced 
by society. Some activists and public bodies maintain that the phrase ‘people with 
disabilities’ is the most appropriate one in this context.101 Indeed, it puts the word 
‘person’ before the word ‘disability’, signalling the prominence of the human 
component on that of ‘(in)ableness’.102 However, I will adhere to another school of 
thought, which endorses the use of the locution ‘disabled people’. Indeed, I believe 
that such a phrase transmits more clearly the idea according to which the person is 
‘made disabled’ by society, instead of having a body or a mind ‘with’ a disability. 103 
In keeping with the principles of the social model I will also avoid referring to 
individuals living with this condition as ‘patients’ as this risks excessively 
medicalising the discourse and presupposes a subordination to doctors or carers. 
Instead, I will use the more neutral term of ‘person’ or ‘individual’. For the same 
reasons, I will also refrain from defining dementia as an ‘illness’ or ‘disease’, both 
words which refer to something intrinsically negative and pathological, preferring 
instead the term ‘condition’.     
  
Methodology 
As already explained, the aim of this study is to explore how values such as those 
affirmed by the social model and vulnerability theory along with legal principles such 
as those affirmed in Article 12 CRPD and in a series of European legal sources and 
policy documents can contribute to better addressing the issues related to healthcare 
decision-making of people living with dementia. It will also clarify how these values 
can be translated into initiatives and behaviours which facilitate the exercise of these 
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individuals’ legal capacity. This first requires clarification of the normative content of 
the analysed provisions and, relating it to the context, problems and dynamics 
emerging from practice. For this reason, this study relies on a combination of doctrinal 
and socio-legal research methods. 
In particular, in order to accomplish the first task, I will employ the classical 
criteria for the exegesis of legal texts widely accepted in legal scholarship and practice, 
and codified in documents such as the Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties 
or specific national and European guidelines. In doing this, I will consider primary 
legislative sources (e.g. international conventions, laws, EU directives and regulations, 
and policy documents), case law, and reports of International and European monitoring 
bodies in addition to the opinions of legal scholars.  
I will use document analysis to explore the practical problems emerging in the 
field of treatment decisions of people living with dementia and of how the legal 
principles and policies at the centre of this work can be realised through promising 
practices.104 In particular, I will rely on empirical studies, reports, personal accounts 
of people living with dementia and their carers, official documents, webpages of 
governments and NGOs, blogs, posters, and audio or video material which reports the 
experiences and difficulties of people with dementia in deciding on medical treatment 
and/or describes promising initiatives. I will give particular attention to sources in 
which the voice of people living with the condition is more central (e.g. personal 
testimonies or interviews with individuals living with the condition) or reports of 
organisations in which such individuals are extensively involved. These materials, 
which have been released in increasing number in recent decades throughout and 
beyond Europe, offer an extensive and detailed picture of the situation in the field of 
healthcare decision-making of people living with dementia. The documents are all 
published and have been collected through a series of channels. The first type of 
channel consists of scientific databases such as Google Scholar, PubMed, PsychNet, 
and Heinonline. These sources have been selected in order to guarantee the inclusion 
of studies produced both in the fields of medicine or psychology and of social sciences. 
For the collection of promising practices I have also used repositories managed by 
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public authorities, NGOs, and research institutions, such as the portals of Alzheimer 
Europe105 and the European Foundations’ Initiative on Dementia (EFID),106  the 
practices database of the ZERO Project,107 the supported decision-making resource 
library of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU),108 and the reports released in 
the context of the EU ALCOVE project109 and by the Academic Network of European 
Disability Experts (ANED).110 This sample has been supplemented by excerpts from 
autobiographies of people living with dementia and other white and grey literature 
collected through snowballing from the material of the database search.  
In analysing this material I will mainly rely on classical content analysis, focusing 
on the facts, events, and behaviours narrated, although I will also take into account the 
language used as a possible indicator of attitudinal barriers such as stigma and 
prejudice or as a an element through which it is possible to identify the spirit and true 




This thesis starts from the barriers faced by people living with dementia in making 
decisions on medical treatment and by embracing an alternative view of the person 
living with this condition, echoed in Article 12 CRPD, proposes a framework which 
avoids or attenuates such difficulties. Then it turns to CoE, EU and single national 
initiatives to explore how such a model can be realised in practice. 
Chapter 2 begins by presenting an overview of the barriers preventing individuals 
living with dementia from exercising their legal capacity and their right to decide on 
medical treatment. It claims that, though the person’s impairment plays a role, 
difficulties arising in this context are often due to external barriers such as the prejudice 
of carers and medical or legal professionals as well as the way in which conversations 
on healthcare choices are normally conducted. It also draws attention to how 
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February 2017. 
107 <https://zeroproject.org/innovative-practices/> accessed 16 February 2016. 
108 <www.aclu.org/other/supported-decision-making-resource-library?redirect=supported-decision-
making-resource-library> accessed 16 February 2017. 
109 See <www.alcove-project.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9&Itemid=118> 
accessed 23 October 2016. 
110 < www.disability-europe.net/> accessed 6 November 2014. 
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legislation on capacity to consent is often not helpful as it demands that the person 
satisfies a utopian and discriminatory standard of mental capacity. The information 
supporting the chapter has been collected through document analysis of qualitative and 
quantitative studies, personal accounts of people living with dementia and their carers, 
and grey literature by NGOs and governmental bodies, and is complemented with 
reflections of scholars in the field. 
Chapter 3 analyses the main ideas of the social model of disability and 
vulnerability theory, clarifying their implications with regard to treatment decisions of 
people living with dementia. In particular, it shows how the combination of these two 
accounts provides a conceptual basis on which to ground an approach to healthcare 
decision-making where the person is not stigmatised, is recognised the right to decide 
for themselves, and is supported in expressing their will on care through adequate 
services provided by the state and by the action of their network of relationships. To 
do this, I refer to the texts of the main theorists of the two conceptions, setting their 
claims in relation to the case of treatment decisions of people living with dementia. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the CRPD and Article 12, identifying it as the legal channel 
through which such a model can be realised in normative terms. First, it aims to study 
how the Convention is underpinned by many of the values discussed in Chapter 3. 
Then, it analyses the normative content of Article 12, shedding light on its possible 
interpretations. In doing so it adopts a doctrinal methodology and refers to the opinions 
of legal experts and monitoring bodies as interpretive aids. It puts particular attention 
to General Comment No. 1 by the UN Committee on the Right of Persons with 
Disability.  
Chapter 5 explores how the powers, institutions, and initiatives of the Council of 
Europe can contribute to the promotion of the principles of the CRPD with regard to 
treatment decisions of people living with dementia. In particular, it looks at the 
potential of CoE policies, case law of the European Court of Human Rights, and the 
action of various monitoring bodies to promote the values of the Convention, help 
Member States translate them into specific regulations and practices, and create the 
necessary conditions for supported decision-making. To do this, the chapter relies on 
both the doctrinal analysis of CoE legal and policy documents and on the content 




Chapter 6 turns to EU institutions, powers, and law-policy making mechanisms, 
studying how they can also contribute to the realisation of the CRPD and Article 12 in 
relation to healthcare decisions of people living with dementia. It mainly focuses on 
policies in the competence areas of health and equality, the possible use of EU 
regulatory powers in this area, and the potential of EU funding programmes. It uses 
doctrinal analysis to shed light on the possible interpretation of legal and policy 
provisions and document analysis to gather information on field initiatives and their 
implications. 
Finally, Chapter 7 looks at initiatives and promising practices established in 
different European countries which can give an idea of how a CRPD-oriented approach 
to treatment decisions of people living with dementia could look like in reality. It 
concentrates on actions that aim to fight dementia-related prejudice, training 
programmes for professionals and carers, specific practices of support during care 
decisional processes, and mechanisms to avoid abuses and undue influence. To do this, 
it relies on document analysis of reports describing the specific initiatives and collected 
through scientific databases and repositories. 
The Conclusion chapter summarises the main messages of the thesis. In particular, 
it emphasises how an approach to treatment decisions based on a more inclusive vision 
of dementia, the centrality of the person, and supported decision-making permits to 
better promote the right to choose of individuals living with this condition. The initial 
positive effects of initiatives already undertaken at the UN, European, and national 
levels, show their potential for producing change in the field of healthcare decision-
making. However, I will suggest that many of the opportunities available in this 
context are still vastly unexploited. As a result, I try to propose future steps in terms 
of policies, practices, and research to further promote the right of individuals living 





People with Dementia and Treatment Decisions: 




Living with dementia can impact on an individual’s capacity to consent or refuse 
medical treatment.1 Indeed, as noted in Chapter 1, people living with this condition are 
often judged as not meeting mental capacity standards for valid treatment decisions. 
This chapter analyses the reasons why this happens and the specific barriers faced by 
individuals living with dementia in exercising their right to choose. Therefore, it makes 
a first step towards addressing the research question at the centre of this work, as it 
identifies the concrete problems to which the following chapters aim to propose a 
solution.  
The central claim of this part is that, though the person’s impairment plays a role, 
many of the obstacles arising in the area of treatment decisions derive from contextual 
factors such as prejudice, organisational problems, lack of training of carers or medical 
professionals, and the inadequacy of the current approach to legal capacity. 2 
Therefore, the focus is on the societal barriers hindering the capacity to consent of 
individuals living with dementia. In order to analyse these barriers, the chapter relies 
on personal accounts and empirical studies published in books, journals, newspapers 
or grey literature reporting the experiences and opinions of people living with 
dementia, their doctors and formal or informal carers, complemented with the analyses 
of scholars in the field.  
The exposition is structured as follows. Section 2 starts by examining how 
prejudice is often the first obstacle preventing people living with dementia from 
exercising their decisional power in healthcare matters. Indeed, because of this, their 
wishes on medical treatment tend to be automatically disregarded, and decisions are 
made on the basis of previous statements or by a surrogate who decides in their best 
                                                          
1 R Jacoby, ‘Ethical and Legal Issues in Dementia’ (2006) 2 The Foundation Years 15, 15. 
2 Such a position also emerges from Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Dementia: Ethical Issues (Nuffield 
2009), 79; NL Batsch and MS Mittelman (eds), World Alzheimer Report 2012. Overcoming the Stigma 
of Dementia (Alzheimer’s Disease International 2012), 24-31 and 37. 
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interests.3 However, people living with dementia are often able to express articulate 
opinions on their medical treatment,4 making it ethically and legally problematic not 
to listen to what they say. These concerns emerge particularly clearly in the scholarly 
debate on the traditional mechanisms of advance directives and decisions on best 
interests, which is analysed in Section 3. Here it is further shown how the significant 
theoretical and practical problems posed by the application of these legal instruments 
to the case of people living with dementia confirm the necessity of a decisive change 
of approach in this area. Section 4 investigates the practical issues faced by individuals 
living with this condition in developing and communicating their medical decisions 
and the challenges confronted by medical professionals, carers and relatives in 
understanding, interpreting and enacting the person’s wishes. Here I note how many 
of such difficulties arise or are aggravated by contextual factors such as the absence of 
support mechanisms and professionals’ lack of training.  Section 5 argues that most of 
the issues described in this chapter can be linked to the inadequacy of legal approaches 
to decision-making in dementia care and to the current concept of capacity to consent. 
Finally, the Conclusion further emphasises that, though the person’s impairment has 
an influence, many of the barriers faced by individuals living with dementia come from 
external factors such as prejudice, organisational problems, lack of preparation of 
medical professionals and carers, and the inadequateness of regulations on capacity to 
consent. In this regard, it is pointed out how in causing or fuelling these dynamics a 
determinant role is played by the vision of dementia and mental disability currently 





                                                          
3 See L Pickering Francis, ‘Decision-Making at the End of Life: Patients with Alzheimer’s or other 
Dementias’ (2001) 35 Georgia Law Review 539, 542; Nuffield Council of Bioethics, above, 79; ME De 
Boer, ‘Advance Directives in Dementia: issues of Validity and Effectiveness’ (2009) International 
Psychogeriatrics 1, 2-3. 
4 See for example J Gather and J Vollmann, ‘Physician-Assisted Suicide of Patients with Dementia. A 
Medical Ethical Analysis with a special focus on Patient Autonomy’ (2013) 36 International Journal 
of Law and Psychiatry 444, 446; T Mueller et al, ‘Assessing Capacity to Consent to Treatment with 
Cholinesterase Inhibitors in Dementia using a Specific and Standardized version of the MacArthur 
Competence Assessment Tool (MacCAT-T)’ (2017) 29 International Psychogeriatrics 333. 
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2. Dementia, prejudice and the label of incapacity  
 
The word dementia derives from the Latin dementia (adj demens), which literally 
means ‘without mind’.5 So, from the outset it emerges what, in common perception, is 
regarded as the main characteristic of this disease: the loss of self and mental ability.  
Swinton notes how various works in academic literature acknowledge that having 
dementia is often regarded as the same as ‘losing one’s mind’. 6  Moreover, Fox lists a 
series of terms used by doctors, researchers and journalists in order to refer to 
dementia, such as ‘mind robber’, ‘never ending funeral’ or ‘slow death of the mind’.7  
Cohen and Eisdorfer note how this condition may often be seen as causing a 
‘dissolution of the self’.8 Beard, Knauss and Moyer, observe that ‘the dominant story 
told about people living with dementia has historically been one where their talk is 
deemed meaningless, their memories defective, and their recollections are of little 
importance’.9 So general attitudes towards these individuals tend to be characterised 
by negative assumptions and preconceptions on their capacity to think and have 
meaningful interactions with the world around them.10  
This perception is also reflected in the field of healthcare decision-making. In this 
regard, prejudice is the first barrier hindering the right to choose of the person, as it 
leads to almost automatically ignore the individual’s statements, assuming they do not 
know what they are saying. 11 Indeed, doctors and carers still frequently equate a 
                                                          
5 See GJ Sterin, ‘Essay on a Word. A Lived Experience of Alzheimer’s Disease’ (2002) 1 Dementia 7.  
6 J Swinton, Dementia: Living in the Memories of God (Eerdmans Publishing Company 2012), 54. 
7 PJ Fox, ‘From Senility to Alzheimer's Disease: The rise of the Alzheimer's Disease Movement’ (1989) 
67 Milbank Quarterly 58, 58. As examples see also M Clark et al, ‘A Slow Death of the Mind’ 
Newsweek (New York 3rd December 1984) 56; W Froelich, ‘Family's Fate Turns on a Biological Roll 
of the Dice’, San Diego Union (San Diego 23rd June 1986); N Cutler, ‘Public Response: The National 
Politics of Alzheimer's Disease’ in M Gilhooly, S Zarit, and J Birren (ed), The Dementias: Policy and 
Management (Prentice Hall 1986), 161. 
8 D Cohen and C Eisdorfer, The Loss of Self: A Family Resource for Care of Alzheimer's disease and 
Related Disorders (Norton 1986). See also A Fontana and RW Smith, ‘Alzheimer’s Disease Victims: 
The “Unbecoming” of Self and the Normalization of Competence’ (1989) 32 Sociological Perspectives 
35. 
9 RL Beard, J Knauss and D Moyer, ‘Managing Disability and Enjoying Life: How we Reframe 
Dementia trough Personal Narratives’ (2009) 23 Journal of Aging Studies 227, 228. 
10 RM Tappen, ‘Persistence of Self in Advance  Alzheimer’s Disease’ (1999) 31 Image, the Journal of 
Nursing Scholarship 1, 1-2; L Snyder, ‘The Lived Experience of Alzheimer’s – Understanding the 
Feelings and Subjective Accounts of Persons with the Disease’ (2001) 2 Alzheimer’s Care Today 8, 9 
and 11; NL Batsch and MS Mittelman (eds), World Alzheimer Report 2012. Overcoming the Stigma of 
Dementia (Alzheimer’s Disease International 2012), 7-29. 
11 KA Lyman, ‘Bringing the Social Back: a critique of the Biomedicalization of Dementia’ (1989) 29 
The Gerontologist 597, 601. 
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diagnosis of dementia with incapacity to decide on care12 and it is not rare to find, in 
the literature, statements simplistically affirming that people living with this condition 
cannot participate in choices about their care. 13 Indeed, quantitative studies show how 
more than 50% of individuals with mild to moderate dementia tend to be judged as 
incapable to consent by their doctors.14 In fairness, a growing number of physicians 
are adopting a more nuanced and positive approach but they seem still far from the 
majority. 15   
This situation is criticised by organisations involved in dementia care. The Leeds 
Christian Council on Ageing states: 
We have noticed that it is too easily assumed by the decision makers in providing 
care (as well as generally) that people with dementia are incapable of making 
choices and taking decisions […] thereby ‘de-humanising’ them.16 
 
Derse reports cases in which a surgical operation had to be performed on 
individuals with early stage Alzheimer’s Disease and the surgeon avoided talking to 
the person, considering more appropriate to discuss the details of the procedure only 
with the relatives. 17 Indeed, as noted by Gillies, because of difficulties in 
comprehension and communication, the person with dementia tends to be assumed 
incompetent and unreliable.18 Also spouses and relatives often have prejudices against 
                                                          
12 L Pickering Francis, above, 542; F Muijc et al, ‘Mental Capacity Assessments among General 
Hospital Inpatients referred to a Specialist Liaison Psychiatry Service for Older People’ (2009) 21 
International Psychogeriatrics 729, 732.  
13 See for example EG DeRenzo, ‘Decisionally Impaired Persons in Research: Refining the Proposed 
Refinements’ (1997) 25 Journal of Law Medicine and Ethics 139; L Volicer, End-of-Life Care for 
People with Dementia in Residential Care Settings (Alzheimer’s Association 2005), 16; MR Gillick, 
‘Doing the Right Thing: A Geriatrician's Perspective on Medical Care for the Person with Advanced 
Dementia’ (2012) 40 Journal of Law Medicine & Ethics 51, 51. 
14 DC Marson et al, ‘Consistency of Physician Judgments of Capacity to Consent in Mild Alzheimer's 
Disease’ (1997) 45 Journal of the American Geriatric Society 453, 455-456; T Mueller et al, 
‘Comparison of Three Different Assessments of Capacity to Consent in Dementia Patients’ (2015) 28 
GeroPsych 21. Such results are mirrored in studies on consent to experimental treatments as shown by 
J Warner et al, ‘Participation in Dementia Research: Rates and Correlates of Capacity to give Informed 
Consent’ (2008) 34 Journal of Medical Ethics 167. 
15  See among others K Hirschman et al, ‘Do Alzheimer’s Disease Patients Want to Participate in 
Treatment Decision, and would their Caregivers Let Them?’ (2005) 45 The Gerontologist 381. 
16 Reported in Nuffield Council on Bioethics, above, 79; LM Miller, CJ Whitlatch and KS Lyons, 
‘Shared Decision-Making in Dementia: a review of Patient and Family Carer Involvement’ (2016) 15 
Dementia 1141, 1144–1146 and 1151-1153. 
17 A Derse, ‘Making Decisions about Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment in Patients with Dementia’ 
(1999) 20 Theoretical Medicine 55, 55-56 and 61-63.  
18 B Gillies, ‘The Experience of Living through Dementia’ (2001) 16 International Journal of Geriatric 
Psychiatry 111, 111. As shown by surveys like those by the English Care Quality Commission (CQC), 
there are hospitals and care structures in which staff is keen to listen to the person, but this does not 
happen everywhere. See CQC, Time to Listen. In NHS Hospitals. Dignity and Nutrition Inspection 
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their relatives living with dementia. In a study by Manthorpe, Samsi and Rapaport a 
nurse reports that ‘usually when we start having that conversation [carers] will say 
things like, “well [my mum] doesn’t know what she’s doing, she can’t make 
decisions”, even though this sort of scenario rather occurs only in the very late stages 
of the illness.19 Policy documents and reports by various European governments and 
NGOs affirm how, though there are signs of improvement, prejudice against people 
with dementia still largely characterises interactions between these individuals and 
professionals or lay persons.20 For example, according to the French Government Plan 
Maladies Degeneratives 2014-2019 ‘the impairment of the brain and its consequences 
on the motor and cognitive functions creates particularly negative images, distant from 
the reality of the people affected and their carers’.21  The Norwegian Dementia Plan 
2020 states that ‘social barriers can result in prejudice and needless isolation, and add 
to the impact of dementia’.22 Nonetheless, in various countries there are (few) cases of 
hospitals, care structures or health services in which there is, generally, a stronger 
openness to listen to the person without preconception, but also in such situations 
individuals living with dementia and care staff report difficulties in countering the 
scepticism and negative attitude of relatives or colleagues.23 
People living with dementia express frustration for such negative attitudes, 
confirming how they are really limit their possibility to make choices and shape their 
life. A person in the early stages of this condition, cited by Phillips, remarked: ‘the 
reality is that when diagnosed with Alzheimer’s, we are immediately discounted; our 
views are discredited because of the disease’.24 Taylor, in the memoir of his experience 
                                                          
Programme 2012 (CQC 2013), 14-18 and CQC, Time to Listen. In Nursing Homes. Dignity and 
Nutrition Inspection Programme 2012 (CQC 2013), 14-19. 
19 J Manthorpe, K Samsi and J Rapaport, ‘Dementia Nurses’ Experience of the Mental Capacity Act 
2005: a follow-up study’ (2014) 13 Dementia 131, 136. 
20 For a general overview see Batsch and Mittelman, above, 24-32.  
21 Ministére des Affaires Sociales, de la Santé et des Droits des Femmes, Plan Maladies Neuro-
Dégénératives 2014-2019 (Dicom 2014), 56 <www.cnsa.fr/documentation/plan_maladies 
_neuro_degeneratives2014.pdf> accessed 5 July 2018. 
22 Norwegian Ministry of Health and Social Care Services, Dementia Plan 2020 (Ministry of Health 
and Care Services 2015), 17 < 
https://www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/3bbec72c19a04af88fa78ffb02a203da/dementia_-
plan_2020_long.pdf> accessed 5 July 2018. 
23 See for example KL Smebye, M Kirkevold and K Engedal, ‘How do Persons with Dementia 
Participate in Decision Making related to Health and Daily care? A multi-case study’ (2012) 12 BMC 
Health Services Research 1, 8-10; O St-Amant et al, ‘Making Care Decisions in Home-Based Dementia 
Care: why context matters’ (2012) 31 Canadian Journal on Aging 423, 428-431; Manthorpe, Samsi and 
Rapaport, above, 136.  
24 Opinion of a person with Alzheimer Disease taken from JM Phillips, ‘A Personal View of Living 
with Early-Onset Alzheimer’s’ (2000) 6 Perspectives – A Newsletter for Individuals with Alzheimer’s 
Disease 1, 2.  
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with Alzheimer Disease laments that he is often not taken seriously: ‘my behaviour is 
treated as something apart from me. “It’s not him, it’s the disease”’.25 Davis, in his 
personal account, denounces the risks others’ attitudes pose for his autonomy: ‘I live 
with the imminent dread that one mistake in my daily life will mean another freedom 
will be taken from me’.26 In a study by Cowdell, a woman with dementia, complains 
that she is consistently ignored by doctors and nurses during her hospital stay:  
‘Don’t know what’s happening to me…do I stay here forever?...People never 
look and they never speak, the doctors and that they come in, there’s a reason 
for it but it’s not very satisfying’.27  
 
However, such prejudices do not seem to be experienced in the same way by all 
individuals living with dementia. Some authors maintain that the personal and social 
context in which a person living with dementia is embedded may impact on how they 
are perceived and perceive themselves.28 Research in this area is still limited, so it is 
not possible to formulate general conclusions with regard to the precise impact of 
various social structures on treatment choices of people with dementia. However, 
elements emerging within the literature allow some tentative considerations.  
The first variable cited by researchers is age.29 As already noted in Chapter 1, the 
vast majority of individuals living with dementia are above 65.30 These people might 
be subject not only to the stigma related to their condition but also to ageist attitudes 
according to which an older person is to be seen as less worthy of consideration or less 
capable than others. 31 This might increase the risk that older individuals living with 
dementia are ignored in their opinions on treatment.  
                                                          
25 R Taylor, Alzheimer’s form the Inside Out (Health Professions 2007), 150-151. 
26 R Davis, My Journey into Alzheimer’s Disease (Tyndale House 1989), 91. 
27 F Cowdell, ‘The Care of Older People with Dementia in Acute Hospitals’ (Alzheimer Society 2007), 
10 < https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/f2a7/f8e1ff4f0e8d012a6f79c87c203cc9c02c56.pdf> accessed 24 
April 2018. 
28 See among others Snyder, above; D O’Connor, B Purves and M Down, ‘Decision Making and 
Dementia: toward a Social Model of Understanding’ in D O’Connor and B Purves (eds), Decision 
Making, Personhood and Dementia. Exploring the interface (Jessica Kinsley 2009); D O’Connor, A 
Phinney and W Hulko, ‘Dementia at the Intersections: A unique case study exploring Social Location’ 
(2010) 24 Journal of Aging Studies 30. 
29 R Cheston, ‘Stories and Metaphors: Talking about the Past in a Psychotherapy group for People with 
Dementia’, (1996) 16 Ageing and Society 579, 595; Snyder, above, 101. 
30 See above Chapter 1. 
31School of Nursing and Midwifery Trinity College Dublin, ‘Perceptions of Stigma in Dementia: An 
Exploratory Study’ (Alzheimer Society of Ireland 2006) 23-27; S Chester Evans, ‘Ageism and 




In relation to gender, Bamford maintains that women living with dementia could 
be more subject to exclusion than men as, on top of age and dementia stigma, they 
have also to cope with the effects of gender discrimination, suffering a ‘triple 
jeopardy’.32 In their survey Mielke, Vemuri and Rocca show that many older women 
have still lower education and socialisation levels than men because of the gender role 
in which they used to be constricted in the past. 33  This could make them less well 
equipped to make sense and cope with dementia and to oppose biased behaviours.34 
Moreover, some maintain that women can be more inclined to hide their condition. 
For example Borley, Sixsmith, and Church report the experience of an older woman 
living with dementia expressing denial and struggling to accept to have passed from 
being the carer of the family, role traditionally given to women,35 to someone who is 
cared for.36 Also with regard to decisions on medical treatment, all these dynamics can 
make the person less resilient to stigmatizing behaviours and so more prone to hold 
back their opinions or to accept that others take control of the situation. However, men 
living with dementia may also feel under pressure to hide their problems and not accept 
help, even in decision-making, sticking to an idea of masculinity that demands strength 
in the face of adversities.37  
In a study involving eight older people with dementia of different social 
background and nationality, Hulko suggests that in families from the working class 
there could be a less negative view of dementia and the person could be less subject to 
disempowering prejudice with regard to care decisions.38 This would happen both 
because the sense of social blame and conventions is less strong in such contexts and 
because here people face more difficulties in coping with practical issues, having less 
time to think about the existential implications of their condition.39 However, on the 
                                                          
32 SM Bamford, Women and Dementia - Not forgotten (ILCUK 2011), 4 and 27 in 
<http://www.ilcuk.org.uk/files/pdf_pdf_191.pdf> accessed 10th June 2016. 
33 MM Mielke, P Vemuri P and WA Rocca, ‘Clinical Epidemiology of Alzheimer’s Disease: Assessing 
Sex and Gender Differences’ (2014) 6 Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 37, 38-41. 
34 Ibid, 42. 
35 On this aspect see R Erol, D Brooker and E Peel, Women and Dementia. A global research review 
(Alzheimer’ Disease International 2015), 23-33. 
36 G Borley, J Sixsmith and S Church, ‘How does a Woman with Alzheimer’s Disease make sense of 
becoming Cared for?’ (2014) 15 Dementia 1405. 
37 See for example the personal account reported in S Wiedersehn, ‘Dementia challenges Idea of 
Masculinity’ The Guardian (Australia) (Sydney 15 Jun 2018) < 
www.theguardian.com.au/story/5471135/dementia-challenges-idea-of-masculinity/?cs=12> accessed 5 
July 2018. 
38 W Hulko, ‘From “Not a Big Deal” to “Hellish”: Experiences of Older People with Dementia’ (2009) 
23 Journal of Aging Studies 132, 135-139. 
39 Ibid, 139-142. 
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other hand, people with low income might receive healthcare of lower quality, in 
which overburdened and poorly trained staff may ignore their wishes just because they 
do not have time to stop and listen or because there are unable to effectively 
communicate with the person.40 Moreover, the cultural environment in which the 
person with dementia lives plays a role in their social consideration and the prejudice 
they face.41 In this regard, an empirical study by Hulko et al, on the self-perception of 
indigenous people living with dementia in Canada, shows how the approach of this 
community is more focused on understanding the positive animistic and metaphysical 
value of dementia, rather than on the problems relating to this condition. 42 Also, 
because of their stronger sense of community, these people may react to these illness 
experiences by putting the person even more at the centre of attention giving to them 
a surplus of support and dialogue space.43 As already pointed out, more research is 
needed to shed light on the exact impact of these factors, and a thorough analysis of 
these complex dynamics goes beyond the scope of this work. What it is important here 
is to remark that the label of incapacity is not attached to everyone in the same way 
and it does not only depend on the cognitive abilities of the person, but also on a series 
of social structures in which the life of the individual with dementia is embedded. 
One of the social structures which may contribute to create a negative prejudice 
towards people living with dementia and hence be a barrier to their ability to make 
treatment choices is the law. The fact that legal capacity legislation provides that if a 
person is not ‘autonomous’ or ‘mentally capable’, they can be deprived of the power 
to choose, puts people with dementia at risk of being ignored when they try to express 
their views. Indeed, it encourages people to think that it is acceptable and even right 
to consider meaningless the wishes of people showing difficulties in expressing 
themselves. Moreover, Harding, in her analysis of decisions by English courts on cases 
regarding people living with dementia, shows how judges tend to embrace a rather 
stigmatising attitude.44  Indeed, their judgements often contain phrases such as ‘[the 
                                                          
40 Department of Health, ‘Dementia. A state of the Nation report on Dementia Care and Support in 
England’ (Department of Health 2013) <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system 
/uploads/attachment_data/file/262139/Dementia.pdf> accessed 12 June 2016. 
41 JN Henderson, ‘The Experience and Interpretation of Dementia: Cross-Cultural Perspectives’ (2002) 
17 Journal of Cross Cultural Gerontology 195.  
42 W Hulko et al, ‘Views of First Nation Elders on Memory Loss and Memory Care in Later Life’ (2010) 
25 Journal of Cross Cultural Gerontology 317. 
43 Ibid. 
44 R Harding, ‘Legal Constructions of Dementia: Discourse of Autonomy at the Margins of Capacity’ 
(2012) 34 Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 425, 437-440. 
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person’s] present beliefs are not based in reality’45 or ‘many of her actions are not 
volitional’,46 without showing any efforts to understand what the person wants to say, 
maybe in ‘uncommon ways’.47 Because of this sometimes biased tendency of judges 
also people with mild dementia may end up being declared incapable to make 
healthcare choices. At that point the person is deprived of their power to directly decide 
on treatment, while choices will be made for them on the basis of previous statements 
(advance directives) or of  their ‘best interests’ or ‘hypothetical will’ by a surrogate,48 
as it is explained in Section 3.  
However, medical practitioners, scholars and people that have been close to 
individuals living with dementia affirm that they are often able to understand the 
substance of proposed medical treatments and to develop opinions on their therapy.49 
First of all, it has to be remembered that dementia is a progressive disease, which in 
the initial phases leaves intact many cognitive abilities and has a different impact from 
case to case. 50 Therefore, generalisations equating dementia with incapacity to decide 
appear without rational and scientific grounding. In effect, empirical studies in which 
researchers directly assess the capacity to consent of people with mild to moderate 
dementia judge these individuals as able to understand treatment information and 
communicate their choice in more than half of cases, contradicting the data relating to 
doctors’ perceptions on the matter.51 However, some scholars argue that even people 
with more advanced dementia often express articulate opinions on medical issues 
regarding them.52 Post and Whitehouse note how even at this stage the person shows 
moments of lucidity in which they can relatively easily make decisions on care.53  
                                                          
45 Dorset County Council v EH, (2009) EWHC 784 (Fam) par 101.   
46 Dorset County Council v EH, above, par 128. 
47 Harding, ‘Legal Constructions’, above, 437. 
48 De Boer, ‘Advance Directives’, above, 2-3; J Herring, ‘Best Interests and Dementia’ and WC 
Schmidt, ‘Proxy Decision-making: a Legal Perspective’ both in C Foster, J Herring and I Doron (eds), 
The Law and Ethics of Dementia (Hart 2014). 
49 L Barth, ‘Chronologie eines rechts- und verfahrensförmigen Sterbeprozesses’ (2008) Zeitschrift zum 
Altenpflegerecht 1; Gather and Vollmann, ‘Physician-Assisted’, above, 446; C Emmett et al, 
‘Homeward Bound or Bound for a Home? Assessing the Capacity of Dementia Patients to Make 
Decisions about Hospital Discharge: Comparing Practice with Legal Standards’ (2013) 36 International 
Journal of Law and Psychiatry 73. See also SM Behuniak, ‘Toward a Political model of Dementia: 
Power as Compassionate Care’ (2010) 24 Journal of Aging Studies 231.  
50 On this point P Bielby, Competence and Vulnerability in Biomedical Research (Springer 2008), 158-
159. 
51 J Warner et al, ‘Participation in Dementia Research: Rates and Correlates of Capacity to Give 
Informed Consent’ (2008) 34 Journal of Medical Ethics 160; Mueller et al, above. 
52 Barth, above, 1; Gather and Vollmann, ‘Physician-Assisted’, above, 446; Behuniak, above, 231.  
53 SG Post and PJ Whitehouse, ‘Fairhill Guidelines on Ethics of the Care of People with Alzheimer’s 
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Therefore, in a statement reported by Livingston et al, the wife of a man living 
with dementia expressed relief that she had followed the actual indications of her 
husband with regard to a heart operation:  
 
“We weren’t in agreement with each other…whether to have a heart 
operation…With hindsight…it was the right decision…he decided…it made his 
mental abilities much worse, but physically, he’s much better”54 
 
In a German legal case, a woman living with severe dementia, though not 
remembering the technicalities of the procedure, showed a firm will of refusing 
artificial nutrition as she was asked her opinion several times in five years and every 
time confirmed, referring to her inability to hear and to see “I want to die. This is not 
life anymore”.55 Also, in an interview reported by Sabat a woman with moderate 
Alzheimer’s Disease showed a well argued opinion on how her care needed to be 
managed: 
 
‘Interviewer: It didn’t give you the feeling that going back and doing some kind 
of speech therapy would be helpful to you? 
Dr. M: No […] It’s gotten, I know what my trouble is. And I think that what I 
would like it uh, only if there’s something that is, uh, a time, a uh, a time and 
with a person who there is a real (gestures back and forth with hands). 
Interviewer: Back and forth – a relationship. 
Dr. M: Um hum. 
Interviewer: Let me back up for a second because I think I’m missing your point. 
You don’t want your life to be . . . 
Dr. M: Going always to see people to see what’s wrong with me.’ 56 
   
A number of nurses, doctors and relatives confessed how they would feel 
uncomfortable in disregarding such expressions of will of the person with dementia.57 
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Indeed, dismissing such statements as the utterances of an incapable individual, relying 
instead on previous declarations or the decisions of relative and guardians seems unjust 
and oppressive of the person’s right to decide on medical treatment. Yet, this is what 
happens regularly in healthcare and legal practice, in which the opinions of the person 
living with dementia are set aside and decisions are made on the basis of their advance 
directives, best interests or presumed will. As However, the use of such tools in the 
case of individuals living with this condition results legally, ethically and practically 
problematic. In this regard, they have been at the centre of a vibrant debate in which 
scholars have pointed out the difficulty of justifying a system leading to disregard 
statements which, though formulated by a person living with dementia, seem relatively 
well articulated and representative of their will. In the next chapter I analyse more 
closely such a debate, showing how it makes further clear the necessity of changing 
the current approach based on a distorted vision of the person living with dementia. 
.   
3. Advance Directives and Surrogate Decision-Making 
 
Advance directives are traditionally defined as legal declarations containing 
instructions about care and medical treatment (in terms of both consent and refusal) 
set up by a person when they have capacity to consent for the time in which they will 
be incapable.58 These anticipated intentions can be conveyed through various means 
of advance care planning. They can be oral statements complying with specific 
requirements of legal validity, signed written documents with different levels of 
formality (living wills), or they may assume the form of conditions and attributions of 
powers and tasks within a lasting power of attorney (LPA) or directed at a proxy or 
judicially appointed guardian or deputy.59 Depending on the jurisdiction, one or more 
of these advance care planning tools may be available to a person.60 Because of the 
way in which they enter into force they are typically used for establishing the care 
wishes of a person in case they develop a degenerative condition like dementia. 
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However, the debate among legal scholars and philosophers originated in the 1990s, 
starting from a series of clinical cases, has posed doubts on their effectiveness in this 
context.  
In 1991, Andrew Firlick, then a medical student, published a short one page piece 
in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), reporting his experience 
with a patient whom he calls Margo. He writes: 
 
‘I met Margo last summer during a gerontology elective after my first year in 
medical school. Margo has Alzheimer’s disease. Like her body, her mind is 
shrinking […] Margo enjoys reading, especially mysteries, she says, though I’ve 
noticed that her place in the book jumps randomly from day to day […]. Maybe 
she feels good just sitting and humming to herself, rocking back and forth slowly, 
nodding off liberally, occasionally turning to a fresh page […]. Margo confused 
me […]. Despite her illness, or maybe somehow because of it, Margo is 
undeniably one of the happiest people I have known. There is something graceful 
about the degeneration her mind is undergoing, leaving her carefree, always 
cheerful. […] How does Margo maintain her sense of self?’61 
 
This excerpt caught the attention of philosopher Ronald Dworkin, who in his book 
Life’s Dominion, poses the following question; let suppose that Margo, before 
developing dementia, had issued an advance directive asking to avoid curing her in 
case she gets this condition: what has to be done by doctors, relatives and carers? 62 
Do they have to follow the advance directive, risking to cause the death of someone 
who seems perfectly happy to continue to live? Or do they have to keep treating Margo, 
ignoring her advance directive? Does an individual’s right to autonomy include the 
power to dictate that a certain medical treatment be not performed on them even though 
once they have dementia they plead for it?63  
Such questions apply not only to the case in which the person has signed an 
advance directive, but also when there is no anticipated statement. They involve the 
wider problem of whether the opinions of people living with dementia have validity 
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and must be followed or whether other means should be used to make the decision 
including not only advance directives, but also the transfer of decisional power to a 
surrogate who decides in the person’s best interest. 
The trenchant solution proposed by Dworkin starts from the liberal ‘integrity 
view’ and is in line with the traditional model of advance directives, underpinning 
many national legislations, as a declarations which substitute the person when they 
have been declared incapable to consent.64 He affirms that recognising the autonomy 
of people with advance stage dementia does not make any sense, as they are not 
capable of appropriately deciding on their care.65 Indeed, such a recognition would be 
justified only to the extent that it allows the individual to express an overall vision of 
their life. However, though they may have an opinion on single choices or on what 
gives to them immediate pleasure (experiential interests), people with dementia would 
lack the ability to cultivate the critical interests necessary to coherently plan their lives 
according to what they consider right and valuable.66 Therefore, their current will has 
to be disregarded and instead the wishes should be enforced that they expressed before 
developing their condition.67 
Such a position has been widely criticised. Dresser notes how Dworkin fails to 
consider that even many individuals without a cognitive impairment live their life day 
by day, without following a coherent plan. 68 She asserts that a lot of people do not 
have a clear idea on how their care should be managed when they become ill and they 
change plans all the time.69 Moreover, the subjective experience of dementia is often 
more positive than it may seem from the outside and the person’s quality of life tends 
to depend more on the environment around them than on their cognitive impairment.70 
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Jaworska, starting from the concept of autonomy as ability to value, claims that 
people living with dementia often have the capacity to make choices on their care.71 
Indeed, even though they may not be able to form an overall vision of their life, they 
still cultivate stable critical interests that go beyond the pursuit of their immediate 
pleasure.72 As shown by real life cases, they are able to feel concerned about being a 
burden to their relatives or about the existential experience of their condition, and some 
of them decide to volunteer as research participants because they want to contribute to 
improve others’ lives: all behaviours showing a commitment to values such as love for 
the family or community wellbeing.73 They can also have strong feelings about their 
right to live independently, though they may need others’ assistance in order to 
understand how to concretely realise this.74 The traditional approach to advance 
directives constitutes a barrier to the expression of such concerns and feelings as it 
demands to ignore them in order to follow what indicated in the anticipated 
declaration.  
As noted by Donnelly, this approach is also flawed from a more technical point of 
view as it assumes that anticipated and contemporaneous decisions can be treated in 
the same way.75 However, as argued by Buchanan, they are different in at least three 
important aspects. First, when expressing an anticipated will the person cannot be 
aware of future progresses in medicine or more effective treatments that may be 
available at the moment in which the decision will have to be enforced. Second, it is 
at least debatable that a healthy person, is really able to grasp how it would feel living 
with a chronic condition. Third, in making an advance decision the person may not 
have the possibility of consulting widely with others and seek advice.76  
For this reason, a number of commentators argue that while it is justifiable to 
promote the contemporaneous autonomy of a person, there is no real theoretical 
justification for giving precedence to the past wishes of a person living with dementia 
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over their present will.77 Indeed, such individuals cannot be considered as the same 
person they used to be because many of the links between them and their past self have 
gone. However, even if claiming that the person living with dementia remains the same 
person in their embodied and social dimension, equally valued and worthy of respect 
by the people surrounding them throughout the course of their life, one has to admit 
that they have distinctive opinions and interests that need to be respected even though 
they appear different than those they used to have before. 78  Therefore, in light of the 
considerations reported above, the barriers which the traditional approach to advance 
directives poses to the person ability to express their wishes seem not justifiable and 
appear even more worthy of being removed.   
This appears even truer in light of the significant practical limitations and 
challenges posed by advance directives and identified by researchers and practitioners 
within and outside the field of dementia care. Indeed, as noted by Fagerlin and 
Schneider, people normally release such declarations much before they even develop 
the condition mentioned in them, having just a superficial understanding of it, derived 
from impressions and non-verified assumptions.79 At this stage it is also difficult to 
foresee which treatments and practices may be needed at the moment the person 
develops a certain condition.80 Therefore, it may be very difficult to provide 
sufficiently adequate instructions on the treatments the individual wishes to refuse or 
accept, leaving often significant doubts to doctors, proxies or relatives on whether a 
specific directive is really applicable to the concrete case or whether the person would 
have asked for different things had they signed the declaration in a different moment.81 
This dynamic is aggravated by the fact that such documents are written by the person 
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in isolation, which means not only that the individual often does not have the 
opportunity of adequately gather information, being challenged on their false 
convictions or discussing choices, but also that people around them are not fully aware 
of his or her opinions and views on care, being unable to interpret or reconstruct their 
will when the moment comes.82 Finally, with specific regard to dementia, it may be 
difficult to establish when the advance directive enters into force. Indeed, in the 
individual living with dementia, mental abilities do not disappear all of a sudden, but 
they rather fade away gradually, making difficult to establish at what point the person 
becomes incapable.83 For all these reasons, advance directives, rather than promoting 
the will of the person, appear as a barrier to its correct interpretation. Indeed, they 
provide a legal mechanism that, because of the distance between anticipated 
declaration and moment of the choice, and because of the difficulties in recording a 
person’s specific wishes, risks to create more doubts than it would solve. 
Similar issues emerge when an advance directive is not available and the will of 
the person needs to be reconstructed by a surrogate. With regard to European legal 
systems two main paradigms of surrogate decision making exist: best interests and 
reconstruction of will and preferences or presumed will (also known as substituted 
judgement). The former is generally described as an ‘objective’ standard as it looks at 
what would be ‘objectively better’ for the person in light of supposedly factual 
considerations.84 As noted by Miola, such considerations also keep an eye on 
subjective elements and possible desires of the person,85 but such evaluations are 
analysed and may be set aside in light of what is thought to be the ‘welfare’ of the 
person. The presumed will mechanism requires the identification of how the person, if 
capable, would have made the decision, trying to infer their hypothetical wishes from 
elements such as previous statements of the person, their values, their personality, 
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habits or previous similar choices.86 Depending on the jurisdiction one or the other 
paradigm may be adopted, or even there could be combined models which, for 
example, require the surrogate to decide in the person’s best interest but ‘taking into 
account’ the person’s previous wishes.87 Anyway, all these models present significant 
challenges in relation to dementia and treatment decisions. 
Indeed, in relation to best interests, especially in choices so intimate such as those 
on care it could be difficult to establish what is ‘good for a person’ in absolute terms.88 
In this regard contrasting views can be presented by doctors, relatives or other people 
around the individual.89 Moreover, the concept of ‘best interest’ of the individual living 
with dementia seems to presuppose that someone knows better than the person what 
has to be done and can impose it on them from the outside. For this reason, the best 
interest model appears rather paternalistic and constitutes a strong barrier to the 
consideration of the genuine wishes of the person. 90 Indeed, it leaves much room for 
the person’s desires to be disregarded in favour of other evaluations pertaining to the 
individual’s ‘objective wellbeing’. In this sense, substituted judgement seems more 
respectful of the person’s autonomy as it relies on their statements and behaviours. 
However, reconstructing the will of the person might be far from easy, for example 
because of the cognitive fluctuations and changes of opinion, which may leave 
contradictory signs of what their real wishes are.91 Moreover, as noted by Fagerlin and 
Schneider relatives and friends of the person have often a very poor knowledge of their 
intimate care intentions: this can be a significant obstacle to a correct reconstruction 
of such intentions. 92  Therefore, also in this field there is the need of a model which, 
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giving primacy to the person wishes would make their interpretation and 
reconstruction easier. In chapter 4, I will show how such a model may be seen to 
emerge in Article 12 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and in 
Chapter 7 I will look at promising practices which go towards the concrete realisation 
of such a more practical approach. 
 
4. Challenges in communication and the decisional process  
  
Previous sections have shown how the view of people living with dementia as 
inevitably incapable individuals who have to be substituted in treatment choices is in 
many cases not in line with reality and creates barriers hindering the person’s right to 
decide. However, even if one accepts that these people are able to form an opinion on 
medical treatment, it is also evident how there are a number of practical obstacles 
impacting on their possibility of exercising their power to choose. Indeed, even 
convinced supporters of these individuals’ right to decide on medical treatment admit 
that making sure they grasp the implications of their choices and that these are 
correctly understood can be often difficult.93 Such difficulties are analysed in this 
section, which points out that, though the impairment of the person plays a role in 
creating them, what really produces such barriers is that professionals, carers and the 
current approach to healthcare choices are not adequately responsive to the needs of 
people living with dementia.  
The first and most frequent barrier relates to the lack of tools to manage the 
individual’s impairment of memory. Because of memory loss, the person living with 
dementia may not remember crucial elements relating to a proposed treatment.94 These 
gaps may appear quite extensive already in individuals living with moderate dementia, 
so that they do not seem to recall, for example, what does a certain medication treat, 
what the collateral effects of a certain procedure are, or how it will be performed.95 
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People living with this condition can also seem not up to date about the current state 
of medicine, which could make it difficult for them to understand even simple 
information on medications.  
Equally, the person may not remember facts of general life which can play a role 
in medical decisions. 96 Therefore, for example, they may refuse relocation in a nursing 
home or accept an invasive treatment assuming that they will be assisted in the 
recovery by their partner, who in reality has passed away. A similar effect may have, 
in dementia with Lewy-bodies, hallucinations.97 Indeed, such hallucinations are often 
well formed, featuring people, children or animals, and being accompanied by related 
phenomena like passage hallucinations or sense of presence depicting in the person’s 
mind a parallel reality which conditions their choices.98 
At times, due to the gaps in short-term memory and executive functioning, people 
living with dementia may not realise that they need care or treatment.99 Indeed, they 
can be unaware of their memory problems, impacting on their ability to make 
conscious decisions on medications such as cholinesterase inhibitors.100 In other cases, 
involving individuals who had received an explicit dementia diagnosis, the 
consciousness of memory problems may have the effect of weakening the person’s 
self-confidence, making them unsure on their opinions on treatment.101 Moreover, 
these individuals may have a scarce drive towards dealing with questions relating to 
their healthcare as they try to focus more on the present and on the positive aspects of 
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their lives.102 Indeed ignoring one’s condition and a potentially difficult future is a 
widespread coping mechanism adopted by people living with dementia.103  
However, these appear as the sort of problems that could be avoided or greatly 
mitigated by reminding the person of things they may not recall or by explaining 
treatment information in simpler terms or by rectifying misunderstandings. 104 
Unfortunately, according to empirical studies on capacity assessments in clinical 
settings, medical and legal professionals tend to assume that they have to limit to what 
they see at first sight, without asking themselves what would happen if the person were 
helped in understanding and reasoning on the implications of the proposed 
medication.105 Therefore, also memory gaps or misunderstandings which could be 
accommodated with a little bit more of explanation become elements leading to the 
deprivation of the person’s power to decide, and this just because care staff is not 
providing appropriate help, erecting a barrier to the full expression of the person’s will. 
In this regard, also the majority of national legislations on the matter do not require 
to actively help the person before declaring someone incapable.106 Even those, like the 
English Mental Capacity Act 2005, who contain such norms (section 3) are often not 
faithfully applied.107  In addition, in the last decades in many European countries legal 
capacity reforms have been enacted based on the principle that the person needs to be 
helped in making decisions rather than substituted.108 However, many of them still 
allow the possibility that choices can be made for the person when support is not 
sufficient or when this is in line with their best interests. These approaches leave the 
door open to substitution even when the person would simply need support or an 
arrangement more in line with their needs. 
                                                          
102 K Bronner et al, ‘Which Medical and Social Decision topics are important after Early Diagnosis of 
Alzheimer’s Disease from the perspective of People with Alzheimer’s Disease, Spouses and 
Professionals?’ (2016) 9 BMC Research Notes 1. 
103 On this see M De Boer et al, ‘Suffering from Dementia – the Patient’s Perspective: a review of the 
literature’ (2007) 19 International Psychogeriatrics 1021, 1030-1031.  
104 JE Soukup, Alzheimer’s Disease. A Guide to Diagnosis, Treatment, and Management (Praeger 
1996), 110-112 e 153-155; M. Giampieri, ‘Communication and informed consent in elderly people’ 
(2012) 78 Minerva anestesiologica 236, 237-238.  
105 Marson, ‘Consistency’, above; Mueller et al, above. 
106 See for example Article 2 of the Italian Civil Code or the Spanish Ley 41/2002. For a summary of 
European legislations on legal capacity and capacity to consent to medical treatment see < 
http://www.alzheimer-europe.org/Policy-in-Practice2/Country-comparisons/2016-Decision-making-
and-legal-capacity-in-dementia> accessed 24 April 2018. 
107 House of Lords, above, 32.  
108 For an overview of these legislations see <www.international-guardianship.com/guardianship.htm> 
accessed 26 July 2018. 
50 
 
Indeed, in reality, the effectiveness of the disclosure is often jeopardised by the 
fact that it happens in noisy environments as hospital wards often are, or while parallel 
conversations are taking place in the same room, a situation which makes it difficult 
for a person with dementia to take up information.109  Moreover, Cowdell reports how 
care staff often tend to ‘bombard’ their patients with information without giving them 
the time to process it and using in some cases quite dismissive and even aggressive 
manners.110In this regard, apart from difficulties relating to the management of 
memory gaps, another significant barrier to the right of people living with dementia to 
decide on medical treatment comes from the way in which doctors and carers 
communicate with them.  
Issues in communication are identified as a problem in the vast majority of cases 
reported in empirical studies on decision-making in dementia care, independently from 
the geographical area or the care setting.111 This problem is strongly felt by people 
living with dementia, as it is evident from the statement of a man with this condition, 
reported by Hulko: 
 
‘Well, having um a difficulty coming out with the right words for example or 
phrases or um having difficulty with uh numbers and um dates, times, um having 
difficulty coming up with um, difficulty um, coming up with just a common 
expression uh, or um even words that are very frequently used by anyone without 
the disease and um having difficulty coming up with just ordinary 
expressions’.112 
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A woman with early stage Alzheimer’s notes: ‘I lose one word and then I can’t 
come up with the rest of the sentence’.113 Another man says: ‘for a while I search for 
a word and I can see it walking away from me. It gets littler and littler. It always comes 
back, but at the wrong time’.114 Because of such issues doctors, carers or relatives may 
have difficulties in understanding what the person wants in terms of medical 
treatment.115 Moreover, the conversation about a certain treatment choice may be made 
difficult by the person’s deficit of attention, which leads them to lose the flow of the 
conversation even when minor distractions occur.116  
Another element which may create issues in understanding the person’s will is 
related to their tendency to change idea and apparently contradict themselves. Indeed, 
individuals living with dementia may often not be able to recall their previously 
expressed wishes or the reasoning and rationale beyond them.117 Holm notes how their 
desires can be quite instable, so if their attention is diverted even for a short period of 
time, they may forget needs that they once thought very important.118 Moreover, 
because of the fluctuations in their cognitive abilities they may appear completely 
unable to participate in the moment in which a consultation is planned, while being 
perfectly lucid the day after.119 These dynamics may create considerable uncertainties 
in the interpretation of the person’s will, so that the people around them may 
misunderstand their wishes or may renounce to even start a conversation with the 
person, assuming that understanding their statements will be in any case too difficult. 
In addition, such dynamics may push medical professionals towards choices 
conditioned by the fear of being accused of performing treatments legitimised by 
unclear declarations, rather than on the willingness to enact the person’s own choice.120  
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However, also in this case the problems reported above seem to arise or be 
substantially aggravated because of contextual factors such as excess of background 
noise or a communication pace which does not leave time to the person to process the 
information received.121 In this regard, the source of many misunderstandings and 
ignoring behaviour against people living with dementia seems to be poor training of 
carers and doctors. Harding reports a series of statements by informal carers showing 
how staff of care structures often lack an adequate knowledge of dementia or how they 
do not take into account the needs of the person.122 In her empirical study, an informal 
carer of a woman with dementia complains: ‘in her first admission nursing staff 
seemed not to understand anything at all about dementia’.123 Another who was caring 
for a man with the same condition lamented ‘during his stay in hospital I visited my 
dad twice a day, this was because they did not understand his needs’.124 In this regard, 
specific and robust training on social aspects of dementia and on communication with 
individuals living with cognitive impairments tends still to be generally absent or too 
limited throughout Europe.125 Moreover, here too legal capacity legislations do not 
offer any help. Indeed, there is no specific norm imposing that conversations on 
treatment decisions are carried on by professionals specifically trained on how to 
interact with an individual living with a certain condition.  
Poor interactions and poor communication with the person living with dementia 
may increase the frailty of the individual and the risk of them been exposed to harmful 
and abusive behaviours on behalf of people around them. Indeed, already because of 
their cognitive difficulties they can feel unsure of themselves and hence be more prone 
to go along with the opinions of others, even if they do not agree with them.126 The 
fact that the person is ignored, or that their doctors, nurses or carers appear to not 
understand or to not be willing to understand the person can aggravate such dynamics. 
In addition, the absence of mechanisms and figures who can assist the person in 
appropriately clarifying their statements leaves the door open to the manipulation of 
their sometimes vague declarations. For these reasons undue influence is also a strong 
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and significant barrier to the expression of the genuine will of the person living with 
dementia with regard to medical treatment. Such a dynamic is reported as recurring 
frequently in various areas of legal decision-making, including will making or 
management of the person’s finance, 127  and episodes of attempts to put pressure on 
the person in relation to healthcare choices and to orient their choice process are also 
documented in empirical studies and reports from various European countries.128 For 
this reason, individuals living with dementia are defined as particularly at risk of undue 
pressure and abuse.129   
To such forms of abuses legislations tend to respond by providing ‘external’ 
safeguards which consist in the annulment of declarations which are the product of 
external pressure, mechanisms for reporting suspicious behaviours and inhibiting the 
contact with the person130 or criminal sanctions in serious cases.131 However, in order 
to be activated such safeguards require often articulate procedures and may be put in 
place after the undue influence has taken place and some unwanted treatments have 
already been administered. Moreover, decisions on medical treatment are often made 
behind closed doors, so that abusive behaviours may often go undetected and 
unreported. Indeed, often dynamics of undue influence unfold within the circle of 
family members or of the healthcare team of the person without the presence of an 
impartial figure which can monitor the movements around the individual living with 
dementia.132 In this regard, empirical studies in various sectors of decision-making 
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show how formal and informal carers may not be willing to act as whistle blowers 
when they witness suspicious behaviour so that they may often go unreported.133 
Therefore, at the moment, the legal safeguard traditionally put in place in European 
legislations do not seem to be able to systematically prevent that the right to choose 
on medical treatment of the person living with dementia be curtailed by external 
pressures. 
However, lack of appropriate legal provisions and lack of training and willingness 
of carers and professionals are not the only reasons why people living with dementia 
are confronted with the barriers described above. Many of the dynamics reported so 
far are actually due to resources and institutional constraints that carers and health 
professionals often face. Therefore, doctors, nurses and carers often may not have time 
to stop and talk with the person, or conversations may happen in inadequate settings 
because no better place is available.134 Equally, abuses or lack of reporting of undue 
influence may be due to the overloading of carers and professionals, the lack of time 
and energy to put attention also to episodes of undue pressure or the fear of 
consequences with regard to the relations with their clients’ families or with their 
employees.135 Therefore, even legislative guidelines requiring to take into 
consideration the environment in which discussions happen or the way in which 
information on treatment is explained where everywhere in place it would be still 
difficult to put them in practice because of institutional and resource constraints.  
 
5. Dementia and the legal approach to capacity: shortcomings  
 
All the barriers and issues reported above seem to be at least co-caused or 
aggravated by the way in which the law deals with healthcare decision-making of 
individuals living with dementia. As noted by Donnelly, the current legal approach to 
dementia appears quite narrow as it tends to look at all the problems just from the point 
of view of mental capacity, 136 that is the possession of sufficient intellectual abilities 
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for deciding ‘rationally’. This capacity centred approach does not allow to see how 
many of the obstacles faced by individuals living with cognitive impairments like 
dementia derive from external factors not directly relating to their brain. Therefore, by 
adopting this angle, the law may be seen as failing to provide solutions to the real 
problems in care choices by people with dementia.137  
In this regard, current capacity tests and consent regulations have been criticised 
for being ‘hypercognitivistic’ and too rationalistic.138 Indeed, their components focus 
exclusively on abilities related to the rational comprehension of the nature and 
consequences of a medical treatment and on the capacity to logically draw conclusions, 
evaluations and choices from such information.139 In this regard, researchers have 
pointed out how these regulations ignore important dynamics such as feelings, identity, 
practical reasoning and narrative.140 In this regard, in light of empirical evidence the 
current narrow approach to capacity to consent to treatment is scientifically 
untenable.141 
Starting from studies in the field of cognitive theory of emotions, Charland affirms 
that the affective sphere has an important positive role in medical decisions. 142  He 
claims that emotions are crucial when it comes to appreciate and evaluate the 
implications of a certain treatment on one’s life, to give personal meaning to 
situations.143 Choosing a medical treatment is not just about comprehending its effects, 
but probably most importantly, it is about saying how one would feel about them. Also, 
White notes how emotion helps to recognise and elaborate contrasts between desires. 
144 Indeed the trigger to acknowledge internal conflicts comes normally from the 
uncomfortable sensation of having wishes whose realisation is mutually exclusive.145 
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As stated by Herman et al, feelings constitute a specific source of knowledge about the 
overall nature of a person’s current situation revealing the ‘meaning aspects of our 
world’ and are thus ‘essential in generating, defining, and keeping track of our goals 
and preferences’.146 
Another important aspect of decision-making which is unaccounted for by the 
traditional rationalistic approach is that of values.147 Indeed, in order to understand the 
sense of a decision, it is important to look at why it has been made.148 This does not 
necessarily require that a person shows a very stable set of values or that their 
statements need to be coherent with what they have said in the past, as some seem to 
argue,149 but simply that one has to take into account the level of their beliefs and try 
to trace how they may have changed. Moreover, as affirmed by Benaroyo and 
Widdershoven, in this field it is also important to consider the interpretation of the 
world and the situation at the basis of the decision, in other words the narrative in 
against which the choice takes place.150 They observe how capacity to consent and 
healthcare decision-making is not a theoretical matter, but a practical one, which 
primarily requires the ability to give meaning to a situation.151 This capacity may lack 
in the person because, for example, they are not comfortable in a certain circumstance 
feeling factually incompetent to make a choice, or indeed because of an impairment 
like dementia.152 In such cases the two authors suggest that their carers should help 
them to get a practical grip on their situation, not limiting to assessing their capacity, 
but contributing to develop in the person a sense of the dynamics they are living.153  
Acknowledging the importance of the ‘non-cognitive’ elements of treatment 
decision-making does not just mean that one also has to assess the person’s ability to 
have emotions, to value or to build a narrative.154 Rather it implies accepting that 
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considerations pertaining to the latter domains may be more prominent than logical 
reasons, so that an individual may decide to give them precedence over rational 
arguments. After all do not we mainly make choices because of emotions, because we 
are afraid of pain, or because we are attached to certain ideas or ideologies? 
This may be even truer in the case of people with dementia as, because of the 
deterioration of cognitive abilities, they tend to rely on other intellectual resources to 
make choices, being guided more by their emotional-irrational sphere.155 In this sense, 
as noted by Berghmans et al, the current approach to decision-making puts them 
automatically in a position of disadvantage156 resulting discriminatory. Indeed, 
capacity legislations and models of healthcare decision-making are based on the 
principle according to which an adult must be presumed to have capacity unless it is 
proven that they have a mental condition and that this impacts on their judgement.157 
This means that people with no signs of intellectual or cognitive or psychiatric 
impairment will not be subject to the hypercognitive capacity tests in use in modern 
legal systems, remaining free to make decisions on the basis of their emotions, fears, 
and embarrassing wishes. Only mentally disabled individuals like people living with 
dementia run the risk of being questioned in their decisional ability and have to 
demonstrate that they satisfy a rationalistic standard that very few of their fellow 
human beings would enforce in usual life situations.  
Besides being not representative of the true reality of decision-making, the current 
legal approach to capacity to consent also results impractical and too rigid in relation 
to dementia. As noted by Herring, it appears based on a sharp binary distinction 
between capacity and incapacity.158 Indeed, an incapacity assessment has the effect of 
drawing a straight bright-line between the moment in which the person is presumed 
completely capable of making a decision or a class of decisions, and one in which they 
are considered totally unable to do so.159 However, if such an approach could make 
sense in cases in which cognitive abilities are lost all of a sudden such as coma, it 
appears much trickier to apply to progressive conditions like dementia.160 Here, the 
memories and reasoning abilities of the person fade away gradually and with 
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significant fluctuations.161 Often the person may appear to be ‘somewhere in between’ 
capacity and incapacity or ‘fail’ only some elements of the assessment. In this regard, 
the current binary approach to capacity, for example, may assume absolutely able to 
make decisions alone a person who is ‘just about capable to consent’, who, though 
able to grasp the general implications of their choice, would probably still need some 
help with regard to specific elements, an help hat legal capacity legislation would not 
provide, as the person is formally considered ‘autonomous’. On the other hand, an 
individual whom has ‘just about’ failed the mental capacity test risks that from that 
moment their opinions start being disregarded by default, even though they might still 
be able to articulate wishes and feelings.162  
As noted by Miola, because of the difficulty in ‘fitting’ such a binary category in 
the case of dementia, even experienced assessors or surrogates may have doubts with 
regard to the capacity or incapacity of the person.163 Indeed, empirical studies 
involving doctors confirm how they are frequently in disagreement with each other 
especially with regard to the capacity of individuals in the initial and mid stages of 
dementia.164 Marson et al performed an investigation on capacity judgements 
regarding people with mild Alzheimer Disease by geriatricians and neurologists from 
five medical centres, showing how their assessments diverge in almost half of cases.165  
Moreover, Qureshi and Johri observe how there is a lack of guidance to medical 
professionals on how to manage consent issues in cases in which the person’s capacity 
is intermittent.166 Finally, Pickering Francis maintains that the currently used concept 
of capacity as a thresholds leads practitioners to consider an ongoing, fixed status 
rather than more correctly as a spectrum and something that continuously changes over 
time.167 For all these reasons, a series of scholars are advocating for more flexible 
solutions with regard to legal capacity and capacity to consent in borderline cases.168     
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People living with dementia face a number of barriers to the exercise of their right 
to make healthcare choices. These barriers mostly derive from prejudice, inadequate 
human, physical and time resources to provide individuals living with dementia with 
the help they need in making decisions, and the lack of a framework which guides 
professionals, institutions and carers in addressing the issues emerging in relation to 
healthcare choices of people living with dementia. 
The first barrier, relating to prejudice, manifests itself in medical and legal 
professionals and cares automatically considering individuals living with dementia as 
incapable of reasoning and deciding on medical treatment. This is seen as inevitably 
due to the person’s impairment. On the contrary, in many cases the deterioration of 
mental abilities is not as serious as to render the person unable to express any opinion 
on their care. Such an absolute loss of capacity to decide occurs only in the final stages 
of the condition. 
Before that phase the person’s power to decide is generally hindered by contextual 
barriers originating from the way in which conversations on treatment choices are 
carried out. Among these barriers there are lack of support with regard to memory 
gaps, care staff inexperience with people living with dementia, time constraints and 
the scarce attention towards creating a favourable environment for conversations.  
In such a situation, regulations on legal capacity and capacity to consent to 
treatment do not appear to lend a great deal of help. At times they may be even seen 
to fuel or aggravate the negative dynamics described above. Indeed, they still 
subordinate the power to make decisions on medical treatment to the presence in the 
person of a set level of mental capacity. Therefore, they indicate conditions like 
dementia as a legally justifiable ground for stripping individuals of their legal capacity, 
increasing the risk that people living with this condition are deprived of their power to 
choose. Moreover, tests for legal capacity tend to set the bar even higher than the 
standard we all adopt in judging the capacity to decide of people. In addition they 
presuppose a sharp binary distinction between mental capacity and incapacity, which 
is difficult to apply in the case of dementia. Finally, the emphasis on mental capacity 
leads to see all decision-making problems as caused by the person’s brain, providing 
no basis for addressing the needs of support and adjustments or to avoid the risk of 
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undue influence. In this regard, capacity legislations are still informed by a ‘passive’ 
approach, in which people are only assessed but not helped to make decisions.  
Current legal approaches do not even provide effective solutions with regard to 
the last phase of dementia, in which the person appears unable of nearly any interaction 
with the world outside. Indeed tools like advanced directives, surrogate decision-
making, substituted and best interests judgement appear often paternalistic, morally 
controversial and difficult to apply in practice.    
Therefore, if we want to truly empower people living with dementia to make 
decisions on medical treatment and stop to deprive them of what is a fundamental right, 
we need to embrace a new approach to healthcare decision-making; an approach which 
does not fuel prejudice against people living with conditions like dementia, which 
actively helps such individuals in making decisions and that ideally avoids 
uncertainties in the evaluation and reconstruction of the person’s will. 
Chapter 4 will explore how such a model can emerge from Article 12 CRPD. Then 
Chapters 5 and 6 will analyse how the two main European transnational organisations 
(CoE and EU) can contribute to the spreading of this model and to promote a new 
vision of healthcare decision-making and dementia also tackling prejudice. Chapter 7 
will then study some initiatives developed at a national level which show how it could 
be concretely possible to remove barriers such as negative attitudes against people 
living with dementia, problems of communication and lack of support and adequate 
safeguards, and lack of training of medical professionals and carers.   
 However, the systemic change needed to tackle these obstacles requires a more 
inclusive view of the person living with dementia and the reality of decision-making 
than the one which has given origin to the current system. The next chapter aims to 










Chapter 2 has documented how people living with dementia face a number of 
barriers in exercising their right to decide on medical treatment and how, in order to 
overcome them, a new approach to capacity to consent is needed, based on a less 
medicalised and stigmatising view of the person living with this condition. This 
chapter aims to set out such a view, drawing from two existing theoretical accounts: 
the social model of disability1 and Fineman’s vulnerability theory.2 In this way, it 
delineates the theoretical framework of this dissertation, clarifying the standpoint from 
which its research problem is addressed and identifying the values that need to inform 
rules, policies and practices governing its field of study, explored in subsequent 
chapters.  
The claim underpinning this part is that the social model and vulnerability theory 
can be the basis for an approach to healthcare decision-making of individuals living 
with dementia which focuses on creating the conditions for the exercise of the person’s 
right to choose, rather than on capacity assessments and surrogate decision-making. 
Indeed, both accounts emphasise the importance of relational and social dynamics in 
shaping the condition of individuals such as people living with dementia, and advocate 
for an active engagement of social institutions in accommodating disadvantage in all 
aspects of life, including healthcare choices. In order to explore such a claim I look at 
the main seminal texts relating to the analysed theories, extracting the main ideas and 
putting them in relation with the case of people living with dementia.  
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The Chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 analyses the main ideas of the 
social model of disability, studying how they lead to a radical change of perspective 
compared to the traditional medicalised vision still dominant in the field of dementia 
care. Section 3 focuses on how the social model can be applied in relation to dementia, 
and outlines its implications with regard to decisions on medical treatment of 
individuals living with this condition. Section 4 turns to Fineman’s vulnerability 
theory, explaining the main ideas and analysing how it further extends and supports 
the claims of the social model of disability. In particular, the Section shows how 
vulnerability theory provides a more precise account with regard to legal personality 
and decision-making which, also in relation to consent to treatment of people living 
with dementia, leads to overcome the rigidities characterising current legislation on 
the matter and in particular to reject the binary category capacity/incapacity, which 
often constitutes a strong barrier to the full expression of the person’s will. Section 5 
explores how adopting such a new vision of legal personality leads to a legal and policy 
approach based on the responsive state, which presupposes that social institutions 
actively engage in helping and accommodating the needs of people in positions of 
disadvantage. In relation to treatment decisions of individuals living with dementia, 
this leads to require that the state, the law and all other social institutions take 
responsibility for creating the right conditions for the person to express their will and 
provide to them the necessary support to make healthcare choices. Finally, the 
Conclusion points out how, by looking at treatment decisions of people living with 
dementia through the lenses of the social model and of Fineman’s vulnerability theory, 
it is possible to lay down the basis for a regulatory model which, being based on a 
more inclusive view of the individual, removes many of the barriers faced by people 
living with this condition. 
        
2. The social model of disability 
 
The general approach to conditions like dementia is still characterised by a rather 
narrow perspective which focuses predominantly on the impairment of the person, 
failing to consider the significant role played by the way in which people react to such 
an impairment or how care services are organised around it.3  This is a dynamic which 
                                                          
3 C Baldwin, ‘Technology, Dementia and Ethics: Rethinking the Issue’, (2005) 25 Disability Studies 
Quarterly 1, but see also Chapter 1 and then further Section 3 of this Chapter. 
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is by no means confined to the area of healthcare decision-making or to the case of 
people living with dementia, still informing the general attitude towards many 
chronical conditions and impairments.4 
This approach is designated as the individual or medical model of disability. 5 The 
term was coined in 1983 by Michael Oliver which by it refers to an approach which 
looks at disabled people solely in relation to their impairment. 6 Here, disability is seen 
as a personal tragedy, something that concerns just the disabled individual and makes 
them something less compared to supposedly ‘normal’ people.7 As observed by 
Brisenden, all difficulties are seen solely from the perspective of proposed treatment, 
with the person being subject to hours of rehabilitation, without considering how this 
fits into their life. 8 So, disabled individuals are treated like objects of care, rather than 
full members of society.9 Moreover, when total rehabilitation is not possible, they are 
marginalised, excluded or hidden. An example of this could be seen in the practice, 
widespread in Europe until the 1980s, of segregating disabled people in asylums.10 It 
has also been seen how the view of (cognitive) conditions as an inescapable deficit of 
the mind, leads to exclude people living with dementia from decisions on their care, 
as doctors and caregivers often assume they are incapable of reasoning.11 
Instead, Oliver proposes an alternative view, the ‘social model’, which sees 
disability as a social creation, as the product of external dynamics, rather than 
                                                          
4 See for example CH Sin, ‘Medicalising Disability? Regulation and Practice around Fitness Assessment 
of Disabled Students and Professionals in Nursing, Social Work and Teaching Professions in Great 
Britain’ (2009) 31 Disability and Rehabilitation 1520; A Ndi, ‘Setting the Stage of 'Ab/normality' in 
Rehabilitative Narratives: Rethinking Medicalization of the Disabled African Body’ (2012) 32 
Disability Studies Quarterly  <http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/3195/3066> accessed 3 October 2018. 
5 M Oliver, ‘The Individual and Social Models of Disability’ (Joint Workshop of the Living Options 
Group and the Research Unit of the Royal College of Physicians, 1990) 2-5 in < http://disability-
studies.leeds.ac.uk/files/library/Oliver-in-soc-dis.pdf> accessed 25 March 2015. See also Oliver, The 
Politics, above, 46-59; K Selman, ‘Trends in Rehabilitation and Disability: Transition from a Medical 
Model to an Integrative Model’ [2004] Disability World 8 in < http://disabilityworld.org/01-
03_04/access/rehabtrends.shtml> accessed 27 January 2015. 
6 See M Oliver, Social Work with Disabled People (Macmillan 1983), who uses mainly the term 
‘individual model’, though the expression ‘medical model’ tends to be used more by other scholars. See 
also S Brisenden, ‘Independent Living and the Medical Model of Disability’ (1986) 1 Disability, 
Handicap and Society 173. 
7 Oliver, The Politics, above, 46-48; Brisenden, above, 173-176; R Traustadottir, ‘Disability Studies, 
the Social Model and Legal Developments’ in OM Arnardòttir and G Quinn (eds), The Un Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. European and Scandinavian Perspectives (Nijhoff 2009), 1.  
8 Brisenden, above, 176. See also Oliver, The Politics, above, 54-59; R Traustadottir, ‘Disability 
Studies, the Social Model and Legal Developments’ in Arnardòttir and Quinn (eds), above, 1. 
9 Brisenden, above, 177-178. 
10 Oliver, The Politics, above, 32-36. For the foreign literature, with a specific focus on mental disability, 
see the book by F Basaglia (ed), L'Istituzione Negata (Baldini Castoldi Dalai 1968).  
11 See above Chapter 2. 
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inevitable natural causes.12 This theoretical account is described in the book The 
Politics of Disablement,13 and builds mainly on the elaborations of the UK’s disabled 
people’s movement, which saw its decisive affirmation in the 1960s-70s in Great 
Britain, though similar ideas have been developed in other countries of the world.14 In 
this sense it builds on the work of the British Union of Physically Impaired Against 
Segregation (UPIAS).15 
UPIAS based its main message on the distinction between ‘impairment’ and 
‘disability’, arguing that the latter is ‘imposed on top of our impairments’ and that it is 
society which ‘disables’ people living with impairments.16 Drawing from this, Oliver 
further explains that, as confirmed by anthropological studies, certain impairments are 
perceived as troublesome in certain societies but not in others.17 Therefore, disability 
appears ‘culturally produced and socially structured’.18 In this regard, the point is not 
curing the impairment or ‘normalising’ the person, but removing the societal barriers 
which disabled people face in their everyday life. 19 Indeed, the community can be a 
powerful means to support disabled individuals and provide services, helping them to 
flourish and realise their human potential, beyond their impairment.20 This of course 
does not necessarily mean that impairments do not play a role in the life of disabled 
individuals or that treatment and rehabilitation is not important for them, but that one 
cannot limit to such aspects.  
Such ideas have formed the basis for disability activists to demand the removal of 
disabling barriers through specific legislation. 21 In this context, the action of disability 
                                                          
12 For a general review of the central ideas of the social model and their developments see Priestley, 
above. 
13 Oliver, The Politics, above. 
14 On the origins of the disabled people’s movement see C Barnes, above, 2-4. 
15 Oliver, The Politics, above, 2. 
16 UPIAS, above, 3. On this distinction see also C Thomas, ‘Disability and Impairment’ in J Swain et al 
(eds), Disabling Barriers – Enabling Environments (Sage 2004). 
17 Oliver, The Politics, above, 14-17. 
18 Ibid, 22. See also J Ryan and F Thomas, The Politics of Mental Handicap (Penguin 1980), 101. 
19See C Barnes and G Mercer (eds), Implementing the Social Model of Disability: Theory and Research 
(The Disability Press 2004); T Shakespeare, ‘The Social Model of Disability’ in LJ Davis (ed), The 
Disability Studies Reader (4th ed, Routledge 2013).   
20 D Nahak, ‘Role of Civil Society in the Empowerment of the Disabled’ (2008) 46 Mainstream Weekly 
available at <www.mainstreamweekly.net/article595.htmlSE> accessed 14 June 2018; Keyes, SH 
Webber and K Beveridge, ‘Empowerment through Care: using Dialogue between the Social Model of 
Disability and an Ethic of Care to Redraw Boundaries of Independence and Partnership between 
Disabled People and Services’ (2015) 9 ALTER 236. 
21 For the English context see, for example, C Barnes, Disabled People in Britain and Discrimination: 
a case for Anti-discrimination Legislation (Hurst & Co, 1991); J Campbell and M Oliver, Disability 
Politics: Understanding our Past, Changing our Future (Routledge, 1996). For the American context, 
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movements has led to the approval in many countries of revolutionary regulations such 
as the Americans with Disabilities Act (1990) or the norms on disability based 
discrimination in the British Equality Act 2010. This trend has developed in the last 
years at a global level, spreading not only throughout Europe, but also in non-western 
countries and being one of the triggers for international human rights legislation such 
as the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.22 The use of the 
social model in this context has more clearly brought up aspects of it which relate to 
changing the life condition of disabled people, putting more emphasis on the active 
vindication of rights and the practical and political challenges in empowering and 
including disabled individuals. In this regard, in line with the social model emphasis 
on barriers removal, scholars and activists advocate for a policy and legal approach 
based not just on respect and non-discrimination, but also focusing on realising 
substantive equality.23 This means that the social model presupposes not only and not 
so much that disabled people are treated according to the same standards of others and 
are not subject to unfair treatment, but most importantly that the state or other 
institutions through policies, laws and the investment of resources really provide them 
with the tools, mechanisms and accommodations they need to be included in society 
and fully enjoy their life on an equal footing with others.24 
As shown by Berensford, the social model is of great importance in the context of 
mental disability.25 Here the focus is on removing attitudinal barriers such as prejudice, 
stereotype, stigma, blame or labelling.26 In this regard, especially movements of 
mentally disabled people reclaim the entitlement to be respected as individuals with a 
different but legitimate way of seeing the world.27 Therefore, they vindicate the right 
                                                          
see F Bowe, Handicapping America, (Harper and Row, 1978); H Hahn, ‘Academic Debates and 
Political Advocacy: the US Disability Movement’ in C Barnes, M Oliver and L Barton (ed), Disability 
Studies Today (Polity 2001) 162. 
22 See Chapter 4. 
23 S Fredman, ‘Disability Equality: A Challenge to the Existing Anti-Discrimination Paradigm?’ in EF 
Emens and MA Stein (eds), Disability and Equality Law (Routledge 2005); OM Arnardòttir, ‘A Future 
of Multidimensional Disadvantage Equality?’ in Arnardòttir and Quinn (eds), above, 54-64;  
24 A Lawson, Disability and Equality Law in Britain: The Role of Reasonable Adjustment (Hart 2008), 
1-59; T Minkowitz, ‘CRPD and Transformative Equality’ (2017) 13 International Journal of Law in 
Context 77. 
25 P Berensford, ‘Social Work and a Social Model of Madness and Distress: developing a Viable Role 
for the Future’ (2005) 12 Social Work and Social Sciences Review 59, 64-71.  
26 Berensford, above, 66-69; Joseph Rowntree Foundation, ‘Towards a Social Model of Madness and 
Distress? Exploring what Service Users say’ (JRF 2010) 19-28. <www.jrf.org.uk/sites/default/files/jrf/ 
migrated/files/mental-health-service-models-full.pdf> accessed 14 June 2018. See also M Price, 
‘Defining Mental Disability’ in Davis (ed), The Disability Studies Reader, above.   
27 R Ciofi, ‘La Malattia Mentale, come Vissuto della Persona, nell’ottica Fenomenologica e 
Sociologica’ (2002) 37 Rivista di Psichiatria 138; JC Jaramillo Estrada and DA Restrepo Ochoa, 
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to decide for themselves, to be empowered and helped to shape their lives, rather than 
being dismissed as ‘mad’.28 Moreover, they challenge psychiatric and medical 
authority, demanding that service users are at the centre of therapy rather than the will 
of their physicians.29 In this context, the social model shares ideas and pathways with 
movements for the liberation of people living with mental conditions such as 
Antipsychiatry, Mad Pride and the various European anti-institutional movements.30 
Also in this area the ideas of the social model have served to movements of users of 
psychiatry and people living with mental conditions to fight for the respect of 
fundamental rights such as that to decide on their care. For this reason, the social model 
provides a strong ground also to address the obstacles faced by people living with 
dementia in deciding on medical treatment such as being ignored because of prejudice 
and not being properly assisted. Indeed, looking at capacity to consent through the 
lenses of the social model permits to claim even more strongly how it is legal capacity 
legislation and practice that needs to change, banning behaviours or rules depriving 
the person of decisional power and providing assistance in overcoming the barriers to 
their right to decide.31 
However, foundational claims of the social model are still at the centre of debate, 
having been subject to criticism by what could be defined as a ‘second generation’ of 
disability scholars. Some of the points at the centre of criticism are particularly relevant 
to the case of people living with dementia. A first point of discussion is that according 
to which impairment would tend to be overlooked in social model analysis.32 Morris, 
                                                          
‘Normality and Mental Health: analysis of a Multivalent Relationship’ (2015) 8 Journal of  Psychology 
CES 37. 
28 B Lewis, ‘A Mad Fight: Psychiatry and Disability Activism’ in Davis (ed), The Disability Studies 
Reader, above, 115-117. See also EJ Maccallum, ‘Othering and Psychiatric Nursing’ (2002) 9 Journal 
of Psychiatric and Mental Health Nursing 87; L Pritchard-Jones, ‘“This Man with Dementia” 
‘Othering’ the Person with Dementia in the Court of Protection’ (2017) 24 Medical Law Review 518, 
521-525. 
29 Lewis, ‘A Mad Fight’, above, 115-117. 
30 See for example T Szasz, ‘The Myth of Mental Illlness’ (1960) 15 American Psychologist 113; 
Basaglia (ed), above; G Antonucci, I pregiudizi e la Conoscenza. Critica alla Psichiatria (Apache 
1986); T Szasz, The Manufacture of Madness: A Comparative Study of the Inquisition and the Mental 
Health Movement (Syracuse University Press 1997). For an analysis of these links see Lewis, ‘A Mad 
Fight’, above, 118-128. 
31 For the moment see I Hoffman and G Könczei, ‘Legal Regulations relating to the Passive and Active 
Legal Capacity of Persons with Intellectual and Psychosocial Disabilities in light of the Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the Impending Reform of the Hungarian Civil Code’ (2010) 
33 Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review 143, 144-146; P Bartlett, ‘The 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Mental Health Law (2012) 
75 The Modern Law Review 754, 758-768.    
32 B Hughes and K Paterson, ‘The Social Model of Disability and the Disappearing Body: towards a 
Sociology of Impairment’ (1997) 12 Disability and Society 325. 
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starting from her own experience as a disabled person, affirms that ‘while 
environmental barriers and social attitudes are a crucial part of our experience of 
disability – and do indeed disable us – to suggest that this is all there is is to deny the 
personal experience of physical or intellectual restrictions’.33 Shakespeare and Watson 
even accuse the social model of having turned impairment into a sort of taboo. 34 
Therefore, according to them, this approach seems sometimes more an ideology 
assuming that it is sufficient to change the society to make the problem of disability 
disappear. In an article of 2013, Michael Oliver has dismissed such criticism, affirming 
how his account does not imply the denial of the impairment level, but rather advocates 
for inserting it in a wider perspective.35 Nonetheless, sometimes the impression does 
arise that the way in which the social model has been applied, especially by activists, 
tends to ignore the objective practical problems directly caused by impairments.  
In order to address such issues, Williams proposes to think at disability in terms 
of interaction between societal dynamics and impairment.36Starting from the 
perspective of critical realism,37 he advocates ‘bringing back’ impairment in the debate 
on disability as even the physical and psychological characteristics of every person 
influence the impact on them of social dynamics. 38 So, disability is ‘an emergent 
property, located, temporally speaking, in terms of interplay between the biological 
reality of physiological impairment, structural conditioning (i.e. 
enablements/constraints) and socio-cultural interaction/elaboration’.39 In terms of 
impairment/society interactions Garland-Thomson refers to the concept of misfitting.40 
She identifies disability as a situation in which an individual does not fit into the social 
structure surrounding them and ‘the shape and function of their bodies comes in 
                                                          
33 J Morris, Pride against Prejudice (The Women’s Press 1991), 10. See also L Crow, ‘Including all 
our Lives’ in J Morris (ed), Encounters with Strangers: Feminism and Disability (The Women’s Press 
1996). 
34 T Shakespeare and N Watson, ‘The social model of disability: an outdated ideology?’ (2002) 2 
Research in Social Science and Disability 9. 
35 M Oliver, ‘The Social Model of Disability: thirty years on’ (2013) 28 Disability and Society 1024. 
36 SJ Williams, ‘Is Anybody there? Critical Realism, Chronic Illness and the Disability Debate’, (1999) 
21 Sociology of Health and Illness 797. 
37 Critical realism developed from the works by Roy Bhaskar which, in opposition to post-structuralism 
and social constructionism at the basis of accounts like the social model, concentrates on the factual 
reasons beyond societal mechanisms, rather than on their interpretation as social constructions. R 
Bhaskar, Reclaiming Reality (Verso 1989); R Bhaskar, A Realist Theory of Science (Verso 1997). 
38 Williams, above, 810-811. See also M Archer, Realist Social Theory: the Morphogenetic Approach 
(Cambridge University Press 1995), 288. 
39Williams, above, 810. 
40 R Garland-Thomson, ‘Misfits: A Feminist Materialist Disability Concept’ (2011) 26 Hypatia 591. 
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conflict with the shape and stuff of the built world’.41 Indeed, she notes, disabled 
people are one of those categories like children, older individuals, women or migrants, 
whom often find themselves in a marginalised position because the architecture of 
society does not take them into account.42 These visions of disability have the 
advantage of describing it as socially produced, but acknowledging in the meantime 
the role of the body and the specificities of the experience of every disabled person. 
Therefore, they permit to explain those situations arising especially in the advanced 
stages of dementia, in which it does not seem possible to fully accommodate the 
person’s impairment, though still putting attention on the role of societal barriers.  
Another issue, related to the question of the dialectic impairment/disability is that, 
according to some scholars, the social model runs the risk of overlooking differences 
between disabled people.43 Indeed, coherently with the focus on the social level the 
traditional version of the social model conceptualises disability as a unitary form of 
oppression talking about ‘disability’.44 However, the experience of disability can be 
very different from person to person.45 First, such differences are due to the particular 
nature of each impairment, so that, for example, a person in a wheelchair and an 
individual living with a mental health condition, though facing some similar dynamics 
for example in terms of prejudice, have a fundamentally different life experience.46 In 
addition, the condition of disabled person is also influenced by the interaction between 
the disability level and a range of other factors such as class, gender, race age or 
culture, so that the reality faced, for example, by a middle-class white disabled man is 
not comparable with that of a black disabled woman of more disadvantage social 
background.47 Therefore, insisting on perceiving disability as a homogeneous dynamic 
may pose the risk that policies, laws and interventions in this area do not match with 
                                                          
41 Garland-Thomson, above, 594. 
42 Ibid, 597. 
43 M Corker, ‘Differences, Conflations and Foundations: the Limits to Accurate Theoretical 
Representation of Disabled Peoples Experience?’ (1999) 14 Disability and Society 627; Shakespeare 
and Watson, above, 18-28; L Terzi, ‘The Social Model of Disability: a Philosophical Critique’ (2004) 
21 Journal of Applied Philosophy 141, 153-155. 
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Light? Introducing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2008) 8 Human Rights 
Law Review 1, 23. 
45 Terzi, above, 153-154. 
46 Corker, above; Shakespeare and Watson, above, 18-28; Williams, above, 803-807.  
47 W Hulko, ‘From “Not a Big Deal” to “Hellish”: Experiences of Older People with Dementia’ (2009) 
23 Journal of Aging Studies 132; DF Warner and TH Brown, ‘Understanding how Race/Ethnicity and 
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Gender Studies’ (2015) 29 Disability and Gender 24.  
69 
 
the needs of a number of individuals. For this reason especially ‘second generation’ 
scholars and activists refer to ‘disabilities’ rather than disability.48 In this regard, also 
the conceptualisation proposed by authors such as Williams or Garland-Thomson have 
indeed aim for a better consideration of the specificities of each disabled individuals 
by recalling attention on the differences between impairments and the particular way 
social structures react to them.49  
In the next chapters I will explain how in relation to the case of people living with 
dementia it is particularly important to bear in mind these aspects. In addition, I will 
explore how Fineman’s vulnerability theory may contribute to avoid overlooking the 
level of impairment and put adequate attention on diversity in disability discourse.   
 
3. The social model and dementia 
 
The social model has started only quite recently to be applied in the context of 
dementia.50 Indeed, as already noted, the approach to this condition still tends to 
concentrate predominantly on the deficits of the person and on the impact and 
management of the symptoms typical of this condition. This narrow focus dates back 
to the very beginnings of dementia as a diagnostic category, that is to when, in 1906, 
Alzheimer and Perusini analysed the first known clinical case of dementia, 51  and 
Kraepelin classified the disease as a specific medical condition in his handbook 
Psychiatrie (1910).52 Indeed, the main point of the works of the three researchers, 
consisted in conceptualising dementia simply as a neuropathology caused by organic 
alterations of the brain and rejecting of the vision, dominant at that time, according to 
which dementia was an inevitable and natural consequence of aging.53 Such a vision 
became more and more dominant in the scientific community, which in the meantime 
discovered a number of different subtypes of this condition, so that in 1980 the 
American Psychiatric Association included ‘primary degenerative dementia’ in the 
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50 See in this sense Mental Health Foundation, ‘Dementia, Rights, and the Social Model of Disability. 
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third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-III), 
officially identifying it as a specific pathology of the brain and establishing criteria for 
its diagnosis.54 
 This process of ‘medicalisation’ of dementia, on the one hand, has allowed to 
achieve a better understanding of this condition and its causes, distinguishing it from 
normal aging and supporting the development of medical research on the disease. 
However, on the other hand, it has produced the prejudice and narrow approach55 
whose consequences have been seen in Chapter 1, and that sees dementia as a personal 
and familiar tragedy, as a ‘death of the mind’ or an ‘unbecoming of the self’ which 
makes the life of the person dreadful and meaningless.56 Looking at dementia from 
this perspective leads to interpret all the person’s behaviours as a product of the 
disease, to consider the person automatically incapable on the basis of their condition 
and to justify forms of medical control in which independence is generally 
discouraged.57 
In the last four decades such an approach has been contested by scholars, care 
professionals, activists and people living with dementia. Among the first to criticise 
the traditional model of dementia there have been the members of the Bradford 
Dementia Group, reuniting scholars from various disciplines with the aim of studying 
the social and relational aspects of this phenomenon, and in particular by Tom 
Kitwood, the founder of the Group and the main proponent of the person-centred 
dementia care approach. This view was developed in the early 1990s and it is summed 
up in Kitwood’s book Dementia Reconsidered.58 It evolved following autonomous, 
though parallel, routes than the social model of disability by which it is in part 
influenced.59 Indeed, similarly to the social model, it claims that the numerous 
problems faced by people living with dementia often come from their social 
environment and the attitudes of others.60 Therefore it advocates for defining this 
condition in terms of interplay between cognitive impairment and social environment, 
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focusing not just on the pathologies of the brain, but on the wider question of living 
with dementia.61  
Kitwood maintains that the narrow, medicalised ‘standard paradigm’ of dementia 
is not able to give a full and faithful explanation of this phenomenon.62 Indeed, some 
biomedical studies pose substantial doubts that neuropathology is alone determinant 
of the condition,63 and clinical experience shows how traits of dementia like change of 
personality or the impression of the ‘vanishing of the person’s self’ are much less 
reported by people who are constantly supported and well cared for.64 Indeed, observes 
Kitwood, individuals living with dementia are often victims not of their condition, but 
of a ‘malignant social psychology’65 informing the behaviour of relatives and carers, 
and resulting in treachery, disempowerment, infantilisation, intimidation, labelling, 
stigmatisation, outpacing, invalidation, banishment, objectification, ignoring 
behaviour, imposition, withholding, accusation, disruption, mockery or disparagement 
against the person.66  
The traditional medical model does not account for these dynamics and indeed, by 
looking at the individual living with dementia only from the perspective of disease, it 
feeds into the negative and deterministic view that, as seen in Chapter 2, creates many 
problems also in relation to the right to decide on healthcare matters.67 Therefore, 
Kitwood advocates for a new paradigm which puts at the centre the person rather than 
the disease68 and looks at dementia also in its biographical, relational and social 
dimension.69  In this regard, he argues that the care of the person has to involve a 
‘positive work’ which is based on recognition and respect.70 By looking at them from 
this perspective, individuals with dementia do not appear anymore as ‘sick people’, 
but rather as ordinary individuals that may simply have a different but still legitimate 
way of living and thinking.71 In this way, also in relation to healthcare choices, this 
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67 Ibid, 37. See also Chapter 2. 
68 Kitwood, Dementia Reconsidered, above, 7-8 and 69-73. 
69 Kitwood, ‘The Dialectics’, above, 186-193. 
70 T Kitwood, ‘Towards a Theory of Dementia Care: Ethics and Interaction’ (1998) 9 Journal of Clinical 
Ethics 23, 27-29. 
71 Kitwood, Dementia Reconsidered, above, 9-10 
72 
 
perspective leads to claim that also individuals living with dementia must be 
recognised the possibility to decide for themselves and that legal mechanisms should 
be eliminated which impose of them hypercognitive and rationalistic standards which 
are not respectful of their particular way to see life.  
The ideas of the person-centred care approach to dementia echo in many ways 
those of the social model of disability. Indeed, as noted by Baldwin, by conceptualising 
dementia in terms of interplay between brain conditions and social environment, the 
person-centred approach implicitly adopts the distinction, central in the social model, 
between disability and impairment. 72 Moreover, by affirming that loss of agency and 
personality often come from social dynamics and others’ ‘malignant social 
psychology’, Kitwood and his followers seem to embrace the idea that in the field of 
disability the focus should be on the social barriers oppressing the person.73 However, 
having been constructed mostly in relation to older individuals near the end of their 
lives and in an optic of care, the person-centred approach to dementia focuses more on 
care and promoting an attitude of respect and kindness rather than empowering people 
living with dementia. Therefore, it lacks the social model’s drive towards fostering 
change at a systemic level and vindicating rights, which is crucial in the area of legal 
capacity and healthcare decisions. Indeed, as seen in Chapter 2, here there is the need 
to challenge deeply rooted legal and mind structures.  
For this reason, in recent decades, activists and scholars in the field of dementia 
are increasingly turning to the social model as a tool for promoting change, inclusion 
and empowerment of individuals living with this condition.74 Organisations such as 
Mental Health Foundation or Dementia Alliance International (DAI) argue that 
embracing the social model would make sure that people living with dementia are 
centre stage in policy discourse, that they are part of a broader social movement for 
change and that the barriers oppressing them are tackled.75 In this regard, Marshall 
affirms that looking at dementia as to a disability would permit to focus more 
decisively on the personal experience and on enabling the person to manage their life, 
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emphasising remaining abilities of the person rather than deficits. 76 Moreover, it 
would allow to understand how people living with dementia are marginalised and 
discriminated in our society.77  
As noted by Gilliard et al, this is the starting point of a new holistic approach to 
dementia, which does not deny the medical implications of the condition, but 
advocates for a broader vision of the social dynamics involved, leading to an active 
engagement with such factors. 78 In relation to legal capacity and healthcare decisions 
of people living with dementia, adopting the perspective of the social model permits 
to advocate more strongly for the necessity to remove the barriers preventing the 
person to exercise their decisional power with regard to care matters and to change 
regulations in this field. Therefore, it can form a basis for developing practices and 
even reforms which really focus on creating the conditions for the exercise of their 
decisional power by the person, rather than using the person’s impairment to deprive 
them of their right to decide. Indeed,  applying to this case the distinction between 
impairment and disability, and classifying dementia as one of those forms of disability 
that are mainly the product of barriers originating from society (and that society can 
also remove), leads to consider also the issues emerging in the area of treatment 
decisions of individuals living with this condition not as an inevitable consequence of 
their cognitive impairment, but rather as the result of  prejudice, lack of arrangements 
which fit the needs of the person, or the inadequacy of legislations based on over 
rationalistic standards of choice making. In this regard, the social model seems to offer 
a paradigm which takes more seriously the concerns expressed by people living with 
dementia, carers, professionals and scholars with regard to the traditional approach to 
healthcare decision-making. For this reason, it appears to offer a paradigm on which 
to build a new system which really addresses the issues and barriers analysed in 
Chapter 2.  
However, applying the ideas of the social model in this specific area requires more 
attention to some specific dynamics characterising the field of treatment decisions of 
individuals living with dementia, adapting and refining the model in relation to them. 
The first factor is that in this condition the impact of impairment can be so significant 
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that even if all external barriers have been removed and the right services and means 
of support are in place, the person does not manage to express a clear, articulate and 
comprehensible decision on their care. In this regard, here, in the dialectic 
impairment/disabling barrier, the former may have a more prominent role than it does 
in other cases such as that of wheelchair users, or that of other intellectual disability or 
mental health conditions. For this reason, it can be that, at times, more attention needs 
to be paid, in this specific case, to overcoming the effects of the impairment, though 
of course a careful look needs always to be kept on external barriers.  So, following 
the work done especially by ‘second generation’ disability theorists,79 it is particularly 
important to keep the emphasis on the definition of disability as interaction between 
impairment and societal barriers. 
In addition, in relation to dementia, it is particularly important to bear in mind the 
significant differences of experiences among people living with this condition. Indeed, 
because of the variability of subtypes, symptoms and external factors impacting on the 
person’s lifestyle the issues and situations faced by individuals with dementia change 
significantly from case to case.80 Therefore, this is one of the paradigmatic cases in 
which disability, though presenting some generally characteristics experienced by 
everyone, cannot be considered as a completely homogeneous dynamic.     
Another element that needs to be considered is that, once moving to analyse the 
issues faced by people living with dementia in the specific area of capacity to consent 
and healthcare decision-making, it is necessary to define how the claims of the social 
model translate in relation to capacity and legal personality. Indeed, the aim of the 
social model is mainly to provide a general vision of disability, inspiring wide ideas 
which can be relevant for a number of different situations. Therefore, while it offers a 
powerful framework to reconceptualise disability and advocate for the removal of 
socially created disabling barriers, it does not provide a specific theory of how such 
barriers arise in a certain situation, or on what specific part of society is responsible 
for a certain barrier, or through which specific process to tackle a certain set of barriers. 
Indeed, as noted by Owens more than a full developed theory it is a macro-scheme 
whose message can be ‘filled’ and brought forward through the combination with other 
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accounts.81 This is not to say that the social model has not provided a basis for quite 
specific analyses of the reality of disabled people, and that even with regard to legal 
capacity and legal personality has not led especially in the context of the movement 
for the liberation of mentally disabled individuals, to powerful claims in terms of fuller 
recognition of legal personality and respect of the autonomy and decisions of the 
individual.82 Only, in order to fully unveil the implications of its message in an area 
such as that of treatment decisions of people living with dementia, it is necessary to 
look at theoretical accounts that support and extend its claims in this context. In order 
to do so I will refer, in the next sections, to the construction of vulnerability developed 
by the American legal scholar Martha Fineman.      
 
4. Vulnerability Theory and a new vision of Legal Personality 
 
Fineman’s Vulnerability theory is an approach developed in the context of 
feminist socio-legal theory, which has been increasingly gaining ground as an account 
of legal personality and a tool to better reflect on the role of social institutions like the 
law and the state in shaping the life condition of individuals.83 It focuses on 
reconceptualising the too narrow and individualistic idea of human being still 
dominant in today’s western legal and political culture, with particular regard to 
dynamics of disadvantage. In this regard, it has a number of points in common with 
the social model of disability and can further extend and support its claims in relation 
to healthcare choices of individuals living with dementia.  
Fineman’s analysis is linked to the critique brought forward within feminist 
thought to the liberal view of the individual as a completely rational, autonomous and 
independent being, who needs to be left free to shape their life without external 
interference.84 Under this traditional view, still at the basis of the current approach to 
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treatment decisions and capacity to consent, 85 vulnerability, frailty and incompetence 
are considered as deviations from the rule represented by ‘autonomous’ people, and 
legitimise paternalistic practices (e.g. incapacitation and deprivation of the power to 
decide) which ‘protect’ the individual from their alleged weakness.86 Instead, the 
American scholar advocates for the rejection of such an independence focused vision 
considering it as fundamentally utopian.87 Indeed, she notes how modern societies are 
so focused on the ideology of autonomy and individualism that they tend to forget how 
everyone is inevitably dependent and influenced by others.88 Moreover, she points out 
how liberal theory seems to forget that all people are potentially exposed to harm, 
frailty, illness or financial difficulties.89 For this reason, she suggests to substitute, at 
the centre of social, political and legal discourse, the idea of the autonomous individual 
with that of the vulnerable subject.90 This would lead to recognise that every person is 
at a certain extent vulnerable.  
Indeed, according to Fineman, vulnerability is intrinsic to the human condition. 91  
For this reason it cannot be considered as an exception, a deviation from the rule, but 
needs to be primarily recognised as a universal characteristic shared by all people.92 
Universal vulnerability derives from the fact that every individual is both ‘embodied’ 
and ‘embedded’ in society.93 The first dimension relates to the materiality of human 
bodies (including the brain), which change overtime, break, fall hill and become old, 
exposing each person to the ever-present possibility of injury, misfortune and 
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dependency.94 For this reason, besides being universal, vulnerability is also constant, 
as, because of the inevitable frailty of the human body, one can mitigate possible 
manifestations of vulnerability but can never eliminate the possibility of harm.95  The 
level of ‘embeddedness’ refers to the fact that we all live with others in society, so we 
are also exposed to the possibility of harmful actions by fellow members of the human 
community.96 In this regard, vulnerability may derive from the interactions between 
embodied differences and societal structure, and in particular from the reaction of 
society to our bodily vulnerability and the social and economic consequences of illness 
or injury.97 Moreover, it may be due to choices made at a collective level, which shape 
the way in which society is organised and can contribute to enhance or attenuate one’s 
vulnerability.98 Therefore, while vulnerability as a state of being is universal, it is 
experienced in a particular way by every person, depending on their social 
positioning.99 Therefore, in Fineman’s account, vulnerability is a complex reality that 
takes often place at the intersection between body/individual dimension and society.  
This vision echoes the claims of the social model of disability.100 Indeed, the idea 
of vulnerability as deriving from both embodiment and embeddedness in society 
resembles quite closely the definition of disability in terms of interaction between 
impairment and societal barriers.101 However, Fineman’s theory gives to such 
elaborations a broader meaning. Indeed, while the social model focuses mainly on the 
case of disabled people, vulnerability theory refers to human condition in general, 
allowing for a reflection which regards not only a category of people but all members 
of society. As noted by Clough, it provides an important unifying aspect to the social 
model, emphasising the feature of impairment as a various but fundamentally universal 
dimension of human condition.102 In this regard, it brings forward more powerfully the 
claim, already present in the social model, that phenomena like disability are not 
pathological, but need to be accepted as part of human complexity. In this regard, it 
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makes clear how also in the area of treatment decisions of individuals living with 
dementia, the person should not be treated as if they have something less than others, 
but needs to be simply recognised as someone who experiences their vulnerability in 
a different way than others because of their brain but also and most importantly 
because of their social positioning. In this way, it further challenges those behaviours, 
analysed in Chapter 2, guided by prejudice and stigmatising attitudes which often 
hinder the persons’ ability to express their will on medical treatment. Indeed, it leads 
to see how individuals living with dementia should not be patronised for their 
inevitable vulnerability, but rather be helped in facing the societal factors co-causing 
it in a way that takes into account and respects the particular way in which they 
experience it.  
By referring to the particularity of each person’s experience of vulnerability, 
Fineman’s account also draws more attention to the specificities and nuances of the 
different situations in which different individuals living with dementia may find 
themselves in, echoing the ideas of ‘second generation’ disability theorists who 
advocate for a better consideration of the differences characterising the various 
personal experiences of single disabled people. Indeed, as already seen, in its 
traditional Oliverean theorisation, the social model tends to refer to disability as to a 
unitary dynamic and form of oppression.103 Vulnerability theory contributes to 
counterbalance this aspect, clarifying how also with regard to long term impairments 
and disability the particular level is as important as the universal one, allowing a more 
faithful representation of the variability of symptoms and experiences typical of this 
condition.  
Therefore, the social model of disability and Fineman’s vulnerability theory show 
significant elements of continuity, as they both conceptualise disability and 
disadvantage in terms of interaction between the personal and embodied dimension 
and social structures-barriers, arguing for a change society so that it can better respond 
to the needs of disabled people and individuals exposed to social jeopardies. However, 
there are also tensions between the two theoretical accounts so that they may lead to 
(partially) divergent directions in terms of policy and legal approach. 
In this regard, the social model of disability, which originated within the context 
of the disability movement as an ideological tool to demand the removal of societal 
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barriers oppressing disabled people, keeps a strong emphasis on the individual and the 
goal of enabling the person to be in control of their life and personal choices. On the 
other hand, Fineman’s vulnerability theory tends to concentrate predominantly on the 
social level and on urging the state to take action through service provision and 
resilience building initiatives. Because of this, the social model provides a more natural 
basis for a political discourse centred on the human rights of disabled people and the 
goal of empowering these individuals to make decisions for themselves, while 
vulnerability theory rather tends to move on the level of wider welfare policies of 
which the individual (not only disabled) is the recipient.104 As noted by Satz, by 
adopting such a wider perspective and by concentrating on state intervention 
Fineman’s theory avoids the problem still characterising many disability policies 
inspired by the social model, which are overly focused on antidiscrimination and fail 
to promote a more general reorganisation of society which takes into account from the 
start the needs of disabled individuals.105 However, on the other hand, while the social 
model appears generally aware of the risks of state’s interventionism and of the need 
to protect the individual from the risk of oppressive interventions, vulnerability theory 
does not seem to have thoroughly elaborated on this potential ‘dark side’ of social 
engineering. 
In this regard, some scholars express concern at the use of the term vulnerability 
in relation to disabled people.106 Indeed, this concept has normally been instrumental 
to supporting paternalistic initiatives107 being a means of stigmatisation108 and social 
control on people living with impairments.109 In this context, disability scholars 
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maintain that employing the term vulnerability brings the focus on impairments, 
inabilities and shortcomings of people in disadvantaged positions, rather than on 
societal barriers.110  Therefore, Dunn, Clare and Holland note how vulnerability may 
increase the risk that the person is deprived of their decisional power under the 
motivation that they need protection. 111 With specific regard to people living with 
dementia, Harding argues that, while the vulnerability approach has potential as a way 
of shifting legal and political attention from the autonomous individual subject to 
universal dependence, because of the specificity of the experience of living with 
dementia ‘it does not take us far enough’.112 Indeed, because of the prominence in 
dementia care of a rhetoric putting emphasis on social death, dissolution of the self, 
inevitability of decline, the negative connotation of vulnerability may be particularly 
emphasised in this context, leading to reinforce practices aiming at 
containing/controlling the person, instead of an appreciation of their potential and 
strengths.113 In this regard, she expresses the concern that, by adopting universal 
vulnerability as a starting point, one runs the risk of overlooking the specific 
interpersonal relationships of dependence and interdependence.114   
However, Fineman notes that the negative meaning associated with the concept of 
vulnerability derives from the misrepresented vision proposed by liberal theory. 115 
Indeed, with its ideology of autonomy and non-interference it has provoked the 
stigmatization of vulnerability and dependency, which has been seen as a pathology.116 
In effect, the power of Fineman’s approach lies in the fact that it takes an under-
theorised concept, characterised by a negative connotation, and gives to it a new 
meaning, emphasising the importance of a radical change of perspective.117 Therefore, 
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through this idea, she emphasises how vulnerability is a normal and even positive 
dimension of humanity, declaring in an explicit way how a radical change of 
perspective is needed.118 Moreover, despite the emphasis on the universal nature of 
vulnerability, the works of the American scholar are also disseminated with references 
to the necessity of looking at the particular condition and specific relationships shaping 
every person’s life.119 In this regard, the recalling of the role played by social 
embeddedness in determining the vulnerability faced by a person, is only another way 
of expressing how we should put attention to the influence of the relationships 
surrounding each individual. So, also with regard to decision-making, Fineman’s 
account advocates for the recognition of the fact that real autonomy and the power to 
shape one’s life cannot be attained without substantial assistance from social 
institutions and relational networks surrounding a person.120     
In this regard, vulnerability theory also leads to a different approach in the field of 
legal capacity and choice making on medical treatment. Indeed, by insisting on the 
universality of vulnerability, and by indicating it as a concept which needs to inform 
the vision of the individual at the centre of legal discourse, it advocates for an approach 
to legal personality that really accepts vulnerability and dependency as a physiological 
characteristic of human nature. In this regard, Herring notes how, while the current 
legal conception of the self emphasises autonomy and liberty as key rights whose 
interference requires strong justification, if ‘we start from the norm of vulnerable, 
interdependent, caring people then the nature of legal intervention becomes different’, 
putting at the centre relationships and care.121 As affirmed by Clough the richer 
understanding of vulnerability proposed by Fineman questions the traditional binary 
division between legal capacity and incapacity, between those with cognitive 
impairments and those without.122 Instead, it considers everyone as vulnerable to 
relationships of domination which unequally distribute the resources necessary to 
enable meaningful choices, and to social, political and legal norms which disavow and 
devalue.123 Therefore also in this context vulnerability plays on the same side of the 
                                                          
118 Indeed, Fineman notes how, by recognising that everyone is vulnerable we see how our vulnerability 
may have positive effects and may be generative as it makes us reach out to others, form relationships 
and use our creativity to overcome obstacles. Fineman, ‘Elderly’, above, 96. 
119 See for example M Fineman, ‘Equality and Difference – The Restrained State’ (2015) 66 Alabama 
Law Review 609, 612-616. 
120 Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State’, above, 260. 
121 Herring, above, 18. 




social model and further brings forward its programme of challenging barriers 
oppressing disabled people like individuals living with dementia, such as the othering, 
stigmatising approach to decision-making which deprives them of the possibility to 
choose for themselves. Therefore, Fineman’s vulnerability theory offers a basis, 
anchored to a broad view of the individual, for reforms and regulations which really 
empower individuals living with this condition.   
 
5. Vulnerability, Dementia and the Responsive State  
 
Advocating for the centrality of the vulnerable individual in legal and political 
discourse implies that the state, the law and all other social institutions need to put at 
the centre of their concerns the vulnerabilities of their citizens and take responsibility 
for accommodating them. In this regard, Fineman’s account also challenges the liberal 
ideology of non-interference and non-intervention of the state. 124  Indeed, by 
recognising that everyone is at some extent vulnerable and dependent it leads to see 
that it is not enough to just ‘leave people free’ to plan their life without interference as 
argued by liberal theorists. Instead, society needs to take action in helping its members 
to face their dependence and frailties.125  
In effect, the particular life condition of each individual ultimately depends on 
whether they benefit from services and adjustments which accommodate their needs. 
We often look at disabled people, at individuals living with dementia, or at other 
categories such as children, older people or citizens living in poverty, and see them as 
weak and in need of protection, patronising them for this. However, as pointed out by 
Lindeman, able-bodied working adults tend to forget how their lives are made possible 
by a number of accommodations and social arrangements without which they will also 
be in a position of disadvantage.126 Indeed, people tend to highlight the adjustments 
put in place to deal with the vulnerabilities of others but overlook the fact that they 
also are dependent from fellow individuals who provide them with the equipment and 
assistance needed for exercising their skills, who give them access to products such as 
electricity or food, who offer them emotional support. They forget that they benefit 
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from shops’ extended hours, ATMs or elevators, all services without which their life 
would be extremely more difficult to manage.127 All these and other adjustments are 
the way in which society builds the resilience of its members.  
In Fineman’s words ‘resilience is the critical, yet incomplete, solution to our 
vulnerability’.128 Indeed, it is impossible to completely eliminate vulnerability, as it is 
intrinsic to human condition, but every individual needs to be equipped to resist and 
recover from harm and adversities. In this sense, the American scholar identifies at 
least five different types of resources which social institutions can provide to build 
resilience: physical, human, social, ecological and environmental.129 Physical 
resources are the material means essential for the wellbeing of everyone such as 
housing, food or money for appropriate care and services. Human resources are the 
‘human capital’ which is normally provided through education, training, knowledge 
and experience which provides to individuals the necessary insight to navigate the 
different situations of life. Social resources are provided through the network of 
relationships one forms with surrounding individuals and social institutions. They give 
each person a sense of community and belonging and offer them the emotional and 
practical support needed to express their personality and make choices. Ecological 
resources relate to the environment and context in which one is positioned and which, 
depending on how it is structured, can enhance or hinder one’s possibilities to fully 
enjoy life. Finally, existential resources refer to the value system of an individual and 
the possibility to cultivate such an ideal background and live according to it.  
In Chapter 2 it has been shown how the lack of such resources has a strong impact 
on the right of people living with dementia to decide on medical treatment. Indeed, the 
scarcity of physical and ecological resources creates a situation in which medical 
professionals, carers and care structures do not have the capacity to provide to the 
person the environment and support they need to express their will.130 To this situation 
also contributes the lack of adequate human resources, that is of professionals and 
carers who are properly trained to communicate with the person and are able to 
understand their declarations.131 For this reason and because of dynamics of stigma 
and prejudice, the social resources, represented by the people around the individual 
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living with dementia, often do not contribute to promote the person’s right to decide, 
but rather oppress them and deny them the possibility to decide for themselves.132 
Finally, it has also been seen how people living with dementia are often not given the 
opportunity of cultivating and making use of their spiritual resources, as they tend to 
not be recognised in their ability to value, sense of self and full personality.133     
To the provision of these resources can surely contribute the family and the 
network of personal relationships in which the person is embedded. However, many 
of them can only be brought into existence through wider and more articulate 
structures governed by the state.134 Indeed, in relation to treatment decisions of 
individuals living with dementia it has been seen how the inability of medical 
professionals and carers to assist the person in making choices is often due to the 
insufficient level of resources invested by the state in care services.135 Also barriers 
like prejudice, negative attitudes against people living with dementia and inadequate 
legal capacity legislation require wide ranging actions and deep systemic changes 
which are very difficult to obtain without the contribution of public institutions.  
In this regard, Fineman advocates for adopting a legal and political model based 
on the responsive state.136 She notes how, until now, public institutions have tent to 
withdraw progressively from their role of regulatory force of society, under the 
ideology of the minimal state.137 However, state institutions ‘form systems that play 
an important role in lessening, ameliorating, and compensating for vulnerability’138 as 
they ‘provide us with resources in the form of advantages or coping mechanisms that 
cushion us when we are facing misfortune disaster and violence’.139 Therefore, the 
state has an obligation to ensure the presence of social institutions which can build 
access to social goods and opportunities on an equal basis for all members of 
society.140 In this regard, it must recognise positions of inequality, universal 
vulnerability and dependency acting as an instrument to build resilience and promote 
social justice in both its law making and enforcement functions.141 Therefore, also in 
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133 See the position by A Jaworska, ‘Respecting the Margins of Agency: Alzheimer’s Patients and the 
Capacity to Value’ (1999) 28 Philosophy and Public Affairs 105, analysed in Chapter 2 Section 3. 
134 Fineman, ‘Vulnerability’, above, 146. 
135 See Chapter 1 section 4. 
136 Fineman, ‘Vulnerability’, above, 148-149. 
137 Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality’, above, 5-6. 
138 Ibid, 13. 
139 Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State’, above, 270. 
140 Ibid, 256. 
141 Fineman, ‘Vulnerability’, above, 149. 
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relation to treatment decisions of people living with dementia, an approach focusing 
on the responsive state shifts the attention on how, citing Clough, ‘[legal and policy] 
responses can best be framed to facilitate autonomy in a thicker and more meaningful 
sense, which may involve access to particular resources, or supports in making 
decisions’.142    
Coherently with these premises also vulnerability theory, like the social model, 
puts emphasis on substantive rather than just formal equality and advocates for a policy 
and legal approach which focuses on creating the conditions for people to shape their 
life, rather than just clinging on the dogma of the individual as a solitary artificer of 
their destiny.143 This approach has often led to see state intervention as a possible 
danger to personal freedom and self-determination eroding the possibilities for a robust 
action of social institutions towards the promotion of possibility of choice and the 
provision of the necessary accommodations and support to obviate to people’s intrinsic 
vulnerability.144 Instead, Fineman, building on a long tradition of feminist thought,145 
emphasises that true autonomy and freedom to decide for oneself cannot be attained 
without an ‘underlying provision of substantial assistance, subsidy and support from 
society and its institutions, which give individuals the resources they need to create 
options and make choices’.146 Indeed, autonomy is not an innate characteristic but 
‘must be cultivated by a society that pays attention to the needs of its members’.147 
Such claims echo the views of disability theorists who advocate for the necessity 
to actively support people living with impairments and remove the societal barriers 
oppressing them.148 In this regard, vulnerability theory further specifies the 
implications of such stances for decision-making and offers a more articulate reflection 
on how they lead to a change in expectations towards the state and social institutions. 
Applying its ideas in the field of treatment decisions of individuals living with 
dementia leads to advocate even more strongly for an active engagement of public 
authorities and social institutions in creating the conditions for the person to express 
their will on healthcare matters. Indeed, by combining the perspective of Fineman’s 
                                                          
142 Clough, above, 478. See also C Mackenzie, ‘The Importance of Relational Autonomy and 
Capabilities for an Ethics of Vulnerability’ in C Mackenzie, C Rogers and S Dodds (eds), Vulnerability. 
New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy (Oxford University Press 2014), 55. 
143 Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State’, above, 256-262. 
144 Ibid, 258-259. 
145 See for example SAM McLean, Autonomy Consent and the Law (Routledge 2009), 19-20. 
146 Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State’, above, 260. 
147 Ibid, 260. 
148 See above Section 2.  
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vulnerability theory and the social model, it becomes clear that also in this situation 
the first question to be considered is whether state/institutional, not individual 
functioning is adequate.149 This analysis angle is also adopted in this thesis and 
explored in the next chapters which indeed aim to study how state(s) and public 
institutions can contribute to create the necessary conditions for people living with 
dementia to decide on medical treatment.   
However, in today’s world, state/social institutions are not a monolith, they do not 
act on a single level or only according to a unitary, centralised mechanism. Indeed a 
now extensive body of literature in legal and political theory shows how because of 
the rise of international cooperation, the prominence of transnational governance 
systems, globalisation trends and the increased interconnectedness created by new 
technologies state power is increasingly distributed between traditional national 
bodies, supranational organisations and private actors.150 So, Ost and van de Kerchove 
note how the model according to which they are organised resembles more the shape 
of a complex net than that of a pyramid.151 Others refer to the concept of multilevel 
governance to designate a system in which power, political and regulatory functions 
are organised in different layers.152 This is particularly evident if one looks at Europe. 
Here, the political and legal landscape appears clearly shaped by the stratified action 
of different institutions and normative sources which include international principles, 
policies and norms promoted by regional organisations such as the Council of Europe 
or the European Union, and the initiatives developed at a national level both by 
governments or national/local institutions. In addition, modern society and politics is 
characterised by an increasing public relevance of private bodies such as companies, 
charities and NGOs, which are taken up functions traditionally pertaining to the state, 
                                                          
149 Fineman, ‘Vulnerability, above, 147. 
150  See for example D Held and A McGrew, ‘The End of  the  Old Order?’ (1998) Review  of  
International Studies 219, 219-243; M Shaw, Theory of the Global State: Globality as an Unfinished 
Revolution (Cambridge University Press 2000), 116; D Treisman, The Architecture of Government: 
rethinking Political Decentralization (Cambridge University Press 2007); NK Göksel, Globalisation 
and the State (2004) 15 SAM Papers 1, 6; N Spina, ‘Explaining Political Decentralization in 
Parliamentary Democracies’ (2013) 1 Comparative European Politics 428.  
151 F Ost and M van de Kerchove, De la Pyramide au Réseau ? Pour une théorie dialectique du droit 
(Facultés Universitaires Saint-Louis 2002). 
152 I Pernice, ‘Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European Constitution-
Making Revisited?’ (1999) 36 Common Market Law Review 703, 708-725; L Hooghe and G Marks, 
Multi-level Governance and European Integration (Rowman and Littlefield 2001). 
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complementing and influence the action of governments and law making bodies. 153  
This emerges not only form the (controversial) trends that in many countries have seen 
the privatisation of public services also in the field of healthcare, or the increasing 
demands placed on families and younger generations to step in to obviate the state 
inability to fund extensive care for a rapidly aging population.154 It also finds 
expression in a greater engagement and influence of non-state interest groups, 
professionals, academics and lay citizens in policy processes. This is evident also in 
the area of disability and healthcare, in which activists and disability rights 
associations are now often involved in the development of new regulations or actions, 
and often are the real initiators of processes of change.155 In addition, especially in 
matters of high technical and organisational complexity national, European and 
International bodies regularly decide to take advantage of the advice of academics or 
individuals with specific professional experience in a certain sector.156     
Therefore, if a century ago ‘the state’ could have been comfortably identified with 
national centralised institutions, today it appears as a much more complex and 
articulate entity which includes on the one hand supranational institutions such as the 
UN, the CoE or the EU and on the other hand is influenced by peripheral entities such 
as local authorities and non-governmental or private societal structures.  These 
different articulations of the state and society interact, control and influence each other. 
Depending on how these interactions work the various institutions can be more or less 
responsive to the needs of a given category of people in a certain situation. The 
rationale beyond the existence of these different layers and mechanisms is that, as 
noted by Fineman, also state and social institutions are vulnerable to a variety of 
internal and external corruptions and disruptions, so that they also need to be supported 
                                                          
153 In addition to already cited literature see also JM McCormick, Weber, Habermas and 
Transformations of the European State (Cambridge University Press 2007), 243-245; M Barberis, 
Europa del Diritto (Il Mulino 2008), 249-265. 
154 See H Maarse, Privatisation in European Health Care: a Comparative Analysis in Eight Countries 
(Elsevier 2004); MI Broese van Groenou and A De Boer, ‘Providing Informal Care in a Changing 
Society’ (2016) 13 European Journal of Ageing 271. 
155 One of the clearest examples is the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in 
which disabled people’s of organisations where involved from the beginning in the negotiations. On 
this point see P Harpur, ‘Nothing About Us Without Us: The UN Convention on The Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities’ in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics (2017). It will be seen in Chapter 5 how 
may institutions of the Council of Europe regularly commission research, involving academics and 
professionals as consultants in the policy process. 
156 It will be seen in Chapter 5 how many institutions of the Council of Europe regularly commission 
research, involving academics and professionals as consultants in the policy process. 
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and monitored in their activities.157 Therefore, distributing the resilience building 
function of the state across different levels and autonomous bodies, allows the various 
institutions to control and help each other in putting in place all necessary provisions 
to make sure that individuals are equipped to face their inevitable vulnerabilities. 
In line with the ideas explained so far, in the next chapters I will look at the relevant 
actions which have been or can be undertaken in order to advance the right to decide 
on medical treatment of people living with dementia at various level of state and 
society. I will first focus on the International UN level. In this context, States have 
shown quite a clear will to be more responsive to the needs of individuals living with 
cognitive impairments by ratifying a Convention such as the CRPD which is in line 
with many of the values analysed in this chapter and in Article 12 explicitly advocates 
for State Parties to engage in creating the conditions for the person to exercise their 
legal capacity.158 Subsequently, I will explore how regional organisations such as the 
CoE and the EU can assist their Member States in realising their objective of being 
more responsive also in the field of treatment decisions of individuals living with 
dementia, by promoting the values and principles of the Convention, monitoring the 
measures put in place by governments in this area, providing channels for the exchange 
of ideas and good practices, reminding States their obligations to offer adequate 
services to people living with this condition and, especially in the case of the EU, 
providing funding to helping institutions in fulfilling such an obligation.159 Finally, I 
will study what concrete initiatives may emerge from single European countries which 
can contribute to create the conditions for people living with dementia to express their 




Through the analysis conducted in this chapter it emerges how adopting the 
perspective of the social model of disability and Fineman’s vulnerability theory leads 
to a vision of the person living with dementia which is more inclusive an adherent to 
lived reality. Therefore, these accounts put in a different light the issues analysed in 
                                                          
157 Fineman, ‘The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State’, above, 256. 
158 See Chapter 4. 
159 See Chapters 5 and 6. 
160 See Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 2 and provide a conceptual basis for a model of healthcare decisions which 
avoids the issues and barriers emerging in everyday care and legal practice. 
In particular, the theoretical perspective adopted in this work permits to understand 
more clearly that the difficulties faced by people living with dementia are often not 
inevitable and pathological consequences of their brain’s deterioration but rather are 
due to the way in which society responds or fails to respond to such an impairment. 
Therefore, also in relation to legal personality and capacity to consent, it is necessary 
to abandon the traditional approach based on a sharp binary distinction between 
capable and incapable people or vulnerable and non-vulnerable individuals. Instead, 
research, policies and legal provisions need to concentrate on removing the barriers 
faced by the person in deciding on medical treatment and creating the conditions for 
them to fully express their will. 
This places also a precise responsibility on the different layers of the state, 
international/regional/local governance, and social institutions to actively engage in 
providing services and support to people living with dementia in making treatment 
decisions. Therefore, adopting the views of the social model and Fineman’s 
vulnerability theory poses the basis for a model of legal capacity legislation, which 
does not focus so much on assessing the cognitive abilities of the person, but rather 
intervenes in empowering everyone to make choices for themselves, despite the state 
of their brain. 
In the next chapter I will explore how such a model is embodied by the CRPD and 
in particular by its Article 12, which appears in line with many of the values analysed 





Legal Capacity, Capacity to Consent and the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), was 
adopted by the UN General Assembly on the 13th December 2006 and entered into 
force on the 3rd May 2008.1 It is the first binding treaty reaffirming the rights of 
individuals living with ‘long-term physical, mental, intellectual or sensory 
impairments’.2 The Convention pays particular attention to legal capacity as, due to its 
nature of ‘gatekeeper’ of legal personality,3  it is a fundamental prerequisite for the full 
enjoyment and exercise of any right. 4 In this regard, Article 12 CRPD creates a new 
human rights and support oriented model5 which appears to embrace the values 
analysed in the previous chapter, being in line with many of the core tenets of the social 
model and Fineman’s vulnerability theory.   
                                                          
1  UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted 13 December 2006 UN General 
Assembly Res 61/106 (2006) UN Doc A/RES/61/106, opened for signatures 30 March 2007, entered 
into force 3 May 2008) 2515 UNTS 3 (CRPD). The text was prepared by the Working Group established 
by the Ad Hoc Committee in its 2nd session. See Ad Hoc Committee, ‘Report of the Second session’ 
(2003) UN Doc A/58/118 & Corr.1. So far the Convention has been signed by 160 State Parties and 
Regional Organisations and ratified/acceded by 174. For the list of signatories and ratifications and for 
the negotiations archives see <www.un.org/development /desa/disabilities/convention-on-the-rights-
of_personswithdisabilities.html > accessed 1 August 2017. 
2 Article 1(2) CRPD. F Mégret, ‘The Disabilities Convention: Human Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities or Disability Rights?’ (2008) 30 Human Rights Quarterly 496, 503-514; P Bartlett, ‘The 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and Mental Health Law (2012) 
75 The Modern Law Review 754, 755-757. 
3 See Chapter 1 Section 3. 
4 T Degener and A Begg, ‘From Invisible Citizens to Agents of Change: A Short History of the Struggle 
for the Recognition of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities at the United Nations’ in V Della Fina, R 
Cera and G Palmisano (eds), The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 
A Commentary (Springer 2017), 23. On the importance of legal capacity for the real enjoyment of human 
rights see A Dhanda, ‘Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of the Past or 
Lodestar for the Future?’ (2007) 34 Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce 429, 456-
460. This aspect was also pointed out by disabled people’s organisations in the negotiations of the 
Convention, as it emerges from Ad Hoc Committee, ‘Daily summary of Discussions related to Article 
9 Equal Recognition as Persons before the Law’ Volume 4#3, 26 May 2004, intervention by People 
with Disabilities Australia, National Association of Community Legal Centres and Australian 
Federation of Disability Organizations  < http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc3sum9.htm> 
accessed 20 November 2017. 
5 J Craigie, ‘A Fine Balance: Reconsidering Patient Autonomy in light of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2015) 29 Bioethics 398; T Degener and A Begg, above, 23-24. 
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This chapter provides an overview of Article 12 provisions, clarifying their 
meaning and implications for healthcare decision-making of people living with 
dementia. In this regard, it explores how they could provide normative tools capable 
of promoting the right to decide of such individuals through supported decision-
making. In this way it further advances answering the main research question of the 
thesis by detailing the normative framework through which it is possible to create 
better conditions for people living with dementia to exercise their right to choose on 
medical treatment.  
The analysis adopts a doctrinal perspective, interpreting CRPD principles in light 
of their literal content, the normative context in which they are inserted and the travaux 
préparatoires. In order to get insights on the various interpretive issues, it refers to 
relevant scholarly works, reports and jurisprudence of international bodies. In this 
regard, it relies especially on the documents released by the UN Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the body entrusted by the Convention with the task 
of advising State Parties on the correct interpretation of its provisions,6 and in 
particular to General Comment No 1, focusing on Article 12 CRPD.7   
Therefore, Section 2 gives a brief summary of the general principles underpinning 
the Convention and contained in its first part, studying how they tie in with many of 
the values analysed in Chapter 2 and express the innovative vision characterising the 
CRPD. Section 3, then focuses on Article 12(1) and (2) CRPD, investigating how it 
proposes a human rights approach to legal capacity, which leads to the rejection of the 
traditional model based on the discriminatory distinction capacity/incapacity and on 
the deprivation of decisional power in case of mental disability. Section 4 concentrates 
on the idea of supported decision-making (Article 12(3) CRPD), the legal tool 
proposed by the Convention to promote the wishes of a disabled person in case they 
face difficulties in expressing their will. In addition, Section 5 deals with Article 12 
provisions concerning legal capacity safeguards and with the problem of avoiding of 
possible self-harm and undue influence. Finally, section six looks at statements of 
principle deriving from CRPD provisions such as Articles 25 (health), or 17 (integrity), 
and by UN bodies on the basis of Article 12, remarking the implications of the new 
                                                          
6 Information on the Committee can be found in <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/ 
CRPD/Pages/CRPDIndex.aspx> accessed 17 January 2018. 
7 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (11th session), ‘General Comment No. 1 Article 
12: Equal recognition before the law’ (2014) UN Doc CRPD/C/GC/1, 6. 
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approach to legal capacity described in this chapter in the field of treatment choices. 
The conclusion, summarises the main elements forming the approach to legal capacity 
and treatment decisions emerging from the CRPD and emphasise how they can 
contribute to solve the issues emerging in the field of healthcare decision-making of 
people living with dementia. 
 
2. The CRPD: general principles and normative underpinnings  
 
The CRPD and the Paradigm Shift in the vision of disability 
During negotiations for the CRPD State-Parties and disabled people’s 
organisations (DPOs) agreed that the text ‘has to reflect the social model’8 and to 
‘avoid the construction of disability as solely medical’.9 The influence of such an 
approach emerges from Convention provisions such as paragraph e) of the Preamble, 
which affirms that ‘disability results from the interaction between persons with 
impairments and attitudinal and environmental barriers’, and Article 9, referring to the 
‘identification and elimination of obstacles and barriers’ impacting disabled 
individuals. 10  By adopting this framework, the Convention promotes a paradigm shift 
in the law’s approach to disability.11 Indeed, as affirmed by the UN High 
Commissioner on Human Rights, it sees disabled people not anymore as ‘objects of 
charity’ but as ‘subjects of rights’ and ‘active members of society’.12 Therefore, 
                                                          
8 Statement of the European Disability Forum, Ad Hoc Committee ‘Compilation of Comments on 
Articles of the Draft Text of the Working Group’ (2004). Similar statements were made by Australia, 
Guatemala, Cuba, Venezuela and Thailand, Ad Hoc Committee, ‘Daily Summary of Discussions’ 
Volume 5 #1, 23 August 2004. The negotiations archives are available at 
<http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/adhoccom.htm> accessed 9 October 2017. 
9 Ad Hoc Committee, ‘Views submitted by Governments, Intergovernmental Organizations and United 
Nations Bodies concerning a comprehensive and integral International Convention on the Protection 
and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities’ (2003) UN Doc 
A/AC.265/2003/4+ Corr.1. 
10 On the influence of the social model on the CRPD see also R Kayess and P French, ‘Out of Darkness 
into Light? Introducing the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2008) 8 Human 
Rights Law Review 1, 7. 
11 Ad Hoc Committee, ‘Press Conference by Chairman of Ad Hoc Committee on Convention on 
Disabled Persons’ Rights’ (2006) <http://www.un.org/press/en/2006/060815_Disabilities.doc.htm> 
accessed 9 October 2017. 
12 Ad Hoc Committee, ‘Statement by Louise Arbour, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to the 
Resumed 8th Session of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities’ (2006) <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/rights/ahc8hrcmsg.htm> accessed 10 
October 2017. See also T Mladenov, ‘The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
and its Interpretation’ (2013) ALTER 69, 72-73. Coherently with this spirit DPOs united in the 
International Disability Caucus (IDC) were granted the right to participate in the negotiations and gave 
a crucial contribution to the drafting of the text. Ad Hoc Committee, Report (2002) UN Doc A/57/357, 
4-6. On the participation of DPOs see also AS Kanter, ‘The Promise and Challenge of the United 
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already from the outset it emerges how the CRPD embraces some of the key ideas 
explained in Chapter 2, so that also in relation to treatment decisions of people living 
with dementia, it provides a solid foundation to claim that these individuals need to be 
recognised as persons with full rights and that the barriers need to be remove that 
prevent them from exercising such rights.  
However, it is not clear which version of the social model underpins the 
Convention. Kayess and French maintain that the CRPD is based on a radical 
understanding of the model.13 Indeed, its provisions would seem to look predominantly 
at social barriers, paying less attention to the role played by impairments. However, 
Harpur notes how the definition of disability in terms of ‘interaction’ between 
impairment and societal barriers (Preamble paragraph e) and Article 1(2) CRPD) show 
a certain receptiveness to the ideas of ‘second generation’ disability scholars.14 In 
reality, the Convention combines elements from both versions of the model.15 This 
permits to the CRPD, throughout its articles, to put adequate emphasis on the social 
dynamics shaping the life condition of disabled individuals, but still paying attention 
to the impact of impairment on disabled people’s lives and recognising diversity within 
the category of disability. 16  
In this regard, the Convention appears to be in line also with Fineman’s 
vulnerability theory. There is no evidence that this account had a direct influence on 
the development of the Convention.17 However, many principles of the CRPD appear 
to echo the claims brought forward by the American scholar. Indeed, the definition of 
disability as the interaction between impairment and societal barriers resembles 
                                                          
Nations Convention on the rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2007) 34 Syracuse Journal of 
International Law and Commerce 287, 297-306. 
13 Kayess and French, above, 7. On the various versions of the social model see Chapter 3 Section 2. 
14 P Harpur, ‘Embracing the New Disability Rights Paradigm: the Importance of the Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2012) 27 Disability & Society 1, 3. As admitted by Kayess and 
French, above, 21, the language of the CRPD is not rigorously adherent to the social model using, for 
example, the expression ‘persons with disabilities’, which may suggest that disability comes from the 
person, rather than society. 
15 Kanter, above, 291. MA Stein, ‘Disability Human Rights’ (2007) 95 California Law Review 75 notes 
how the CRPD is also influenced by other ideas such as that of ‘right to development’, which identifies 
development and social justice as a basis for fundamental rights, and Nussbaum’s relational vision of 
dignity. 
16 T Degener, ‘A New Human Rights Model of Disability’ in Della Fina, Cera and Palmisano (eds), 
above, 47-54. 
17 Indeed, Fineman’s account on vulnerability started being developed in the first half of the years 2000s 
and the first important works detailing its fundamental claims were published in between 2008 and 
2012, when the CRPD had already been adopted by the UN General Assembly. Therefore, though 
similar ideas were probably circulating among scholars and activists already during the time in which 
the Convention was being drafted, it cannot be claimed that Fineman’s vulnerability theory had a direct 
influence on its text. 
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closely the idea of vulnerability as caused by the interaction between embodied and 
embedded differences.18 In addition, as it will be seen in relation to Article 12, the 
CRPD seems quite close to the approach to legal personality advocated by Fineman.19 
Finally, the entire Convention is a means to claim the obligation of the state(s) to be 
responsive to the needs of disabled people and actively engage in creating the 
conditions for them to fully enjoy their rights.    
 
Autonomy 
An expression of the paradigm shift underpinning the Convention is contained in 
Article 3(a) CRPD, which affirms, as a general principle, that of respect for the 
‘individual  autonomy’ of disabled individuals. As noted by Mladenov, this is the 
attribute according to which people can be seen as active subjects shaping their lives, 
rather than objects who passively bear others’ choices.20 The link between recognition 
as a full human being and autonomy is particularly evident in relation to mentally 
disabled people whose autonomy has often been restricted by segregating practices 
and laws denying them the freedom to choose.21 It has also been seen how the 
autonomy and ability to decide for themselves of people living with dementia is still 
questioned inside and outside the field of treatment decisions. 22   
The CRPD affirms, in Preamble (n), ‘the importance for persons with disabilities 
of their individual autonomy and independence, including the freedom to make their 
own choices’. This formulation seems to be rather adherent to a liberal conception of 
the individual as totally independent and detached from others. However, the 
Convention goes beyond the classical focus on self-determination and making 
decisions for one’s self.23 Indeed, O’Cinneide notes how the entire CRPD is centred 
on the importance of relationality for real autonomy, recognising that disabled people 
depend on social support for the enjoyment of their rights, and requiring State Parties 
                                                          
18 See Chapter 3 Section 4.  
19 See further Section 3. 
20 Mladenov, above, 73.   
21 See for example F Basaglia (ed), L’Istituzione Negata (Dalai 1961). 
22 See Chapter 2. See also Nuffield Council on Bioethics, Dementia: ethical issues (Nuffiled 2009), 79-
80 <http://nuffieldbioethics.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Dementia-report-Oct-09.pdf> accessed 
13 January 2018; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, ‘Involuntary placement and 
involuntary treatment of persons with mental health problems’ (2012); European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights, ‘Legal Capacity of Persons with Intellectual Disabilities and Persons with Mental 
Health Problems’, (2013) both in <http://fra.europa.eu/en/publications-and-resources/publications> 
accessed 5 November 2017.  
23 Mladenov, above, 73. 
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to actively promote their empowerment and independence.24 In this regard, it is in line 
with Fineman’s claim that autonomy presupposes an active engagement of social 
institutions and of the people around the individual in order to create the opportunities 
for them to exercise their power of choice. The adherence to such an approach 
emerges, for example, in Article 19 CRPD, on independent living, which affirms that 
every disabled individual shall have access to the support services necessary to 
promote ‘living and inclusion in the community’.25 Moreover, Article 12 CRPD 
advocates for disabled people to be actively ‘supported’ in making decisions for 
themselves.26 Therefore, the CRPD contains a general principle requiring the state and 
the society around disabled individuals like people living with dementia to engage in 
removing barriers and creating the conditions for the exercise of their autonomy. 
 
Equality and non-discrimination  
The theme of barriers removal is further developed by the principle of equality and 
non-discrimination.27 Indeed, as noted by Arnardóttir, the Convention is characterised 
by a strong focus on substantive equality, which does not only require that all people 
are treated in the same way, but that socio-economic barriers affecting individuals in 
situations of disadvantage are removed. 28 In this regard, it again shows the adherence 
of the Convention to a vision such as that advocated by the social model and Fineman’s 
focused on barriers removal and the duty of society to accommodate disadvantage.   
Therefore, on the one hand, Article 5(2) affirms that State Parties shall ‘guarantee 
to persons with disabilities equal and effective legal protection against discrimination’, 
intended as ‘distinction, exclusion or restriction’ on the basis of their impairment.29 
On the other hand, the Convention also advocates for equality of opportunity,30 
                                                          
24 C O’Cinneide, ‘Extracting Protection for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities from Human Rights 
Frameworks: Established Limits and New Possibilities’ in OM Arnardóttir and G Quinn (eds), The UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: European and Scandinavian perspectives 
(Martinus Nijhoff 2009) , 3. See also L Series, ‘Relationships, Autonomy and Legal Capacity: Mental 
Capacity and Support Paradigms’ (2015) 40 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 80, 85; Della 
Fina, ‘Article 3 [General Principles’ in Della Fina, Cera and Palmisano, above, 124. 
25 The link between this provision and the right of autonomy is also stressed in Committee on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities (18th session), ‘General Comment No. 5 on Living Independently and being 
Included in the Community’ (2017) UN Doc CRPD/C/GC/5, 1-4. 
26 See further Section 4. 
27 Article 3 (b), (e) and (g) and Article 5 CRPD. 
28 OM Arnardóttir, ‘A Future of Multidimensional Disadvantage Equality?’ in Arnardóttir and Quinn 
(eds), above, 46. 
29 On non-discrimination in the CRPD see also R Cera, ‘Article 5 [Equality ad Non-Discrimination]’ in 
Della Fina, Cera and Palmisano (eds), above, 161-167. 
30 Article 3(e) CRPD. 
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implying that action is taken to provide to disabled individuals with the resources 
necessary to have the same possibilities of choice of all other individuals. Through 
such principles the Convention offers a first important foundation to ground the idea 
of a state obligation to actively contribute to build, in Fineman’s words, the physical, 
human, social, ecological and environmental resources necessary for a person to 
overcome their vulnerability also in relation to treatment decisions.31 
Indeed, Article 5(3) CRPD obliges State Parties to take ‘all appropriate steps to 
ensure that reasonable accommodation is provided’. As noted by Kayess and French, 
this principle is probably the main expression of the substantive approach to equality 
at the centre of the CRPD as it requires the adoption of ‘necessary and appropriate 
modification and adjustments’32 to guarantee to disabled people the enjoyment and 
exercise of their human rights on an equal basis with others. 33 Such protection and 
accommodation is not only directed against barriers directly related to disability, but 
also to other dynamics which can negatively impact on the condition of disabled 
individuals.34 Indeed, paragraph (p) of the Preamble urges to address also ‘aggravated  
forms of  discrimination on the basis of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political 
or other opinion, national, ethnic, indigenous or social origin, property, birth, age or 
other status.’35  
With regard to treatment choices of individuals living with dementia, the 
aforementioned principles imply not only that these people cannot be discriminatorily 
deprived of the possibility to decide, but that the many contextual barriers to their 
power to choose need to be removed. In this regard, the principle of reasonable 
accommodation provides a normative basis to claim that in the field of medical 
decision-making State(s) are truly responsive, investing resources in the promotion of 
the person’s capacity to decide.  
 
                                                          
31 See Chapter 3 Section 5. 
32 Article 2(4) CRPD. 
33 Kayess and French, above, 9. 
34 T Degener, ‘Intersections between Disability, Race and Gender in Discrimination Law’ in D Schieck 
and A Lawson (eds), European Union Non-Discrimination Law and Intersectionality. Investigating the 
Triangle of Racial, Gender and Disability Discrimination (Routledge 2011), 33-38;  G de Beco, 
‘Protecting the Invisible: An Intersectional Approach to International Human Rights Law’ (2017) 17 
Human Rights Law Review 633, 645-656; W Ringel, ‘Non-discrimination, Accommodation, and 
Intersectionality under the CRPD: New Trends and Challenges for the UN Human Rights System’ 
(2017) 20 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online 98.   
35 With particular regard to gender also Article 3(g) CRPD inserts among the Convention General 




In Chapter 2 it has been shown how one of the first barriers to the decisional power 
of people living with dementia is that they are kept out of choices on their care because 
of prejudice.36 This is one of the ways in which they, as many individuals experiencing 
mental health and neurological conditions, are excluded from ordinary social 
interactions. Such dynamics are often triggered by stigma37 deriving from unjustified 
fear of diversity, labelling or other forms of socio-economic oppression,38 and leading 
to rejection or marginalisation by the community.39 Of course, they do not necessarily 
derive just from disability, being often the result of the interplay between health, age, 
gender, race or class factors.40 
A statement against these attitudes is provided by the principle of social 
inclusion.41 The UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs refers to it as ‘the 
process of improving the terms of participation in society for people who are 
disadvantaged […] through enhanced opportunities, access to resources, voice and 
respect for rights’42 Similarly the World Bank identifies it as the process of enhancing 
the opportunities of individuals disadvantaged on the basis of their identity to be part 
of society.43 Therefore, by referring to this right in relation to all disabled people, the 
CRPD clarifies that even individuals living with a severe cognitive impairment should 
not be excluded and stigmatised. Therefore, also in relation to treatment decisions of 
people living with dementia behaviours according to which the person’s opinion is 
disregarded, assuming them incapable to reason, need to be abandoned.  
                                                          
36 Chapter 2 Section 2. 
37 N Rüscha et al ‘Mental Illness Stigma: Concepts, Consequences, and Initiatives to reduce Stigma’ 
(2005) 20 European Psychiatry 529. 
38 N Kabeer, ‘Social exclusion and the MDGs: the challenge of ‘durable inequalities’ in the Asian 
context’ (Asia Conference: Promoting Growth, Ending Poverty, London, March 2015) 
<www.eldis.org/vfile/upload/1/document/0708/DOC21178.pdf> accessed 13 January 2018. 
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(Prentice Hall 1963), 2-3; R Kurzban and M Leary, ‘Evolutionary Origins of Stigma: the Functions of 
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Press 2007). 
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Foundation for Shared Prosperity’ (2013) in 
<https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/16195 License: CC BY 3.0 IGO> accessed  9 
March 2009; UN, ‘Leaving No One Behind: the imperative of Inclusive Development. Report on the 
World Social Situation’ (2016) UN Doc ST/ESA/362, 20.  
41 Article 3(c) CRPD. 
42 UN, above, 20.  
43 World Bank, above. 
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Accessibility 
A normative basis to tackle more ‘practical’ barriers in the field of decision-
making can be found in the right to accessibility.44 Indeed, this principle refers not 
only to the removal of barriers impeding the access to physical environments, but also 
to issues of communication, readability or availability of services which prevent 
disabled people to live their life to the full and enjoying their rights.45 In relation to 
healthcare the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) 
identifies, in its General Comment No. 14, four components of accessibility: non-
discrimination (universal access to health facilities), physical accessibility (being able 
to physically reach hospitals and ambulatories) economic accessibility (affordability) 
and information accessibility (being put in condition to understand information on 
medical treatment).46 The last component is of special importance for people living 
with dementia, as it has been seen that a lot of problems with regard to healthcare 
decisions arise from the fact that information on medical treatment is not explained to 
them in a way that matches with their needs.47  
In this regard, Article 9(1) CRPD provides a clear statement for the overcoming 
of such obstacles requiring State Parties to promote the elimination of barriers in 
‘information, communication and other services’. In order to achieve this goal Article 
9(2) prescribes that training is provided to staff of public and private organisations, so 
they are able to properly provide accessible information. Moreover, Articles 2 and 4(f) 
urge State Parties to assure that services are possibly designed from the beginning to 
be usable by all people without the need for adaptation. In relation to treatment 
decisions, this implies that public and private actors need to make sure that 
explanations, guidelines or protocols are written taking into account the possible 
                                                          
44 Articles 3(f) and 9 CRPD. The Committee on the Rights of persons with disabilities emphasises how 
such a principle is linked to that of reasonable accommodation and how it is also a prerequisite for 
independence and inclusion of disabled individuals. See Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (11th Session), ‘General comment No. 2. Article 9: Accessibility’ (2014) UN Doc 
CRPD/C/GC/2, 1 and 10. See also F Seatzu, ‘Article 9 [Accessibility]’ in Della Fina, Cera and Pamisano 
(eds), above, 228-233. 
45 See A Palacios and F Bariffi, La discapacidad como una cuestión de derechos humanos. Una 
aproximación a la  Convención Internacional sobre los Derechos de las Personas con Discapacidad 
(Cinca 2007), 105-104; L Waddington, ‘A Disabled Market: Free Movement of Goods and Services in 
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46 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (22nd session), ‘General Comment No. 14:  The 
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12)’ (2000) UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4, 3-4. 
47 See Chapter 2 Section 4. 
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difficulties of comprehension of disabled people such as individuals living with 
dementia.  
 
3. Article 12 CRPD and the right to legal capacity  
 
Personhood, autonomy and legal capacity 
The values informing the CRPD emerge also in Article 12, which specifies them 
in relation to legal capacity. Article 12(1) CRPD affirms that all disabled people have 
‘the right to recognition everywhere as persons before the law’. As noted by Quinn, 
this norm is a direct expression of the Convention paradigm shift towards the 
recognition of disabled people as fully fledged members of society. 48 Indeed, legal 
personality is the juridical tool through which an individual or a group is recognised 
as a bearer of rights and duties.49  
Article 12(2) further develops the statement of principle contained in Article 12(1), 
affirming that ‘States Parties shall recognize that persons with disabilities enjoy legal 
capacity on an equal basis with others in all aspects of life’. As confirmed by the 
Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, in the CRPD the term legal 
capacity refers both to the entitlement to hold rights (legal standing) and to exercise 
them (legal agency).50 Therefore, Article 12(2) promotes a true conceptual revolution 
as it classifies the power to make legal choices as a fundamental right, something no 
one can be deprived of, at least on the basis of disability. 51 This means that under the 
Convention legal capacity cannot be dependent anymore on the mental capacity of the 
                                                          
48 G Quinn, ‘Personhood and Legal Capacity. Perspectives on the Paradigm Shift of Article 12 CRPD’ 
(HPOD Conference, Cambridge Mass, 2010) <www.nuigalway.ie%2Fcdlp%2Fdocuments% 
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51 See Hoffman and Könczei, above, 145-146; O Lewis, ‘Advancing Legal Capacity Jurisprudence’ 
(2011) 6 European Human Rights Law Review 700, 700; E Flynn and A Arstein-Kerslake, ‘The Support 
Model of Legal Capacity: fact, fiction or fantasy?’ (2014) 32 Berkeley Journal of International Law 
124, 127-130.  
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individual.52 In this sense the Committee notes that ‘under Article 12 of the 
Convention, perceived or actual deficits in mental capacity must not be used as a 
justification for denying legal capacity’.53 In this way the CRPD adopts a universal 
model in which legal capacity is considered a fundamental attribute of each individual 
independently of the impairment they may or may not have. Under this approach even 
people living with severe dementia should be recognised, in principle, as having the 
same level of legal capacity of everyone else.   
This vision shows a significant discontinuity with the traditional approach to legal 
personality which, in line with the liberal concept of autonomy, subordinates the 
recognition of legal capacity to the presence in the person of mental capacity.54  Under 
this classical approach, the two concepts are so conflated to be considered the same 
entity.55 As noted by Dhanda, following this approach, a mentally disabled person can 
see all or part of their decisional power transferred to a guardian or deputy risking a 
sort of civil death.56 Instead, the CRPD relies on a conception of the individual putting 
more at the centre their relationality. In this regard, it appears in line with feminist 
scholars like Fineman, who claim that there is no real autonomy and freedom to choose 
unless society and the people around the decision-maker actively work for making sure 
that the person benefits from an adequate spectrum of alternatives and receives all the 
support their require to make a certain decision.57 As explained by Quinn, the 
Convention recognises that ‘most of us, most of the time, both think and act 
irrationally’.58 While traditional liberal theory tends to perceive the individual as an 
atom, ‘shorn of all cultural and social bonds’, there is, behind Article 12, the awareness 
that our ability to decide is really determined by the environment in which we act.59 
                                                          
52 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ‘General Comment’, above, 3-4. On the 
distinction between legal and mental capacity see N Devi, J Bickenbach and G Stucki, ’Moving towards 
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54 Quinn, ‘Personhood and Legal Capacity’, above, 6-9.  
55 P Bielby, ‘The Conflation of Competence and Capacity in English Medical Law: A Philosophical 
Critique’ (2005) 8 Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 357. See also Committee on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities, ‘General Comment’, above, 4. 
56 Dhanda, above, 438-456. On the functioning of this civil death around the world see ML 
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Persons with Mental Disabilities and the Future of Guardianship Law’ (2013) 117 Penn State Law 
Review 1159, 1160-1173. 
57 See Chapter 3 Section 5.  
58 Quinn, ‘Personhood and Legal Capacity’, above, 6-9. 
59 Ibid, 8. 
101 
 
Moreover, it acknowledges that the concept of ‘mental capacity is not […] an 
objective, scientific and naturally occurring phenomenon’ but is ‘contingent on social 
and political contexts’.60 Indeed, it has also been seen how this concept is based on a 
narrow and distorted perception of what making decisions is in reality.61 Therefore, it 
cannot be assumed as an impartial criteria for regulating legal personhood. 
Through this principle the CRPD challenges the rationalistic legal approach and 
the negative attitudes of legal and medical professionals, which de facto strip people 
living with dementia of their power to decide for themselves. Indeed, it clarifies how 
even in this case all situations in which the person is assumed ‘incompetent’ or 
‘demented’ and thus disregarded in their opinions are not acceptable.  
 
The rejection of the capacity/incapacity distinction  
As noted by Richardson, Article 12(1) and (2) implies, with regard to disabled 
adults, the abandonment of the traditional binary divide between legal capacity and 
incapacity.62 Indeed, according to the CRPD, there is no point at which the person’s 
disability makes them loose their power to decide. As affirmed by Clough, in this way 
Article 12 challenges the hyper cognitivist, artificial, othering, stigmatising 
incompetence model traditionally characterising western legal capacity legislations,63 
which, it has been seen, creates a series of issues in the field of treatment decisions of 
people living with dementia. In this regard, it appears to adopt a view of legal 
personality very close to that proposed by Fineman, who claims that in legal and 
political discourse we should stop dividing people into capable and incapable, 
vulnerable and invulnerable, as liberal theorists seem to suggest. Instead we need to 
recognise that we are all at a certain extent vulnerable.64 
The consequence of adopting this perspective is the rejection of tests of legal 
capacity/incapacity stating the cognitive prerequisites for the validity of legal 
decisions. 65 Under the classical distinction reported by Wong et al, there are three 
                                                          
60 Ibid, 4. 
61 See Chapter 2 Section 5.  
62 G Richardson, ‘Mental Disabilities and the Law: from Substitute to Supported Decision-Making?’ 
(2012) 65 Current Legal Problems 333, 343. 
63 B Clough, ‘Disability and Vulnerability: Challenging the Capacity/Incapacity Binary’ (2017) 16 
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64 On this point see Chapter 3 Section 4. 
65 See Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ‘General Comment’, above, 4. On capacity 
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and Consent to Treatment’ (2004) 97 Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine 415; M Donnelly, 
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types of legal capacity tests. 66 The first, the status approach, presumes that a person 
with a diagnosis of mental impairment is for this sole reason incapable of making legal 
decisions.67 This test is to be refused as it assumes that all mentally disabled people 
are incapable to make decisions, without verifying at what extent this is factually true 
in the specific case.68 According to the second type, the outcome approach, the 
attribution of legal incapacity is made according to the decision content, so that the 
person is judged incapable if their choices seem irrational. Also this model appears 
discriminatory, as it leads to disregard choices just because they are socially 
unacceptable.69 Under the third test, the functional approach, the capacity of the 
person is assessed on the basis of their actual ability to understand the substance and 
consequences of a single decision.70 Here the assessment is not abstract, but case 
specific.71 An example of this kind of tests are the MacAT-T and section three English 
Mental Capacity Act 2005.72 
This last approach, used to receive higher approval among experts, as it takes into 
account the nuances of the specific case and validates even decisions that others may 
consider irrational. 73 Also for these reasons, scholars such as Keys or Szmukler, Daw 
and Callard have maintained that the CRPD was imposing a ‘functionalist approach’ 
on legal capacity. 74 However, in General Comment No 1, the Committee clarifies that 
                                                          
Healthcare Decision-Making and the Law: Autonomy, Capacity and the Limits of Liberalism 
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also the functional approach needs to be rejected as ‘it is discriminatorily applied to 
people with disabilities’ and ‘presumes to be able to accurately assess the inner-
workings of the human mind’.75 In this regard, it remarks how in all the three 
approaches cited above, ‘a person’s disability and/or decision-making skills are taken 
as legitimate grounds for denying his or her legal capacity’ and  ‘Article 12 does not 
permit such discriminatory denial of legal capacity, but, rather, requires the provision 
of support in the exercise of legal capacity’.76 It has been seen with regard to treatment 
decisions of people living with dementia how such norms subordinate the person’s 
decisional power to the reaching of a rationalistic standard not imposed on others.77 
Therefore, by refusing the binary distinction capacity/incapacity, Article 12(2) 
contributes to promote the right to decide on care of these individuals. It also avoids 
the problem, typical of the classical approach, of assessing at what point of their 
gradual cognitive deterioration the person has to be regarded as mentally incapable.78 
Finally, it removes the dilemma of whether the previous ‘non-demented’ declarations 
instead of the actual will of the individual should be respected: indeed, even in case of 
severe dementia all the statements of the individual are in principle valid.    
 
The rejection of substituted decision-making 
The direct practical consequence of this human rights approach to legal capacity 
is that transferring the individual’s decisional power to a third person who decides for 
them is not an acceptable response to their possible difficulties in decision-making. 
General Comment No 1 expressly emphasises that ‘States parties must review the laws 
allowing for guardianship and trusteeship’ and ‘replace regimes of substitute decision-
making’.79 Here the Committee refers to the classical oppressive notion of 
guardianship which, as reported by Glen, is generally defined as the legal process by 
which the state deprives a person of the power to make decisions, and grants that power 
to another individual or entity.80 However, as a consequence of reforms put in place in 
many European and Extra-European countries, today the word guardianship is often 
used to designate both substituted decision-making measures and arrangements more 
                                                          
75 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ’General Comment’, above, 4. 
76 Ibid. 
77 See above Chapter 2 Section 5.  
78 Wong et al, above, 439 identify this as a general shortcoming of the functional approach. 
79 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ‘General Comment’, above, 6. 
80 K Glen, ‘Changing Paradigms: Mental Capacity, Legal Capacity, Guardianship and Beyond’ (2012) 
44 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 93, 93. 
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respectful of the person’s autonomy.81 Therefore, in order to understand what 
provisions are in line with the CRPD, it is necessary to look at the single norms and 
nuances of national legislations.  
In this regard, the Committee affirms that have to be considered forms of 
substituted decision-making, illegitimate under Article 12, all those measures in 
which: 
a) legal capacity is removed from a person, even for a single decision; 
b) a substitute decision-maker can be appointed against the will of the person; 
c) the substitute decision-maker decides according to ‘what is believed to be in 
the objective “best interests” of the person concerned’ instead of choosing on 
basis of the person’s will and preferences’. 82  
 
In relation to treatment decisions of people living with dementia, this principle 
derived from the CRPD, seems to address the problem that decisions are made for the 
person even when they have opinions on their own. In this regard, it proposes a radical 
solution, denying the very same possibility that someone can be substituted in making 
choices. 
 
4. Supported Decision-Making 
 
The Supported decision-making approach to legal capacity 
Article 12(3) CRPD states that, instead of depriving the person of their decisional 
power, ‘States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide access by persons 
with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their legal capacity’. 
Therefore, consistently with its universal legal capacity approach, the Convention 
states that also in the case of individuals living with severe cognitive impairments the 
law cannot take away their capacity to make decisions, but rather it has to put in place 
the means to remove the societal barriers that the person faces in exercising their legal 
capacity and that, in the logic of the CRPD, are seen as the real hurdles which prevent 
them from being recognised as fully fledged individuals. This statement shows a 
decisive option for an ‘active’ approach to legal capacity, in which the person is not 
                                                          
81 For an overview of such reforms see T Carney ‘Searching for workable Alternatives to Guardianship 
for Vulnerable Populations?’ (2015) 1 Ethics, Medicine and Public Health 113, 113-116. 
82 See Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ‘General Comment’, above, 6.  
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just ‘assessed’ but is ‘helped’ in developing and voicing their decision through 
supported decision-making, and is respected in their decisions which are still 
recognised legal effect. Indeed, here support by others, rather than mental capacity, is 
indicated as the key prerequisite of choice making. 
Through this norm, the CRPD applies also to the field of legal capacity the ideas 
of the social model of disability, affirming how rather than focusing on impairment it 
is necessary to look at the social dynamics impacting the life of disabled people and to 
use the social and relational network, also with regard to choice making.83 Moreover, 
by requiring that State Parties provide access to measures of support, Article 12(3) 
CRPD provides a strong normative basis for claiming, in line with Fineman’s 
vulnerability theory, that state and society should be responsive and invest resources 
in creating the conditions for disabled individuals like people living with dementia to 
make decisions.  
General Comment No. 1 clarifies the key elements that need to characterise 
supported decision-making. 84  In summary it demands that: 
a) the rights and preferences of the person are always respected; 
b) support measures are proportional to the person’s needs;85  
c) support should be available to everyone and costs, difficulties of 
communication and severity of impairment, should not be an obstacle to it;  
d) legal capacity support ‘should not hinge on mental capacity assessments’; 
e) the person can refuse the support and there are safeguards to prevent abuses.  
 
However, neither the Convention nor the General Comment provide a specific 
definition of this concept. Therefore, a series of questions remain open. 
The first concerns who has to materially assist the person in making choices. The 
Committee states that support ‘encompasses both informal and formal support 
arrangements’.86 In relation to both cases, commentators emphasise the necessity that 
                                                          
83 See Chapter 3 Section 2. 
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the support person is a trusted individual who has an ongoing relationship with the 
beneficiary and a good knowledge of their personality and desires.87 Informal 
arrangements, in which family members or friends voluntarily help the person, 
emphasise this dimension of proximity, besides being less costly.88 Support may even 
be provided by more than one individuals with differentiated roles forming a ‘circle of 
support’ or ‘support network’.89 Formal support arrangements would entail the 
appointment through a formal act (e.g. lasting power of attorney or authority decision) 
of a caretaker helping the individual in a series of choices.90 As stressed by Glen, such 
kind of mechanisms can be useful especially when the person lives alone and has no 
family, as it happens nowadays with many older people.91  Moreover, being formally 
appointed, the support person is usually subject to regular scrutiny by a designated 
body. Also in this case the role may be shared by a series of individuals. An important 
contribution may be also given by independent advocates, who have the advantage of 
being external to the family, so impartial and less inclined to exert pressure on the 
person.92 As stated by Mirfin-Veicht, support can also take the form of peer 
advocacy/peer support or self-advocacy in which an individual which lives the same 
disability of the beneficiary helps them in making decisions. 93   
Another open question concerns the possible means of support that need to be put 
in place according to the CRPD. As all measures need to be ‘tailored to the person’s 
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circumstances’94 it is difficult to identify them on an a priori basis. However, the 
Committee gives some examples. The first kind of support means it identifies consist 
in providing accessible information, reminding or explaining a certain point in simple 
terms.95 Another way of supporting the person may be through ‘the development and 
recognition of diverse, non-conventional methods of communication’ in case of 
individuals with difficulties in expressing themselves like many people living with 
advanced dementia.96 Also it may consist in creating a favourable or quieter 
environment. Trying to further qualify what supported decision-making entails, the 
CRPD Handbook for Parlamentarians states that the support person(s) is or are 
someone who ‘explain(s) the issues when necessary, and interpret(s) the signs and 
preferences of the individual’ and can, for example, ‘communicate the individual’s 
intentions to others or help him/her understand the choices at hand’ or ‘help others to 
realise that a person with significant disabilities is also a person with a history, interests 
and aims’.97 Therefore, it highlights three components of support: explanation, 
interpretation and management of the relationship with others.  
As affirmed by the Committee, supported-decision making should cover all the 
possible situations regarding decision-making of disabled people.98 In this regard, 
Bach and Kerzner, describe support as a continuum, a dynamic process that follows 
the person in the evolution of the disability, articulated in three levels: ‘legally 
independent decision-making’, in which the disabled person is substantially able to 
make decisions on their own, ‘supported decision-making’, in which the person is 
assisted by someone that tries to help them in expressing their wishes and ‘facilitated 
decision-making’, when, in case of significant disability, every attempt of 
communicating with the person is useless, so it is necessary to reconstruct their will 
from previous declarations. 99 
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Supported decision-making and severe impairments 
The universal support model proposed by the CRPD has been criticised for being 
utopian in relation to serious impairments like very severe dementia or coma.100 
Already in the responses to the Draft General Comment, scholars and DPOs have 
stated how, in such extreme cases, it may seem impossible to avoid forms of 
substituted decision-making, because not only the person is unable to speak, but also 
their basic brain functions seem almost totally compromised.101 Dawson advocates a 
more ‘realistic’ interpretation of the CRPD, which allows for a limited application of 
substituted decision-making.102 In this regard, State Parties like The Netherlands, 
Norway and Poland made reservations to the Convention, specifying that they interpret 
Article 12 as permitting substituted decision-making in extreme circumstances.103 In 
this regard, positions in the debate seem split between those who maintain that the 
CRPD allows for a limited role of substituted decision-making104 and those who argue 
that this mechanism is in any case impermissible.105   
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In reality, as noted by Series, even the Committee includes, under the category 
‘supported decision-making’ practices which are traditionally considered substituted 
decision-making. 106 Indeed, in paragraph 21 of General Comment No 1, it suggests 
that where, after significant attempts have been made, it is not possible to determine 
the opinion of the person, the decision should be made on the basis of ‘the best 
interpretation of will and preferences’ that is, by reconstructing their desires.107 This 
is clearly a situation in which the person is substituted as the decision is materially 
expressed by a third person, and the Committee seems to endorse it. Also, Arstein-
Kerslake and Flynn argue that Article 12 ban on substituted decision-making does not 
require states to eliminate all schemes in which a person has to make decisions for 
another. 108 For example, powers of attorney or situations in which a representative is 
appointed to make decisions on the basis of the person’s wishes would be still 
acceptable.109 
In this regard, even a convinced supporter of Article 12 like Quinn admits that the 
Committee’s position according to which pure support is always the only possible and 
sufficient remedy, may be considered more as a fiction. 110 Though, he maintains, it is 
a necessary fiction as it permits to make a strong political statement in favour of 
support and avoids that especially judges could attempt to widen the range of 
exceptions to this paradigm.111 However, Callaghan and Ryan, note how the 
terminological confusion produced by such a fiction is hindering the reform process 
as, in the eyes of a series of practitioners and States, it undermines the seriousness and 
practical applicability of Article 12 model, as what is proposed by this norm appears 
to most professionals as simply impossible to achieve.112  
The case of people living with dementia shows how, from the strictly technical-
legal point of view, the uncompromising model of universal legal capacity proposed 
by the CRPD and its Committee is at least partially untenable. Indeed, it does not seem 
to take into due account what happens in the very last phases of the condition in which 
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the person is generally unable to speak or even to move, and their capacity to interact 
with the people and the environment around them is so compromised that it is 
inevitable to substitute them in the decision.113 So, the approach emerging from the 
Convention appears not completely evidence based. 
However, though with the caveat that there are (few) cases in which this support 
focused model of universal legal capacity is not valid, the approach emerging from 
Article 12 CRPD would still be a significant improvement compared to the traditional 
model of capacity to consent and treatment decisions of people living with dementia. 
Indeed, the latter, being centred on the myth of rationality and the gatekeeping function 
of cognitive capacity, appears much less evidence based than the one proposed by 
Article 12 CRPD. As already seen in Chapter 2, also for people living without a 
specific impairment making decisions is not so much a matter of cognition and often 
the most important choices in an individual’s life are determined by irrational factors 
rather than rational considerations.114 Therefore, by rejecting such a 
‘hypercognitivistic’ model of decision-making and mental capacity, the CRPD moves 
away from a system that discriminatorily applies to people living with impairments 
like dementia a rationalistic standard of capacity not imposed on others.115 In addition, 
by qualifying legal capacity as a fundamental right of every individual and identifying 
supported decision-making as the mechanism that needs to be put in place in case a 
disabled individual experiences any difficulty in making choices, it significantly 
attenuates the risk, often present in the case of individuals living with dementia, that 
the person is stripped of the possibility of making decisions too soon and that choices 
are made for them by others, despite the fact that they may still have articulate opinions 
and the ability to voice them. 
                                                          
113 Also the studies which classify a high percentage of their participants living with dementia as capable 
to consent still report that a percentage of these individuals are absolutely unable to form or 
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Therefore, notwithstanding the concerns of some scholars and practitioners, 
Article 12 CRPD appears to propose an approach to legal capacity which, though not 
completely unproblematic, improves on the current system and is worth promoting and 
implementing. In this regard, in relation to the debate regarding this provision of the 
Convention, Callaghan and Ryan suggest to avoid focusing too much on the problem 
of the appropriateness of the Committee’s idea of universal legal capacity, as this may 
divert the attention from what are the really important and positive messages of Article 
12 CRPD, such as the condemnation of all legal capacity regimes discriminating on 
the basis of disability and the fact that in any decisional process, and also in case of 
serious impairments, the will of the person needs to be centre stage.116 Indeed, what 
really seems to be the message emerging from the CRPD and General Comment No 1 
in relation to pervasive impairments, is that when it is inevitable to substitute the 
person one has to prefer a ‘subjective’ paradigm, rather than one based on the notion 
of ‘best interests’. This is very important especially in the field of decisions on medical 
treatment. Indeed, as already seen, though all surrogate methods have disadvantages, 
the ‘best interests’ paradigm is particularly problematic has it does not permit to take 
into account the nuances of such highly subjective decisions, such as those regarding 
medical care, and results paternalistic.117  
 
Advance directives 
In this regard, the Committee appears to endorse also advance directives as a 
means of support which allows the person to clarify ‘will and  preferences  which  
should  be  followed  at  a  time when they may not be in a position to communicate’.118 
Indeed, it states how ‘all persons with disabilities have the right to engage in advance 
planning’ of which advance directives are one of the main examples.119 However, it 
has been seen how this instrument poses moral, legal and practical concerns 
particularly in relation to people living with dementia.120 Moreover, because of its 
essence of declaration of a legally capable person for the time they are incapable121 it 
seems to presuppose the sharp divide capacity/incapacity, an idea overcome by the 
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CRPD. In this sense, Scholten and Gather observe that under Article 12 advance 
directives could virtually never become effective or operate only in rare cases.122 
For these reasons it may appear strange that this legal tool is still mentioned and 
even endorsed in General Comment No. 1. In reality, in the Article 12 model of 
decision-making, it is still important, only it has a different role than in the past. Indeed, 
the Committee refers to this mechanism as one (among many) ‘form of support’ which 
combined together can contribute to reconstruct the will of the person.123 Therefore, it 
does not act anymore as a substitute of the person’s actual statements, which enters 
into force at a given moment and dictates their will for them.  Instead, it is an 
instrument more directed at integrating and double-checking the person’s actual 
declarations in the context of wider support relationships. Morrissey notes how, as the 
person can set out the circumstances in which the advance directive is activated or 
deactivated, it can enter into force gradually and even for a limited period of time, 
serving as a communication tool  which ensures that the person’s will is respected in 
moments of crisis, but without impacting on legal capacity.124 Therefore, people living 
with dementia can decide to write, with the help of a supporter, an advance directive 
for particularly ‘bad days’ or for the time in which, in the last stage of their illness, 
they will not be able to express detailed opinions. When the time will occur, their 
support person, doctors or carers will refer to that document but, if in one moment of 
lucidity different opinions will emerge from the person’s statements or behaviours, 
they will have to take them into account as well. Moreover, the Committee also stresses 
how the support that the person should receive, includes also the drafting of advance 
care plans.125 Therefore such a declaration will be constructed through the ongoing 
interaction with the supporter, relatives, specialised organisations, and become a 
document that the person writes and periodically updates in order to leave a trace of 
their wishes. 
This approach avoids the dilemmas emerging in the field of care decisions of 
individuals with dementia when the anticipated will contrasts with current utterances 
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of the person or there are doubts that what it is written in the advance directive really 
reflects the actual wishes of its author.126 Indeed, here there is no divide between a 
time in which the person has the power to decide and one in which only the advance 
directive needs to be followed. Rather, the whole situation is seen as a process of 
change which is followed by the supporter and accounted for in the advance directive. 
 
5. Protection and Safeguards 
 
The problem of self-harmful decisions  
Another point on which the critics of the Convention have focused, is that Article 
12 would not seem to offer indications on what to do in case of self-harming decisions 
of the person127 or when the individual seems unable to grasp the substance of a certain 
choice.128 Indeed, there are cases in which the law may arrive after a document has 
been signed or a decision made, too late for giving support. In addition, despite all 
efforts, supported decision-making practices are not always successful.129 The remedy 
to all such situations was traditionally the binary concept of incapacity, which used to 
act as a ground for invalidating harmful decisions. But in the CRPD system, in which 
this category is not admissible anymore, there is the need to find alternative 
mechanisms which take on this function. In this regard, Donnelly expresses concern 
as General Comment No 1 does not provide a solution for such issues, risking that its 
focus on promoting the autonomy and equality of disabled people could result in 
endangering their dignity, their right to live a safe and well lived life.130 
However, as remarked by Arstein-Kerslake, on the one hand, the CRPD does not 
exclude the possibility to use the legal remedies, present in all private law legislation, 
that permit to invalidate declarations which are the result of misrepresentation.131 
Moreover, the function of clarifying the will of the person and setting aside statements 
product of incorrect understanding, may be included among the supporter’s role of 
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interpreting and reconstructing the person’s wishes seen above. As noted by Cendon, 
in this context the support person may enter in a dialectic dynamic with the disabled 
individual, inviting them to better reflect on decisions which appear vitiated by a 
distorted perception of reality.132 In a recent study, Zinkler and I have analysed a case 
of supported decision-making of a man with Schizophrenia and a life-threatening 
pneumonia, who refused both antipsychotics and antibiotics. The carers and guardian, 
after having tried to persuade the person and in consideration of the fact that he 
expressed the will of remaining alive, interpreted his will in the sense of respecting the 
person’s refusal of antipsychotics and administering the minimum necessary of 
antibiotics in order to eliminate the risk of death of pneumonia.133 This sort of 
mechanisms are all based on negotiation and a central role of the person’s will, 
therefore appear less oppressive of the traditional remedies based on incapacitation. 
In this scenario there would probably still be some scope for mechanisms of 
assessment of the person’s capacity to make decisions. Only, they would not have the 
aim of evaluating whether their reach a certain cognitive threshold for the validity of 
their legal acts, but rather it would serve to establish the weight of various declarations 
and the kind of support they would need, looking also at other external factors than 
their intellectual abilities. Indeed, as suggested by the Council of Europe 
Commissioner on Human Rights, functional tests can help in determining the kind of 
support that should be made available to the individual or in distinguishing the 
moments in which he or she may be in the best conditions to reason. 134   
 
Safeguards 
All the support practices mentioned above presuppose a strong interaction between 
the disabled individual and the network of people around them. This interaction gives 
the possibility to empower the person through support, but it can also allow forms of 
undue influence. Ward maintains that Article 12 text is confusing and can leave the 
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door open to possible pressures by supporters.135 In this regard, it may be easy for 
support persons or family members to misuse the ‘interpretation’ of the person’s will 
to manipulate the statements of the beneficiary.  
This problem emerges also in systems based on substituted decision-making, as 
here legal representatives and carers are somehow even authorized by the law to 
disregard the person’s will in favour of considerations of their ’objective’ best 
interests.136 Moreover, Gooding points out how everyone is subject to external 
influences so we should not set a different standard for disabled people, requiring that 
they make decisions in complete isolation.137 Nonetheless, the same Committee for the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities recognises that individuals benefitting from 
supported decision-making may be particularly exposed to undue influence.138  
For this reason Article 12(4) CRPD specifies that ‘States Parties shall ensure that 
all measures that relate to the exercise of legal capacity provide for appropriate and 
effective safeguards to prevent abuse’ and to guarantee that ‘measures relating to the 
exercise of legal capacity respect the rights, will and preferences of the person, are free 
of conflict of interest and undue influence’. According to the second part of Article 
12(4) CRPD, the first of such safeguards should consist in the cited legal capacity 
measures being ‘proportional and tailored to the person’s circumstances’ and to ‘apply 
for the shortest time possible’. In this sense, the affirmation made by the Committee 
that the person may refuse support at any time is also a valuable presidium against 
abuse.139 In order to make sure such rules are observed and the dynamics characterising 
the specific support relationship are properly monitored Article 12(4) provides that all 
measures ‘are subject to regular review by a competent, independent and impartial 
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authority or judicial body’. The Committee also advocates for mechanisms allowing 
third parties ‘to challenge the action of a support person if they believe that the support 
person is not acting in accordance with the will and preferences of the person’.140 
General Comment No 1 notes how such protective safeguards represent a substantial 
improvement compared to the ones usually characterising traditional capacity 
legislations. In fact, while the latter avoid undue influence by transferring the power 
to choose to a legal representative who is supposed to be less vulnerable to pressures, 
the former maintains at the centre the will and preferences of the person.141  
Of course, also in this case, the CRPD and the Committee only set general 
principles which will then have to be specified by national legislations, taking into 
account the nuances of specific contexts and circumstances. In this regard, it would 
have to be established, for example, if the review of legal capacity measures should be 
performed by an administrative or judicial authority, how frequent reviews should be, 
how they have to be conducted (e.g. through home inspections, oral questioning etc.) 
or how third parties may materially challenge the behaviour of the support person (e.g. 
judicially, through an ombudsman or through an accredited NGO). 
In this regard, a number of scholars have noted how it could be difficult to detect 
undue influence and to distinguish it from ‘healthy’ support relationships. Indeed, 
using the definition of the Committee itself, undue influence occurs when ‘the quality 
of the interaction between the support person and the person being supported includes 
signs of fear, aggression, threat, deception or manipulation’.142 Such dynamics often 
develop beyond closed door and are difficult to detect even by the person 
themselves.143 Broström points out how often undue pressure is involuntary and 
exercised by absolutely well intentioned people.144 Moreover, Kohn, Blumenthal and 
Campbell, show that especially in the case of older people also a sense of deference or 
luck of trust in themselves may have distortive effects on the person’s will.145 In order 
to avoid such inconveniences, it may be useful to associate to the ‘external’ safeguards 
proposed by the Convention, based on the control of authorities or third parties, more 
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‘internal’ ones. For example, the action of the various members of a person’s network 
of support (doctors, formal carers, relatives, independent advocate) which have 
different interests, may be used so that each member checks the behaviour of others, 
making sure that abusive practices are stopped already at their beginning. In Chapter 
7 I will look at some example of such practices to prevent undue influence. 
 
6. The CRPD, health and medical treatment 
 
Right to Health and capacity to decide on medical treatment 
The messages contained in Article 12 CRPD and in General Comment No 1 are 
also echoed in other norms of the Convention and in statements by other UN bodies, 
specifically referring to the area of health and medical treatment. In this regard, such 
provisions and statements further clarify the implications of the CRPD approach to 
choice making in relation to medical treatment. 
In this regard, Article 25(1) CRPD requires the enjoyment by disabled individuals 
of ‘the    highest    attainable    standard    of    health    without discrimination   on   the   
basis   of   disability’. Article 25(1) paragraph (d) specifies that, in order to realise this 
goal, State Parties have to guarantee that care is administered to disabled people ‘on  
the  basis  of  free  and  informed consent’ , putting at the centre the rights, dignity, 
autonomy and needs of the person. This formulation partly echoes that of Article 12 
ICESCR and the relevant jurisprudence of the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR), in charge of monitoring the implementation of the 
Covenant.146 The CESCR, in its General Comment No. 14, identifies four determinants 
of the right to health: availability of adequate care services, accessibility of services 
and information, acceptability and quality.147  The third determinant (acceptability) 
refers to the necessity that all health services comply with principles of medical ethics 
and respect individuals, minorities, gender and life cycle requirements.148 Paragraph 
18 of the Comment clarifies that this right and its determinants should be realised 
without any discrimination also on the basis of disability.149  
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Article 25 CRPD specifies with particular regard to medical treatment, the 
principle of universal recognition of legal capacity. Indeed, in General Comment No 
1 the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities emphasises how such 
provisions are linked to Article 12 CRPD, as the concept of ‘high standard healthcare’ 
presupposes the recognition of the person’s capacity to decide on the modalities of 
their care.150 Therefore, the Committee confirms that Articles 12 and 25 CRPD, read 
in conjunction, oblige States Parties to avoid that substitute decision-makers ‘provide 
consent on behalf of persons with disabilities’.151 This requires medical staff to ensure 
‘appropriate consultation that directly engages the person with disabilities’ and that 
‘assistants or support persons do not substitute or have undue influence’ on the 
person’s decision.152 Moreover, it also demands that all the information on medical 
treatments is presented to the person in an accessible way, which permits them to be 
fully involved in the decisional process regarding their care.153  
Therefore, this provision further confirms that, with regard to treatment choices, 
also mentally disabled individuals like people living with dementia have always the 
right to decide, that there should be no binary distinction between capacity and 
incapacity to consent on the basis of disability, that all the person’s statements are 
legally valid in principle, and that if, because of their impairment, the person faces 
challenges in expressing a choice they need to be supported through a more inclusive 
style in medical consultations. By designating adequate informed consent procedures 
as an element of the standard of health services that State Parties need to guarantee, 
Article 25 CRPD makes further clear how, as claimed by the social model and 
Fineman’s vulnerability theory, the state(s) has an obligation to be responsive to the 
needs of individuals such as people living with dementia and to create the conditions 
for them to exercise their right to decide on medical treatment. In this regard, the 
reference to ‘adequate consultation’ sessions, and the ability of staff to assist the person 
in consenting to treatment confirms the duty of the state(s) to provide the necessary 
‘ecological’ and ‘human’ resources for deciding on healthcare, through training for 
medical and care staff and by making available adequate spaces for the conversation 
between the person and the professionals responsible for their care. In the following 
                                                          
150 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ‘General Comment’, above, 10. 
151 Ibid. 
152 Ibid. 
153 See also Quinn, ‘A Short Guide’, above, 111; Pavone, above, 478. 
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Chapters it will be studied how such a goal can be realised by governments and 
professionals can be given opportunities to train in communication and the 
management of consent procedure involving individuals living with dementia through 
local and European level initiatives.154   
As stated by Weller, also in the CRPD the right to health is situated at the 
intersection of ‘the three planes of individual autonomy, health and public health 
governance, and the expertise of health professionals’ which all need to be taken into 
account.155 This means that empowering the person to shape their care plan according 
to their needs is an essential requirement for them to be truly healthy. Therefore, the 
assessment of what is medically best for the individual will have to put at the centre 
the subjective determination of what the person prefers, rather than objectively 
determined standards.156  
However, inserting autonomy in the wider context of the right to health also 
implies that the recognition of the power to decide on medical treatment even to 
individuals experiencing mental impairments like dementia cannot result in leaving 
the person alone to make self-harmful and ill informed choices. Rather, it leads to use 
supported decision-making and the interpretation of will and preferences to solve 
misunderstandings, overcome moments of confusion or delirium, fill cognitive gaps 
and clarify obscure or contradicting statements in order to truly promote the wellbeing 
of the person. Indeed, the message of conceptions such as that of the social model or 
vulnerability theory, echoed by the CRPD, is that it is not sufficient to leave people 
alone in deciding but it is necessary to engage with them in order to promote true self-
determination. In this regard, as noted by Hendricks, because of the long history of 
marginalization and abuse characterizing our society’s approach to disability, the 
CRPD understandably puts emphasis on the refusal of paternalistic practices.157 
However, Frederiks notes how providing treatment and medical aids to minimise the 
impact of illnesses and impairments as far as reasonable and possible is equally 
important for promoting the independence of disabled individuals.158 This aspect 
                                                          
154 See Chapter 5 Section 3; Chapter 6 Section 3; Chapter 7 Section 4. 
155 P Weller, ‘The Right to Health: The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2010) 
35 Alternative Law Journal 66, 67. 
156 Ibid, 69. 
157 A Hendriks, ‘UN Convention on the Right of Persons with Disabilities’ (2007) 14 European Journal 
of Health Law 273, 278-279. 
158 BJM Frederiks, ‘The Rights of People with an Intellectual Disability in the Netherlands: From 
Restriction to Development’ 14 European Journal of Health Law 149. 
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emerges also if one reads the provisions under discussion in connection with Article 
10 CRPD, affirming the right to life of disabled people, and with Article 17 of the 
Convention according to which ‘every  person  with  disabilities  has  a  right  to  respect  
for  his  or  her  physical and mental integrity’. Such provisions impose to find a 




From the just explained formulation of the right to health derives that any form of 
forced or involuntary treatment is unacceptable under the CRPD. Minkowitz argues 
that the Convention, through various articles, prohibits ‘Mental Health Act provisions 
enforcing medical interventions without free and informed consent’, any exception to 
free and informed consent for disabled people and any norm authorizing compulsory 
treatment of any kind.159 Arstein-Kerslake and Flynn include forced treatment among 
the discriminatory measures prohibited by Article 12. 160 They also claim the 
inappropriateness under the CRPD of milder limitations to the person’s agency such 
as imposing them to wash at certain times or regimenting their care and life according 
to a priori schedules. 161 Also Callaghan and Ryan agree that Article 12 bans 
‘substituted decision-making, including via involuntary treatment orders’.162 Indeed, 
The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities specifies, in General 
Comment No 1, that ‘forced treatment by psychiatric and other health and medical  
professionals  is  a  violation  of  the right  to  equal  recognition before the law and an 
infringement of the rights to personal integrity (art. 17), freedom from torture (art. 15), 
and freedom from violence, exploitation and  abuse  (art.  16)’.163  
However, the Officer of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 
maintains, commenting on Article 14 on deprivation of liberty, that the CRPD does 
not exclude that the freedom of (mentally) disabled people cannot be even preventively 
compressed for reasons of care or treatment but that the legal grounds upon which such 
                                                          
159 T Minkowitz, ‘Prohibition of Compulsory Mental Health Treatment and Detention under the CRPD’ 
(2011) 8-9 available at <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1876132> accessed 17 December 2017. 
160A Arstein-Kerslake and E Flynn, ‘The Right to Legal Agency: Domination, Disability and the 
Protections of Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2017) 13 
International Journal of Law in Context 22, 22-23  
161 Ibid, 28-30. 
162 Callaghan and Ryan, above, 596. 
163 Committee for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ‘General Comment’, above, 11.  
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restriction of liberty is determined ‘must be de-linked from the disability and neutrally 
defined so as to apply to all persons on an equal basis’.164 Upon ratification of the 
Convention, States Parties such as Australia, Norway and The Netherlands have 
inserted interpretive declarations specifying that according to them the CRPD still 
permits compulsory care or treatment in extreme circumstances and subject to 
sufficient legal safeguards.165  
As noted by Kayess and French, paradoxically the current text of the CRPD 
contains no explicit provision on involuntary treatment.166 The insertion of specific 
norms on the matter was debated during the Convention negotiations in relation to 
Article 17.167 The draft text of this norm affirmed, in paragraph 2, that States Parties 
‘shall protect persons with disabilities from forced intervention aiming at correcting, 
improving or alleviating any actual or perceived impairment’ and, in paragraph 4, it 
affirms the necessity that involuntary treatment is minimised and administered only in 
exceptional circumstances and undertaken in the least restrictive setting possible. 
However, this formulation was opposed by DPO’s because it seemed to approve 
compulsion for disabled individuals though limiting its scope.168  For this reason the 
final text of Article 17 only consists in the twenty three words long recognition of the 
rights to mental and physical integrity of disabled individuals with no further 
specification.  
As noted by Bartlett, such a text and its convoluted drafting history do not offer 
decisive elements either in favour or against the total abolition of involuntary 
treatment.169 Therefore, we need to reconstruct the position of the Convention on such 
a topic starting from its general principles and other relevant norms. In this regard, 
                                                          
164 OHCHR, ‘Annual report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to the General Assembly’ 
(2009) UN Doc A/HRC/10/49. See also OHCHR, ‘Persons with Disabilities’ Dignity and Justice for 
Detainees’ (2008) Week Information Note No. 4, 2, available at 
<http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/60UDHR/detention_infonote_4.pdf> accessed 26 July 
09.  In relation to this interpretation P Bartlett and R Sandland, Mental Health Law (Oxford University 
Press 2013), 276 note how, for it to make sense, it should be intended as requiring not only that the 
‘language of disability’ is avoided in relevant legislations but also that apparently neutral criteria are 
not disproportionately applied to disabled people; otherwise the problem would just have been moved 
from the realm of direct to that of indirect discrimination. Here the two authors also criticise this 
interpretation because it seems to lead to the problematic consequence of expanding the possibilities for 
preventive limitations of liberty for all citizens. 
165 The texts of such declarations is available at <https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src= 
TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-15&chapter=4&lang=_en&clang=_en> accessed 17 December 2017. 
166 Kayess and French, above, 30. 
167 For a synthesis of the debate on this issue see Bartlett, above, 769-771.  
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid.  
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already from Article 3 CRPD it can be derived that any practice that diminishes the 
dignity and autonomy of disabled people is not justifiable under the Convention. As 
stated by the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, involuntary treatment surely can be 
included in such practices, as the sole imposition of a treatment is humiliating and 
distressing, thus not even justifiable under therapeutic reasons.170 Moreover, Article 
25 CRPD, as we have seen, affirms that medical treatment is permissible only if the 
disabled person has personally accepted it. Also, Article 14(1) CRPD prohibits any 
deprivation of liberty on the basis of disability, providing a further indication against 
forced treatment, as normally such a practice presupposes the confinement or even 
physical restrain of the person.171 Therefore, in light of the cited principles is it possible 
to affirm that involuntary treatment is generally in contrast with the CRPD.  
However, Szmukler, Daw and Callard argue that excluding involuntary treatment 
altogether would be seriously problematic in relation to circumstances (including, for 
example, severe dementia or coma) in which treatment should be provided to a person 
who cannot materially make treatment decisions for themselves.172 Hendriks also notes 
how in exceptional and carefully examined circumstances it can paradoxically play a 
role in promoting the independence and dignity of the disabled person.173 Indeed, in 
the already cited case study of the man with schizophrenia and pneumonia, the 
administration of medications despite the refusal of the person had indeed the aim of 
promoting his autonomous wish to continue to live.174 In reality, in all the cited 
situations the treatment, though it is not covered by a specific act of consent delivered 
in the precise moment, it is performed in application of a plan or a reconstructed wish, 
which appears to have been approved by the person. The scheme here is that of 
‘Ulysses pacts’ by which a person in moments of lucidity agrees on practices that need 
to be put in place in order to manage moments of crisis, despite the fact that they reject 
them in the specific moment.175 As affirmed by Mirfin-Veicht, such mechanisms can 
be deemed in line with the CRPD.176 
 
                                                          
170 Special Rapporteur on Torture, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and other Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment’ (2013) UN Doc A/HRC/22/53. 
171 F Seatzu, ‘Article 14 [Liberty and Security of Person]’ in Della Fina, Cera and Palmisano, above. 
172 Szmukler, Daw and Callard, above, 248. 
173 Hendriks, above, 279. 
174 Zinkler and De Sabbata, above. 




7. Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
proposes a new rights and support based approach to legal capacity. Such an approach 
appears to embody the values analysed in Chapter 3. Therefore, it provides a model of 
legal capacity and healthcare decision-making which can empower people living with 
dementia in choosing their care and permits to better address the legal moral and 
practical issues emerging in this area. This model is characterised by the following 
elements. 
First, it qualifies legal capacity as an inalienable human right, recognising the 
power to make decisions to all individuals included those with severe cognitive 
impairments. Coherently, it rejects the binary distinction capacity/incapacity and 
refuses mental capacity tests when they lead to a deprivation of decisional power on 
the basis of (mental) disability. Therefore, with regard to treatment decisions of people 
living with dementia, it provides a powerful statement against behaviours in which the 
opinion of the person is disregarded because of prejudice or labelling. It also avoids 
the problem of defining when the individual becomes capable and proposes a more 
viable approach to advance directives.  
Adopting this perspective leads to maintain that if a disabled individual like a 
person living with dementia struggles to make decisions on their care the remedy 
should be helping them through supported decision-making. This mechanism consists 
in a relationship which accompanies the person throughout the progression of their 
condition till the very final stages. It can result in a number of different practices but 
it always needs to put at the centre the will of the person and not amount to forms of 
undue influence. In this regard, the person can be helped remembering things they do 
not remember and to communicate, or, in case of very extensive impairment, they may 
be empowered to express their desires through best interpretation of their will and 
preferences.  
However, the implementation of the CRPD model poses a series of challenges. 
First, it certainly presupposes that the principles explained above are really abound to 
in national legislations and practices. This demands to persuade and put pressure on 
national governments, parliaments and judges so that they really take action to promote 
the CRPD. It also requires them to establish how the principles of the Convention 
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translate in terms of detailed rules and concrete behaviours. In this regard, it is also 
necessary to identify which specific means of support are needed in the case of people 
living with dementia. In addition, it is crucial to create the conditions for these means 
of support to be effectively applied in practice. This includes providing adequate 
training to professionals and informal carers and making sure they have adequate 
resources in terms of money, time and facilities. Also it requires the establishment of 
mechanisms directed to avoid or minimise the risk that support degenerates into undue 
influence. Finally, in order to guarantee that such practices and resources are always 
put to the advantage of the person’s power to decide on treatment, it is necessary to 
raise awareness among professionals and lay persons, making sure they truly embrace 
a less stigmatising and medicalised view of dementia ad that they really believe that 
capacity to consent is a fundamental right of every individual, including people living 
with dementia.  
In the next chapters I will explore how such issues could be addressed through the 
actions of the two main European regional organisations (the Council of Europe and 
the European Union) and through initiatives by public bodies, care structures, NGOs, 









The CoE is an intergovernmental organisation grouping 47 European Member 
States, with the aim of promoting democracy, human rights, and the rule of law.1 It is 
the leading organisation for the promotion of human rights on the continent.2 In this 
regard, it has a series of powers allowing it to promote coordinated policies on a 
European scale and is equipped with particularly authoritative monitoring bodies and 
a human rights court (the European Court of Human Rights) to which every citizen 
can apply and whose decisions are binding for Member States and private parties.3 
Indeed, the CoE has acquired significant authority among national governments and 
public opinion, and has often proven quite effective at impelling Member States to 
comply with its human rights standard.4 
This chapter investigates how such powers and mechanisms can be used to 
promote a model of legal capacity and treatment decisions for people living with 
dementia congruent with the CRPD. In particular, it focuses on the possible role of 
CoE bodies in specifying the normative content of the Convention, prompting Member 
States to implement its principles, and guaranteeing that the necessary conditions are 
in place so that the right to choose of individuals living with this condition is respected. 
There are already signs of such bodies’ potential in this area, emerging from 
documents such as the CoE Disability Action Plan 2006-2015 and Disability Strategy 
2017-2023, reports by monitoring bodies, and case law of the European Court of 
                                                          
1 For an overview on the CoE see F Benoît-Rohmer and H Klebes, Council of Europe law. Towards a 
pan-European Legal Area (CoE 2005); TEJ Kleinsorge (ed), Council of Europe (Wolters Kluwer 2010); 
A Royer, The Council of Europe (CoE 2010); JW Hart, ‘The European Human Rights System’ (2010) 
102 Law Library Journal 534, 534-537; J Rehman, International Human Rights Law (2nd ed Longman 
2010), 183-243; DL Shelton and PG Carozza, Regional Protection of Human Rights (2nd ed Oxford 
University Press 2013), 13-53; K Sithole, ‘The Council of Europe, Rights and Political Authority’ 
(2013) 21(1) European Review, 118. See also <http://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/home> accessed 30 
November 2015. 
2 On the relevance of the CoE in the field of human rights promotion within the European context see 
the presentation page of the organisation in < http://www.coe.int/it/web/moscow/the-coe/about-coe> 
accessed 16 December 2015.  
3 See further Section 2. 
4 Hart, above, 534-537; Sithole, above, 118-125. 
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Human Rights. My analysis starts from these and other CoE materials released in the 
area of mental disability, aging, and health, studying first what has already been 
achieved and then trying to understand what more can be done for the future. Because 
the majority of these sources are normative documents, my research mainly relies on 
doctrinal analysis, though it still uses content analysis in the (limited) cases in which 
a certain source (e.g. a page on the CoE website) describes only a certain initiative 
(e.g. an awareness raising campaign), rather than dictates rules or guidelines.         
The chapter is organised as follows. Section two provides a brief overview of the 
structure of the CoE and its main bodies. In this regard it mainly focuses on the 
Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly, the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR), and monitoring bodies: the European Committee of Social Rights 
(ECSR), the Commissioner for Human Rights, and the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture (CPT). Section three concentrates on relevant recommendations 
and resolutions of the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly, 
studying how they can urge Member States to implement the principles of the CRPD 
through organic policy plans, awareness raising, training incentives, and dissemination 
of promising practices. It first provides a brief explanation of the nature of 
recommendations and resolutions as normative documents, then goes into the analysis 
of single measures. Section four then turns to the ECtHR and, starting from relevant 
judgments in the field of legal capacity of disabled individuals, it investigates the 
potential of the Court case law for promoting the CRPD approach in the area of 
treatment decisions of people living with dementia. Section five deals with the work 
done in the fields of disability, health, and aging by a series of CoE monitoring bodies, 
exploring how they can contribute to creation of conditions for the promotion of the 
right of individuals living with this condition to express their opinion on medical 
treatment. Section six focuses specifically on the debate concerning involuntary 
treatment, best interests, and advance directives carried on within the CoE, especially 
with regard to the Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and with 
special attention to the recent Draft Additional Protocol on Involuntary Placement and 
Involuntary Treatment of People with Mental Disorders. The conclusion summarises 
the strengths, weaknesses, and potential of CoE action in relation to treatment 





2. CoE General Structure 
 
Committee of Ministers 
CoE bodies are regulated by the Treaty of London (CoE statute), by which the 
organisation was created in 19495 and are structured so as to cover the executive, rule-
making and judiciary functions necessary for the attainment of its goals.  The 
Committee of Ministers (Articles 13-21 CoE Statute) is the executive organ of the CoE 
and is responsible for its political initiative (Article 15 CoE Statute). 6 It is made up of 
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of CoE Member States (Article 14 CoE Statute). Its 
work results in policies mainly contained in Recommendations and drafts of 
Conventions such as the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the 
European Social Charter, or the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine.7 In 
this regard, the Committee plays an important role in promoting cooperation and 
political dialogue between national governments and in monitoring their action (see 
Committee of Ministers Resolution (84)21 and Secretariat memorandum 
Monitor/Inf(2004)3).8 
The Committee of Ministers is supported by its deputies’ session and rapporteur 
groups9 such as those on Human Rights (GR-H) and Social and Health Questions (GR-
SOC).10 In addition, as noted by Palmer, the Committee may appoint bodies of experts 
with advisory tasks.11 Examples in this sense are the Committee of Experts on the 
Rights of People with Disabilities (DECS-RPD), the Committee of Bioethics (DH-
                                                          
5 Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5th, 1949, 87 UNTS 1030. 
6 On the Committee of Ministers see, in general, G De Vel, The Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe (CoE Press 1995); Benoît-Rohmer and Klebes, above, 48-55; Royer, above, 10-11; S Palmer, 
‘The Committee of Ministers’ in Kleinsorge (ed), above, 93-101. See also 
<http://www.coe.int/t/cm/home_en.asp> accessed 26 February 2016. 
7 See Section 3 and 4. 
8De Vel, above, 26-29. In this regard, the Committee can be asked by the Parliamentary Assembly, the 
Secretary General, or Member States to look at the situation of human rights in a specific country and 
can ask the Secretary General to gather information in this respect Benoît-Rohmer and Klebes, above, 
121-124. 
9 These bodies are made up of permanent representatives of each government. De Vel, above, 32-36. 
See also CoE, Committee of Ministers. Procedures and working methods (2016) in 
<https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1950611&Site=COE&BackColor 
Internet=C3C3C3&BackColorIntranet=EDB021&BackColorLogged=F5D383#P831_63713> 
accessed 3 March 2016. 
10 See <http://www.coe.int/t/cm/subsidiaryGroups_en.asp> accessed 3 March 2016. 




BIO), and the Drafting Group on Aging (CDDH-AGE). The work of the Committee 
of Ministers is coordinated by the Secretary General and the Deputy Secretary 
General.12   
 
Parliamentary Assembly 
The Parliamentary Assembly (Articles 22-35 CoE Statute) is made up of 318 MPs 
designated by Member States’ parliaments. 13 As reported by Benoît-Rohmer and 
Klebes, its main role is as an independent forum for discussion and for soliciting the 
Committee of Ministers through recommendations and resolutions to take action on 
crucial issues for the promotion of human rights in Europe (Article 23 CoE Statute).14  
According to Article 24 CoE Statute, the Assembly may form Committees of 
members focusing on specific areas, such as the Committee on Legal Affairs and 
Human Rights, the Committee on Equality and Non-discrimination, which has a 
specialised Sub-committee on Disability, and the Monitoring Committee.15 This last 
committee has the duty to issue reports focusing on the human rights situation of single 
countries.16 The Assembly may issue recommendations to governments on the basis 
of such reports and may also punish persistently non-compliant states by annulling 
their parliamentary delegation credentials.17 
The interaction between Parliamentary Assembly and Committee of Ministers is 
favoured by mechanisms such as the duty of the Committee to take action when a 
recommendation by the Assembly is received (Article 15 CoE).18 In addition, members 




                                                          
12 See Benoît-Rohmer and Klebes, above, 71-74. 
13 On the Parliamentary Assembly in general see Benoît-Rohmer and Klebes, above, 48-55; Royer, 
above, 10-11; TEJ Kleinsorge, ‘The Parliamentary Assembly: Europe’s Motor and Conscience’, in 
Kleinsorge (ed), above, 74-89. See also, <http://www.assembly.coe.int/nw/Home-EN.asp> accessed 27 
February 2016.    
14 Benoît-Rohmer and Klebes, above, 65-66. 
15 See Royer, above, 13. See also < http://website-pace.net/en_GB/web/apce/committees> accessed 26 
February 2016. 
16 Resolution 1115(1997) adopted 29 January 1997. 
17 The monitoring activity of the Parliamentary Assembly started around the second half of the 1970s 
and developed thanks to Order No. 488, also known as Halonen Order (1993), and Resolution 
1031(1994). On this point see Kleinsorge, ‘The Parliamentary Assembly’, above, 85-88. On the actual 
system of monitoring by the Assembly see Benoît-Rohmer and Klebes, above, 118-122. 
18 Ibid 70-71. 
129 
 
European Court of Human Rights 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is regulated by Articles 19-51 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It is made up of a number of full-
time judges equal to that of State Parties of the ECHR (Article 20 ECHR), elected by 
the Parliamentary assembly (Article 22 ECHR). 19  It is an autonomous jurisdictional 
body whose decisions are guided only by the principles of Human Rights Law.20 It is 
in charge of judging violations of the European Convention and of clarifying its right 
interpretation.21 The ECHR is regarded as one of the most important human rights 
conventions on a European level.22 Signed in Rome on the 4th November 1950, it 
focuses on civil rights23, has binding force,24 and. has been ratified by all the Member 
States of the Council of Europe.25  
Cases may be brought in front of the Court by state parties of the ECHR (Article 
33 ECHR) and by ‘any person, nongovernmental organisation or group of individuals 
claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties’ (Article 
34 ECHR), once all internal remedies have been exhausted (Article 35 ECHR). 26  
After the recourse has been presented and provided it is admissible, the Court considers 
it in a public procedure, normally in front of a panel of seven judges (Article 38 
                                                          
19 On this point see Mowbray, above, 26-27. 
20 Ibid. 
21 The Court may also issue advisory opinions to the Committee itself (Article 47 ECHR).For a general 
overview on the ECtHR see S Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights. Achievements, 
Problems and Prospects (Cambridge University Press 2006), 136-192; P van Dijk et al (eds), Theory 
and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (4th ed Intersentia 2006), 35-44; MW Janis, 
RS Kay and AW Bradley, European Human Rights Law. Text and Materials ( 3rd ed Oxford University 
Press 2008), 67-116; A Mowbray, above, 10-63. See also < 
http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=home> accessed 26 Febraury 2016. 
22 MW Janis, RS Kay and AW Bradley, European Human Rights Law. Text and Materials ( 3rd ed 
Oxford University Press 2008), 3, refer to the ECHR as establishing ‘not only the most successful 
system of international law for the protection of human rights, but one of the most advanced form of 
any kind of international legal process’. Sithole, above, 118 defines the Convention as ‘the bedrock of 
the most advanced system of international human rights protection’. On the relevance and importance 
of the ECHR see also S Greer, The European Convention on Human Rights. Achievements, Problems 
and Prospects (Cambridge University Press, 2006); DJ Harris et al, Law of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (2nd ed, Oxford University Press 2009), 30-36.   
23 AWB Simpson, Human Rights and the End of the Empire (Oxford University Press 2001), 601-602. 
24 On the normative force of treaties in International and human rights law see Rehman, above, 19-22; 
MN Shaw, International Law (7th ed Cambridge University Press 2014), 66-69. 
25 On the Convention see in general Greer, above; P van Dijk et al (eds), Theory and Practice of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (4th ed Intersentia 2006); Janis, Kay and Bradley, above; K 
Reid, A Practitioner’s Guide to the European Convention on Human Rights (4th edition Sweet and 
Maxwell 2011); Mowbray, above; E Wicks and C Ovey (eds), Jacobs, White and Ovey: The European 
Convention on Human Rights (6th ed Oxford University Press 2014); WA Schabas, The European 
Convention on Human Rights. A Commentary (Oxford University Press 2015).  
26 On the exhaustion of domestic remedies see Janis, Kay and Bradley, above, 36-38. 
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ECHR).27 Judgments of the Court can be appealed in front of the Grand Chambre, 
which operates a panel of seventeen judges (Articles 43, 44 and 46 ECHR).28  
 
European Committee of Social Rights 
The European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR) is the body in charge of 
monitoring the compliance of State Parties legislation with the ERC and the RevERC 
and is made up of 15 experts of social rights elected by the Committee of Ministers 
(Article 25(1) ESC). 29 It adopts conclusions on state reports presented on a yearly 
basis issuing interpretative declarations.30 In addition, the Committee of Social Rights 
adopts statements of interpretation, clarifying its position on specific questions.31 
Moreover, since 1998, the ECSR also receives collective complaints issued by 
organisations included in a special list, which have the right to appeal to the 
Committee. 32 Once a complaint has been received, the ECSR examines it and asks for 
observations from the member-state concerned. At the end of the procedure, the 
Committee issues a decision clarifying whether there has been a human rights violation 
and what measures must be undertaken in order to remove the violation.33 The 
jurisprudence of the European Committee is summarised in the Digest of the Case Law 
of the ESCR.34    
 
Other monitoring bodies  
                                                          
27 For further explanation on the procedure in front of the Court see Mowbray, above, 27-58. 
28 On the judgements of the ECtHR see section 3.3. 
29 The functioning of the Committee is regulated by Articles 21-29 European Social Charter (ESC), part 
IV of the Revised Social Charter (RevESC) and its Additional Protocol on a System of Collective 
Complaints (1995). On the European Committee of Social Rights see, in general, N Valticos, ‘La Charte 
sociale europeènne: sa structure, son contenu, le controle de son application’ (1963) 26 Droit Sociale 
466; R Brillat, ‘The Supervisory Machinery of the European Social Charter’ in G De Burca and B De 
Witte (eds), Social Rights in Europe (Oxford University Press 2005); O De Schutter and M Sant’Ana, 
‘The European Committee of Social Rights’ in G De Beco (ed), Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms 
of the Council of Europe (Routledge 2012), 72. 
30 See De Schutter and Sant’Ana, above, 78-80. 
31 See De Schutter and Sant’Ana, above, 83-84. 
32 See Brillat, above, 32-34. 
33 On the system of collective complaints see M Jaeger, ‘The Additional Protocol to the European Social 
Charter Providing for a System of Collective Complaints’ (1997) 10 Leiden Journal of International 
Law 69; RR Churchill and U Khaliq, ‘The Collective Complaints System of the European Social 
Charter: An Effective Mechanism for Ensuring Compliance with Economic and Social Rights’ (2004) 
European Journal of International Law 417. 
34 See ECSR, Digest of the Case Law of the European Committee of Social Rights (CoE 2008), 108. 
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Duties of general human rights monitoring and awareness raising are assigned to 
the Commissioner for Human Rights.35 In this regard, as noted by Benoît-Rohmer and 
Klebes, the role of this office is mainly preventive.36 
According to Articles 8 and 3(f) Resolution (99)50, the Commissioner may issue 
recommendations, opinions, and reports and bring them to the attention of the 
Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers, to which he or she has to 
present an annual report (Article 3(h) Resolution (99)50. The main activity of the 
Commissioner consists of visiting member-states to assess their human rights 
situation.37 These visits permit the Commissioner to meet representatives of the 
government, parliament, the judiciary, and human rights associations or NGOs and 
discuss the main human rights issues regarding the interested country.38 This also 
allows the Commissioner to start a fruitful process of dialogue through which he can 
suggest solutions, tailored to the local context, in order to increase the level of human 
rights protection.39Assessment visits result in country reports, which contain detailed 
recommendations to the member-states.40 Also, information collected during the 
Commissioner’s visit provides material for thematic reports which this office releases 
periodically. In this context, the Commissioner can also consult external experts and 
commission research on a certain topic.41  
The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CPT) has similar powers regarding the respect of the 
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading 
                                                          
35 The powers of the Commissioner are regulated by Committee of Ministers Resolution (99)50. He or 
she is elected by the Parliamentary Assembly under recommendation of the Committee of Ministers 
(Articles 9, 10 and 12 Resolution (99)50). On the Commissioner in general see Benoît-Rohmer and 
Klebes, above, 76; T Hammarberg, ‘The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights’ in G 
Alfredsson (ed), International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms: essays in honour of Jakob Th 
Möller (Nijhoff 2009), 515; L Sivonen, ‘The Commissioner for Human Rights’ in De Beco (ed), above, 
17; M Bond, The Council of Europe and Human Rights (CoE, 2013), 70-71; A Weber, ’Commissioner 
for Human Rights’ in E Abdelgawad and H Michel (eds), Dictionary of European Actors (Larcier 2015).  
See also <http://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner> accessed 26 February 2016. 
36 Benoît-Rohmer and Klebes, above, 76. 
37 Weber, above.  
38 Ibid. 
39 Sivonen, above, 23-24. 
40 Ibid. 
41 See Sivonen, above, 28-30. See also Hammerberg, above.  
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Treatment or Punishment. This Convention entered into force on the 1st of February 
198942 and was ratified by all Member States of the Council of Europe.43  
The CPT includes a member for every Member State of the CoE, who serves in 
their personal capacity (Article 4 Convention on Torture) and is elected by the 
Committee of Ministers (Article 5 Convention on Torture). Like the Commissioner, 
this Committee’s core activity is conducting visits to Member States. As summarised 
by Kicker, the CPT has the power to enter any place of deprivation of liberty at any 
time (Article 9 Convention on Torture).44 At the end of each visit, the Committee 
issues a confidential report (Article 11 Convention on Torture). It may also issue 
immediate observations, requiring prompt action in order to solve particularly serious 
problems (Article 8(5) Convention on Torture), or public statements, stigmatising the 
behaviour of states which refuse to cooperate (Article 10(2) Convention on Torture). 
The recommendations issued in the various state-reports are reported, adopting a 
systematic style, in annual General Reports.  
                                                          
42 On the Convention and the Committee on the Prevention of Torture see in general K Ginther, ‘The 
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment’ (1990) 2 European Journal of International Law, 123; A Cassese, ‘The European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Punishment comes of Age’ in N 
Blokker and S Muller (eds), Towards More Effective Supervision by International Organs. Essays in 
honour of Henry G. Schermers (Nijhoff 1994), 115; MD Malcom, Preventing Torture : the European 
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(Clarendon, 1998); R Morgan, ‘The CPT Model: an examination’ in L Sicilianos (ed), The Prevention 
of Human Rights Violations. Contribution on the Occasion of the Twentieth Anniversary of the 
Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights (Nijhoff 2001); R Morgan and M Evans, Combating 
Torture in Europe: the Work and Standards of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture 
(CoE, 2001); R Kicker, ‘The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the CPT)’ in De Beco (ed), above, 43. See also < 
http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/default.htm> accessed 3 March 2016. 
43 See < http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/126> accessed 3 March 
2016. 







3. Policies to promote the CRPD: Recommendations and 
Resolutions  
 
Recommendations, Resolutions and care decisions of people living with dementia 
The first ways in which CoE institutional structures can contribute to the 
implementation of Article 12 and CRPD principles is by promoting them among 
Member States and their citizens and by persuading governments to take action in 
order to translate them into reforms, national policies and practices. In this regard, the 
Committee of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly in particular can develop policy 
plans reaffirming the values of CRPD and suggest specific rules and initiatives in this 
field. Moreover, they can solicit actions to concretely advance a supported decision-
making culture, such as awareness raising initiatives, training programmes on human 
rights and disability, or channels for the dissemination of promising practices. The 
instrument through which this can be done is called a Recommendation. 45     
Parliamentary Assembly Recommendations (Rule 25.1.a Parliamentary Assembly 
Rules of Procedure)46 are addressed to the Committee of Ministers with the aim of 
urging it to take action on a certain issue.47 Recommendations of the Committee of 
Ministers are addressed to Member States and detail the CoE policies in a specific 
area. 48  They enter into force without ratification.49 Moreover, as observed by De Beco, 
they can be proactive, setting a wider strategy for preventing future violations.50  
Recommendations do not have binding force.51 However, because of the authority 
of their issuing bodies, they can exert a good level of political influence.52 In this 
                                                          
45 The Commissioner on Human Rights and the CTP also issue recommendations, but they are 
essentially the last part of their reports, so I will look at them later on when analysing the monitoring 
bodies reports.  
46 Resolution 1202 (1999) adopted on 4 November 1999 and subsequent modifications. 
47 As the Assembly is independent from national governments and expresses the voice of Europe’s 
people 
48 De Vel, above, 37; Benoît-Rohmer and Klebes, above, 56. On the role and functioning of the 
Committee of Ministers see above section 2.1. 
49 G De Vel and T Markert, ‘Importance and Weakness of the Council of Europe Conventions and of 
the Recommendations addressed by the Committee of Ministers to Member States’, in B Haller, HC 
Kruger and H Pretzold, Law in Greater Europe: Towards a Common Legal Area. Studies in Honour of 
Heinrich Klebes (Kluwer Law, 2000), 345.  
50 G De Beco, ‘Introduction: the role of European Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms’, in De Beco 
(ed), above, 3. 
51 De Vel and Markert, above, passim.  
52 Indeed, Assembly Recommendations served to this independent body representing the people of 
Europe can put political pressure on the Committee of Minister. In turn, Committee of Ministers 
Recommendations can kick-start change processes at a continental level. Indeed, their proposals often 
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regard, they may be an instrument of pressure in the hands of NGOs. Moreover, they 
may be used by the ECtHR and national courts as interpretive documents.53 Finally, in 
some cases, provisions included in Recommendations have become part of binding 
EU legal documents. 54 
Parliamentary Assembly Resolutions can also be helpful in affirming statements 
of principle promoting the application of the CRPD.55 These documents contain a 
decision by the Assembly ‘on a question of substance which it is empowered to put 
into effect, or an expression of view for which it alone is responsible’ (Rule 25.1.b 
Parliamentary Assembly Rules of Procedure). They are not binding and do not require 
an explicit response from the Committee of Ministers.56 However, they can be used to 
bring attention to one or more problems. 
Currently, the CoE has not issued specific recommendations or resolutions on 
healthcare decisions of people living with dementia. However, it has released 
important recommendations in the field of legal capacity of mentally disabled people 
and of aging. The most important, in relation to the CRPD, are Committee of Ministers 
Recommendations Rec (2006)5 on the ‘Council of Europe Action Plan to promote the 
rights and full participation of people with disabilities in society’ 2006-201557 and the 
Council of Europe Disability Strategy 2017-2023 ‘Human Rights: a reality for all’, 58 
which continues the work done by the Plan. The Committee of Ministers 
Recommendation R(99)4 on the ‘Legal Protection of Incapable Adults’ is also relevant 
to this topic, although somewhat outdated. In the field of older people’s rights, the 
Committee of Ministers’ recommendations Rec(2014)2 on ‘The Promotion of Human 
                                                          
stem from the mutual agreement of a vast majority of European governments and  are the expression of 
a widespread and recognised need for change. Benoît-Rohmer and Klebes, above, 107-109. 
53 G Puppinck, ‘Status of the recommendations of the Committee of Ministers in the legal field of the 
Council of Europe – Synthesis’ (2012) in <http://eclj.org/PDF/status-of-the-recommendations-of-the-
committee-of-ministers-in-the-legal-field-of-the-council-of-europe%E2%80%93synthesisenglish.pdf> 
accessed 1st of December 2015.See, as an example, Prisma Presse v. France, (2003) 15(3-6) Revue 
Universelle des Droits de l’Homme, 211; Romanian Constitutional Court, decision of 20 July 1999.In 
general see Benoît-Rohmer and Klebes, above, 108-109; Puppinck, above. 
54 See for example the resolution of the European Parliament of 28 September 2011 on human rights, 
sexual orientation and gender identity at the United Nations, which refers explicitly to Recommendation 
CM/Rec(2010)5 on discriminations founded on sexual orientation or gender identity. On this point see 
Benoît-Rohmer and Klebes, above, 109: Puppinck, above. I will also show that the CoE and EU policies 
on disability seem influenced by one another.  
55 TheCommittee of Ministers can also emanate Resolutions, but they concern the specification of 
constitutional or procedural issues. See Benoît-Rohmer and Klebes, above,29-30. 
56 Ibid 66. 
57 See <www.coe.int/t/e/.../Rec(2006)5%20Disability%20Action%20Plan.doc> accessed 2 December 
2015. 
58 Available at < https://rm.coe.int/16806fe7d4> accessed 5 August 2018. 
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Rights of Older Persons’ and Rec(2009)6 on ‘Ageing and Disability in the 21st century’ 
are noteworthy. With regard to Parliamentary Assembly resolutions, valuable statements 
have been issued in Resolution 1642 (2009) entitled ‘Access to Rights for People with 
Disabilities’59 and Resolution 2039 (2015) on ‘Equality and Inclusion for People with 
Disabilities’.  
  
Promoting the values of the CRPD  
As noted by Flynn, the Disability Action Plan 2006-2015 was published a few 
months prior to the adoption of the CRPD and follows its approach, echoing many of 
the Convention provisions.60 Therefore, it is a first step in the incorporation of these 
principles in a system, such as that of the CoE, which provides particularly effective 
enforcement mechanisms. 61 The Plan also provides for the creation of the European 
Coordination Forum for the Disability Action Plan (CAHPAH), now Committee of 
Experts on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (DECS-RPD),62 made up of 
representatives of governments, CoE institutions and NGOs, with the role of advising 
national governments on the implementation of this document.63 The CoE Disability 
Action Plan embraces the social model of disability and the human rights approach to 
legal capacity. Indeed, Section 2.2 of the Introduction acknowledges that disabled 
people should be seen as persons rather than just patients.64 Also, Action Line No. 12, 
affirming the right to legal personhood of disabled people, challenges the binary 
concept of incapacity and the link between rationality and decisional power at a 
European level.  
Similar messages are repeated in the CoE Disability Strategy 2017-2023, but with 
a clearer endorsement of the CRPD and Article 12 which are now explicitly referred 
to throughout the document. For example, paragraph 11 of the Strategy recalls the 
paradigm shift from a medicalised to a human rights-based approach promoted both 
by the UNCRPD and the Disability Action Plan 2006-2015. In this regard, it affirms 
                                                          
59 See <http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=17697&lang=en> 
accessed 4th December 2015. 
60 E Flynn, above, 58-59. 
61 See section 2. 
62 European Committee for Social Cohesion, Human Dignity and Equality, ‘Protection of the rights of 
persons with disabilities. Council of Europe action and challenges’ < https://rm.coe.int/16802edb67> 
accessed 8 August 2018. 
63 E Flynn, From Rhetoric to Action. Implementing the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (Cambridge University Press 2011), 59-61. 
64 Disability Action Plan 3.9.1 also stresses that health care professionals need to acknowledge the social 
model of disability. 
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that the interpretation and implementation of principles or actions undertaken under 
the Strategy itself need to be guided by the provisions of the Convention (paragraph 
23), which is thus formally indicated as the evaluative framework in this area. 
Regarding legal capacity, paragraphs 61-63 explicitly cite Article 12 and emphasise 
how the power to make all necessary decisions for one’s life is a fundamental 
requirement for full enjoyment of human rights. These paragraphs note how many 
European legislations still allow forms of substituted decision-making in which 
disabled people are stripped of the possibility to exercise their rights and they urge 
governments to reform these systems.  
Therefore, in relation to treatment decisions of people with dementia, CoE 
disability policies confirm that the person needs to be recognised as an individual with 
full rights, including that of making their own decision, and that the state and society 
need to create the conditions for the exercise of such rights. Similar ideas are also 
affirmed in relation to older people by Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation 
1796 (2007). This document, advocates for old age - which plays a crucial role in 
determining the condition of the majority of people living with dementia - 65to be 
regarded as a complex process dependent on social structures and urges policies that 
accommodate the needs of older individuals. With more specific regard to the right to 
make choices, recommendation Rec(2014)2 II.12, echoes the CRPD and affirms that 
all older people (including older people living with dementia) ‘enjoy legal capacity on 
an equal basis with others’. Such a reaffirmation is surely important because, as noted 
by Van Bueren, both older people with or without dementia may suffer de facto 
limitations of their decisional power deriving from prejudice and overly invasive use 
of the power given to guardians with the scope of assistance.66  
 
Specifying the principles of the CRPD 
Paragraph 3.12.2.VI of the Disability Action Plan indicates how such values and 
principles translate in terms of specific legal rules. It requires the provision by Member 
States of ‘appropriate assistance to those people who experience difficulty in 
exercising their legal capacity’ and in paragraph 3.12.3 urges them to set up ‘specific 
                                                          
65 See above Chapter 1. 
66 G Van Beuren, ‘Background briefing paper’, for the International Symposium on the Rights of Older 
People, January 2009, in < 




legislative measures, bodies, reporting procedures and redress mechanisms’ in order 
to guarantee that disabled people are not discriminated and unjustly deprived of the 
power to make decisions. Disability Action Plan 3.9.1 clarifies the implications of such 
statements in relation to treatment decisions, stating that disabled people ‘should be 
consulted and fully involved’ in the decision-making process regarding their care and 
should be ‘consulted to the maximum possible extent’ (Disability Action Plan 3.9.3.II). 
Moreover, line 3.9.3 VI of the Action Plan indicates specific means of support in order 
to assist the person in healthcare decision-making. It urges Member States ‘to ensure 
that reasonable steps are taken to provide all relevant information […] in a format 
understandable to the disabled person’ (Disability Action Plan,).  
However, such declarations do not define the ‘maximum possible extent’ or 
‘reasonable effort’, remaining vague on what the extent of the duties of doctors or 
carers. Moreover, as noted by the Fundamental Rights Agency, the Action Plan does 
not provide a complete set of guidelines regulating support in the full spectrum of 
situations in which disabled people may find themselves and does not clearly establish 
what kind of measures are acceptable, referring for that to Recommendation R(99)4. 
67  
This document, issued by the Committee of Ministers in 1999, contains some 
provisions which align with Article 12 CRPD. Indeed, Principle 3 R(99)4, entitled 
‘maximum preservation of capacity’, affirms that ‘a measure of protection should not 
automatically result in a complete removal of legal capacity’ (Principle 3(1)). Also, it 
states that measures with a lower impact on the decisional capacity of the person are 
preferred (Principle 5) and that they should be tailored to the circumstances of the 
specific case. Moreover, Principle 4(2) R(99)4 specifies an important distinctive 
characteristic of supported decision-making a kind of test of whether a certain measure 
is really a measure of support by requiring that the support person ‘acts jointly with 
the adult concerned’.  
However, as it was written much earlier than the Convention, the R(99)4 contains 
elements that do not align with it.68 For example, Principle 3(1) still allows restrictions 
                                                          
67 FRA, Legal Capacity of Persons with Intellectual Disabilities and Persons with Mental Health 
Problems (FRA 2013), 18. 
68Recommendation R(99) 4 was issued during a vibrant debate on legal capacity legislation. Between 
the 1990s and the 2000s this debate brought, o reforms of legal capacity regulation to various countries 
such as France, Germany, Austria, England and Italy. E Carbone, ‘Liberta’ e protezione nella riforma 
dell’Incapacità d’agire’ in < http://www.altalex.com/documents/news/2004/12/10/liberta-e-protezione-
nella-riforma-dell-incapacita-di-agire#sdfootnote18sym> accessed 1st December 2015. At that time, the 
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of legal capacity where this appears necessary for the protection of the person, leaving 
the door open to paternalistic practices. In effect, it authorizes incapacitation for 
reasons of ‘protection’ of the person, exposing them to the risk that doctors or carers, 
simply overrule decisions they do not agree with with the pretext of ‘saving the person 
from harmful choices’. Moreover, the norm does not limit the use of substituted 
decision-making to extreme circumstances, suggesting that people could be deprived 
of their decisional power even when they have expressed an articulate opinion. In this 
regard, the fact that the Action Plan refers to the R(99)4 as a whole, without 
distinguishing the various provisions, may cause confusion and could allow someone 
to claim that deprivation of legal capacity is not necessarily in contrast with current 
European human rights standards, even after the CRPD.  
This confusion seems to be partially rectified by paragraph 63 of the Disability 
Strategy 2017-2023, which reads:  
‘States are required under the UNCRPD, as far as possible to replace substituted 
decision-making with systems of supported decision-making. Possible 
limitations on decision-making should be considered on an individual basis, be 
proportional and be restricted to the extent to which it is absolutely necessary.’ 
 
This line apparently adopts a formulation which is less radical than that of the 
CRPD and especially of the Committee. As we have seen, the latter states that 
substituted decision-making is never admissible. The CoE Disability Strategy instead 
seems to allow this possibility, though in very limited cases. However, in substance, 
the two approaches appear similar. As we have seen, the UN Committee includes some 
forms of substitution in its definition of supported decision-making, although it does 
not admit this explicitly. In this regard, the Coe Disability strategy states in reality the 
same idea, but expressed in more exact terms. On one hand, it admits that sometimes 
substitution is inevitable, reassuring professionals, carers, and activists working with 
people living with serious conditions such as late stage dementia. On the other hand, 
it clarifies how substituted decision-making should be used only when ‘absolutely 
necessary’. Indeed, it seems to go as far as to maintain that exceptions can be made 
not even for categories of people but just for single cases, suggesting a particularly 
                                                          
Recommendation used to be considered quite advanced, however it does not reflect many of the ideas 
that have emerged in recent years. M Keys, ‘Legal Capacity Law Reform in Europe: An Urgent 
Challenge’, (2009) 1 European Yearbook of Disability Law 68. 
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small proportion of situations in which it is acceptable to deviate from the principle of 
supported decision-making. 
Recommendation Rec(2014)2 on the rights of older people also contributes 
towards spreading an approach to legal capacity based on supported decision-making. 
Rec(2014)2 II.13 states that older people have the right to receive appropriate support in 
exercising their legal capacity and that an eventually appointed representative ‘should 
support the older person on his or her request and in conformity with his or her will and 
preferences’. Rec(2014)2 goes on to give useful indications with regard to specific 
provisions which should concretely characterise a system based on support by referring to 
specific national examples. For example, it praises the Czech reform of legal capacity 
legislation, which has abolished full incapacitation and has introduced a series of 
trusteeship measures that accompany the person in the decision rather than substituting 
them. The recommendation also endorses the Dementia Strategy adopted by Denmark in 
2010 which issues specific recommendations to strengthen support services for people 
living with this condition.  
In summary, Committee of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly 
recommendations provide some useful indications on how a human rights and support-
based model such as that proposed by the CRPD may translate in terms of specific 
rules. It also details valuable provisions  related to treatment decisions of people living 
with dementia by reaffirming legal capacity as a fundamental right, emphasising that 
the person needs to be constantly involved in the decisional process of their care, and 
clarifying that a capacity regulation truly based on support must abolish full 
incapacitation, guarantee that the person is assisted in the way they desire, ensure that 
capacity measures apply for the shortest time possible, and establish that inspection 
mechanisms. However, the fact that outdated sources such as recommendation R(99)4 
have not yet been declared abrogated can still create confusion about the exact CoE 
position in this area. Moreover, the documents cited above fail to clarify a series of 
elements such as what specific safeguards and monitoring mechanisms should be 
preferred to monitor the quality of support. They also do not provide a complete 
repertoire of support means that State parties would have to provide. This is certainly 
due to the fact that CoE policies need to be general enough to be applicable in the 
different situations of the various Member States. However, another explanation can 
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be found in the fact that, as noted by Mirfin-Veicht,69 practice has not yet produced a 
vast set of examples of supported decision-making tools, so it is still early to draw 
general indications in this regard.    
 
Promotion initiatives   
Paragraph 64 of the European Disability Strategy affirms that, in order to promote 
the principles affirmed in its policy plans, the CoE undertakes actions aiming at urging 
and supporting Member States to improve their legislation, policies and practices on 
legal capacity, organise training events and awareness raising initiatives, and 
disseminate promising practices. These types of actions have always characterized 
CoE policy activities in this area, even before the Disability Strategy.  
With regard to the first aspect, Parliamentary Assembly resolutions in particular 
show the commitment of the CoE towards maintaining the attention of its Member 
States on such themes. Indeed, Resolutions 1642 (2009) and 2039 (2015) urge Member 
States to ratify and implement the CRPD and invite them to include disability issues 
in their political agenda.70 In relation to training and awareness raising, the CoE 
regularly organises and funds events throughout Europe open to policy-makers, 
professionals and lay people. Examples include the training courses for carers and 
social workers organised in the Vologda Region, Russian Federation, the International 
Symposium on “Human Rights and Disability” organised in Vienna in 2014,71 or the 
International seminar on prejudice against disabled people, organised in Copenhagen 
in 2017.72 Such events are valuable occasions to disseminate the messages contained 
in the various CoE documents on disability, to discuss related issues, and to exchange 
thoughts and experiences of good practices established in various countries of Europe. 
This last function is also covered by the research activity of the Committee of Experts 
on the Rights of People with Disabilities, which regularly publishes reports on specific 
topics. In 2017 it published a study conducted in cooperation with the National 
                                                          
69 B Mirfin-Veicht, Exploring Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities: An Integrative Literature Review (Donald Beasley Institute 2016), VIII. 
70 See Section 3. 
71 On these initiatives see European Committee for Social Cohesion, Human Dignity and Equality, 
above. 
72 For information on this event see <https://www.coe.int/en/web/chairmanship/-/international-seminar-
in-copenhagen-denmark-on-changing-attitudes-and-prejudice-about-persons-with-disabilities> 
accessed 8 August 2018. 
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University of Ireland (Galway) specifically focusing on legal capacity.73 This 
document contains a review of the most innovative reforms and practices in this area, 
constituting an important instrument of information for governments, care structures, 
charities, and individuals.  
Thanks to these initiatives, the CoE has managed to produce some tangible change 
in practices and legislations on legal capacity in Europe. This was publicized in the 
evaluation report of the Disability Action Plan 2006-2015, released by the DECS-
RPD74 and seeing the collaboration of various NGOs which presented their evaluation 
papers, such as the European Disability Forum (EDF)75 and the European Association 
of Service Providers for Persons with Disabilities (EASPD).76 The Evaluation Report 
emphasises how, after the release of the Disability Action Plan, many CoE Member States 
have started processes of reform concerning their legal capacity and antidiscrimination 
legislations, removing the legal barriers existing in this area. Such reforms have taken 
place in Iceland, Norway and Ireland.77 Moreover, as also noted by the EASPD, the Action 
Plan promoted principles affirmed in the International context to a growing number of 
political actors, officers, professionals, and common people.78 In this context, some 
countries such as Austria have started programmes to train various members of the justice 
profession on the ways to address cases involving disabled people.79 Related to medical 
treatment, the Evaluation Report emphasises how the principles of person-centred care are 
now central in the organisation of health services even in the case of disabled people in 
the majority of Member States,.80   
Despite these significant results, there are still numerous challenges. Indeed, there are 
still national regulations which appear to discriminate against mentally disabled 
                                                          
73 Council of Europe, A study on the Equal Recognition before the law. Contribution  towards the 
Council of Europe Strategy on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2017). 
74 CoE, Abridged Evaluation Report. Implementation of the Council of Europe to promote the rights 
and full participation of people with disabilities in society: including the quality of life of people with 
disabilities in Europe 2006-2015 (CoE, 2015), 73-75 in < 
http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/Disability/Source/2015_Disability_conference/Abridged_Evaluation_Report
_en.pdf> accessed 1st March 2016. 
75 EDF, Report on the Implementation of the Disability Action Plan 2006-2015 (CoE, 2015), in < 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=090000
16802ff569>, accessed 20 April 2016; EDF, Analysis Paper Developing a Disability Action Plan 2016-
2020 (CoE, 2015) in < https://www.google.it/?gws_rd=ssl#q=EDF+report+disability+action+plan> 
accessed 20th April 2016. 
76 EASPD, Enjoyment of Rights: towards the new CoE Disability Action Plan (CoE, 2015) in < 
http://www.easpd.eu/sites/default/files/sites/default/files/Publications/easpd_report_on_coe_dap_.doc
x.pdf> accessed 1 March 2016. 
77 CoE, Abridged Report, above, 54-55. 
78 EASPD, above, 4-5. 
79 CoE, Abridged Report, above, 54.  
80 Ibid, 43. 
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individuals.81 Moreover, as noted by Ferrante, a lot of work is still needed in order to 
ensure that professionals and carers really adopt an approach based on supported decision-
making.82 In this regard, the potential of the Committee of Ministers and of the 
Parliamentary Assembly to exert political pressure on Member States is still partially 
unexploited, as there are currently no initiatives of naming and shaming against 
governments which have not engaged in reform processes with regard to legal capacity 
policies. Also, although the CoE organises many awareness raising and training events, it 
seems utopian to expect that it would have the necessary resources to carry on such 
initiatives for every equipe, hospital, or local community existing in Europe. On a similar 
note, CoE institutions have the capacity only to ‘make known’ promising practices, but 
not to actively invest money in their realisation, leaving unaddressed one of the most 
influential factors in stopping processes of change in the reality of politics and care 
services: lack of funding. Finally, as we have seen before, recommendations and resolution 
are not well equipped to specify the exact content of the CRPD model of legal capacity 
and to impose their respect in single concrete cases as they are non-binding documents 
that must be applicable to all Member States.  
 
4. Applying the CRPD through the ECtHR  
 
ECtHR judgments: general characteristics 
A more effective contribution in this sense may be given by the ECtHR through 
its case law. As we have seen, it has the power to issue binding judicial decisions 
concerning human rights complaints brought forward by individuals, groups of 
individuals, or NGOs against a member-state. Therefore, its judgments have an 
immediate impact on the situation of people and, because they are issued in relation to 
concrete cases, provide a specific indication of what human rights principles mean in 
practice. In addition, ECtHR judgments can influence the way in which national judges 
interpret human rights by suggesting new ways to look at a certain legal issue through 
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the so-called ‘dialogue between Courts’.83 As shown by Janis, Kay and Bradley, the 
Court has a high level of legitimacy and prestige, so the vast majority of its judgments 
are enforced and respected.84  
The Court has the power to order States to remove the regulations which, in a 
specific situation, do not align with the European human rights standard, and it may 
require the government to pay damages to the victim of the violation. 85 As affirmed 
by Harris et al, the Court judges with respect to three categories of obligations.86 The 
first category is that of negative obligations, which require Member States to abstain 
from human rights violations. The second is that of positive obligations, which require 
Member States to take action in passing reforms or creating the legal, political, or 
social conditions for the exercise of a certain right. The third category of obligations 
pertains to ‘horizontal effect’ (also called Drittwirkung) and holds states responsible 
for not preventing or reacting to violations by private individuals.87 This concept may 
be of great importance in relation to dementia. Indeed, in this case violations often 
arise because citizens misuse the spaces left open by the law.    
Therefore, the ECtHR offers protection on a large spectrum of violations, also 
when not directly caused by governments, as it can respond to harmful behaviours in 
the field of treatment decisions such as the violation of a person’s autonomy through 
the neglect of his or her will, discriminatory legislation or inadequate policies of 
hospitals and care structures. 88  Moreover, ECHR principles, which form the legal 
basis of ECtHR decisions, are formulated in quite broad terms. Therefore, as noted by 
Schabas, it is possible to read them in a way that accounts for the evolution of society.89 
For this reason the Court can interpret them in light of new sources such as the CRPD, 
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making them a gateway through which the Convention enters the CoE Human Rights 
enforcement system.90 
 
ECtHR judgements and legal capacity  
Relevant judgements for the field of treatment decisions of people living with 
dementia have been issued by the Court in relation to Articles 3 ECHR (prohibition of 
torture), 5 (right to liberty and security), 6 (right to a fair trial), 8 (right to respect for 
private and family life), 14 (prohibition of discrimination), and 18 (limitation on use 
of restrictions on rights). Such cases do not necessarily involve people living with 
dementia or focus on healthcare decisions, but they affirm principles and rules relating 
to the right to legal capacity and the rejection of incapacitation, the provision of 
support in decision-making, and safeguards which can be applied in this area. 
On the first aspect, the case law of the ECtHR may offer some guidance on the 
concrete provisions and legal capacity measures in contrast to the CoE human rights 
standard by indicating which specific oppressive national rules should be repealed. 
However, until now even the Court has appeared to follow the partially outdated model 
indicated in recommendation R99(4). Indeed, its decisions tend to focus on limiting 
the duration and scope of incapacitating measures rather than clearly advocating for 
their rejection. Nonetheless, they still provide some valuable statements on norms ad 
practices that can be acceptable or unacceptable also in relation to the case of treatment 
decisions of people living with dementia.  
As noted by the European Commissioner on Human Rights, the ECtHR has 
established the principle that even the existence of a serious impairment is not in itself 
a valid reason to deprive a person of his or her legal capacity.91 In the case Shtukaturov 
v Russia, a Russian citizen had been incapacitated following his mother’s request 
without being previously consulted by the judge. Therefore, the applicant alleged a 
violation of Article 8 ECtHR, maintaining, among other allegations, that his 
incapacitation was unjustified.92 In response to this claim, the Court first affirmed that 
the existence of a mental disability, even a serious one, does not justify a deprivation 
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of legal capacity. Secondly, it stated that legal capacity measures should be tailored to 
the conditions of the individual. In this regard, the ECtHR, assessing the Russian legal 
capacity regulation, noted that a system based on the binary distinction between full 
capacity and total incapacity is not compliant with the principle of proportionality.93  
Another principle affirmed by the ECtHR is that an individual may be 
incapacitated only if there is clear evidence that such a measure is needed.94 In this 
context, the ECtHR, in the case X and Y v Croatia, affirmed that the judgment 
concerning the need of incapacitating the person has to be done on the basis of the 
assessment made by a medical expert.95 In the already cited case Shtukaturov v Russia, 
the Court affirmed that a declaration of legal incapacity issued solely on the basis of 
documental evidence was in breach of Article 6(1) on the right to a fair trial.96 
Nonetheless, the judgment is not an act of the medical expert but is the responsibility 
of the judge, who has to confirm that the assessment of the medical expert is not 
arbitrary.97  
The case law of the European Court of Human Rights also establishes principles 
in terms of legal capacity safeguards. In the case JT v UK, the Court affirmed that, 
under Article 8 ECHR, a mentally disabled person has the right to choose their 
guardian or trustee. The situation at the basis of the decision was that of an individual 
who wanted to exclude her mother from her legal representation.98 The Court has also 
emphasised in the already analysed X and Y v. Croatia that the person – such as an 
individual with dementia -  even when placed under guardianship, must be fully 
informed on the judicial actions and affairs carried out in their name.99 Finally, in the 
case Stanev v Bulgaria, the ECtHR affirmed the right of the person to directly access 
the Court in order to obtain the restoration of legal capacity.100 The case DD v 
Lithuania focused, among other issues, on the change of guardian required by the fact 
that the person and the legal representative had shown huge disagreements and had a 
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conflictual relationship.101 In this situation, the Court affirmed that ‘the fact that an 
individual has to be placed under guardianship […] does not mean that he is incapable 
of expressing a view on his situation’, which needs to be respected.102 
Such judicial statements are certainly important also in the field of treatment 
decisions of people living with dementia. Indeed, for the first time at a European level, 
they challenge the binary ‘all or nothing’ approach to legal capacity, which we have 
seen appears practically and legally problematic in the case of people living with this 
condition. Moreover, they provide clear statements affirming the illegality of those 
prejudices still frequent in medical and legal professionals, which lead them to 
automatically assume that the person living with dementia is incapable. However, they 
still leave open the possibility of a person being deprived of their legal capacity on the 
basis of a functional assessment, and are therefore  not completely in line with Article 
12 CRPD. Full alignment would require a much stronger statement in favour of the 
right to legal capacity of every person and on supported decision-making as the only 
remedy, except for very extreme circumstances, in case of difficulties in making 
decisions. 
Despite this, some judgments of the ECtHR are doing a good job in promoting a 
more support-based approach to legal capacity. Already in the case DD v Lithuania, 
the Court seemed to promote a regulatory model based on the reconstruction and 
implementation of the person’s will. In addition, it refers to the concept of support in 
other two cases, the case Kruskovic v Croatia and the case Vaudelle v France. In the 
first case, a man who was divested from his legal capacity had a daughter, went to the 
Birth Register Office, and registered himself as the father of the baby.103 However, the 
County Office of State Administration ordered the annulment of the declaration two 
years later, saying that it had to be deemed invalid as the applicant was legally 
incapable. The ECtHR qualified this as a violation of Article 8 ECHR.104 The Court 
blamed the behaviour of the Birth Register Office and the County Office of State 
Administration, as they annul the person’s declaration and failed to support the 
individual, for example by suggesting he call his already-appointed guardian.105 In the 
case Vaudelle v France, an incapacitated person was criminally convicted and tried in 
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absentia, without him being notified and adequately informed of the procedure.106 
Indeed, the criminal court considered his participation in the trial to be useless, as he 
would not been able to follow the proceedings.107 The ECtHR dismissed this argument, 
maintaining that if adequately supported and assisted by a psychiatrist or by his lawyer, 
the applicant could have attended the hearings.108  
In light of such judgments, Bartlett, Lewis and Thorold note that Article 8 ECHR, 
as interpreted by the ECtHR, could now be regarded as establishing a positive 
obligation on Member States, a duty to actively engage in promoting the conditions 
for the exercise of legal capacity and the presence of mechanisms of support in order 
to assist the person to in overcome the difficulties he or she may experience when 
choosing for themselves.109 As admitted by the three authors, to date there is no 
specific judgment of the ECtHR specifically affirming this position, which seems to 
run sub-trace to some judgments. However, developing this interpretative line can be 
a possible way to promote a model based on supported decision-making at the CoE 
level.110 
In general, the cases considered thus far by the ECtHR show how the Court can 
be a good channel to promote the concrete realisation of the principles of the support 
and human rights approach to legal capacity proposed by the CRPD. Indeed, its case 
law shows that when disabled people challenge national legal capacity legislations and 
practices in front of its judges, they often succeed in their claims. Unfortunately, 
because of the costs and logistic complexities characterising such a procedure, the 
number of claims in relation to the right to make decisions of disabled individuals are 
still limited, so the Court has not had the opportunity to express itself on a range of 
important issues in this area. Moreover, many decisions of the Court are still partly 
trapped in a vision of legal capacity which pre-dates the CRPD and therefore now 
appears outdated. This is also due to the fact that a lot of claims so far have asked the 
ECtHR just to limit the scope of substitute decision-making practices rather than pose 
the problem of the rejection of the very same idea of incapacity and substituted 
decision-making. Therefore, also in relation to capacity to consent to treatment of 
individuals living with dementia, it could be a good strategy for the future for 
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individuals or NGOs to incentivise European litigation in this area and push the ECtHR 
to consider a more radical interpretive position and embrace more decisively the 
principles of Article 12 CRPD by giving to it the opportunity to issue more extensive 
guidelines on the rules and support for various situations in which people living with 
this condition find themselves. 
Through this channel it would be possible to achieve substantial progress with 
regard to the extensiveness and efficacy of the ECtHR action in promoting the right to 
legal capacity of individuals like people living with dementia. However, this positive 
evolution in the Court’s approach may be impeded by the fact that general norms of 
International law and International human rights law do not formally establish a 
hierarchical superiority of the principles established at the International level, such as 
those of the CRPD, over norms developed at a regional level such as those of the 
ECHR.111 As emerging from Article 32 ECHR, the European Convention on Human 
Rights is the only binding authority on the Court.112 Therefore, there is no formalised 
legal metatheory which permits to ground the claim that the ECtHR is obliged to step 
out of the traditional pathway it has followed so far in deciding cases in matters of 
disability, to take a fuller account of the CRPD. In this regard, one could even object 
that it is the CRPD which needs to be interpreted in light of the ECHR, rather than the 
norms of the latter that have to be applied in a way that is compatible with the UN 
Convention. 
However, a possible counter argument to this objection is that the European Court 
of Human Rights has recognised in its case law that ‘the [European] Convention 
should so far as possible be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international 
law of which it forms part’ and that it needs to be interpreted in light of the rules of the 
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Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties which obliges the Court to take into 
account in the hermeneutic process of any treaty provision the other International rules 
relevant for the parties.113 This could be assumed as a legal-interpretive basis to ground 
a duty of the ECtHR to interpret the ECHR in light of the CRPD in relation to cases 
regarding citizens of the European continent, as all countries of Europe have now 
ratified the UN Convention. In this regard, as noted by Ulfstein, the ECtHR has already 
referred to International principles as tools for the so called ‘evolutive’ interpretation 
of ECHR provisions,114 through which the European Convention is interpreted in light 
of the evolution of society, the European common legal sensibility and the wider legal 
context.115 In this sense, it has been shown in Section 3 of this Chapter that the Member 
States of the CoE have approved, through the CoE Committee of Ministers, 
recommendations (e.g. the Disability Action Plan 2006-2015 or the CoE Disability 
Strategy 2017-2023) which are recognised value of interpretive documents in front of 
the ECtHR.116 These documents can be used to claim that the common European legal 
tradition and sensibility in the context of human rights of disabled people has shifted 
in the direction of the CRPD and that the ECtHR has to take this into account when 
interpreting the norms of the European Convention. 
Of course, even if such arguments would be accepted by the Court, embracing 
more fully the vision proposed by the CRPD would still require a significant change 
in the approach and sensibility which has so far characterised the action of the 
ECtHR.117 In this regard, there might be many cases in which the Court, also in light 
of previous case law, would find insurmountable tensions between the principles of 
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the CRPD and the ECHR, considering ‘not possible’ to interpret the latter in light of 
the former. For this reason it would probably take a long time for the European Court 
of Human Rights to enact a visible change of approach in the direction of the UN 
Convention, and also in this case such a shift will probably never lead to a complete 
resonance of ECtHR case law with the vision of the CRPD. However, any step towards 
a better promotion of principles such as those affirmed in Article 12 CRPD will still 
represent an improvement compared to the current situation. 
 
5. Monitoring and creating the conditions for the right to decide  
 
The ESC and RevESC system  
Besides promoting CRPD principles among Member States and work for their 
enforcement in specific cases, CoE institutions have also the potential of contributing 
to create the conditions for a support based approach to treatment decisions. In this 
regard a particularly important role can be played by the system of the European Social 
Charter and Revised European Social Charter, and by the Committee for Social 
Rights.118 Indeed, such a complex of norms and monitoring tools, focuses on issues 
and principles relating to the basic social an economic need of people, including the 
right to adequate healthcare services.  
The European Social Charter (ESC) was adopted on the 18th October 1961 and 
entered into force on the 26th February 1965. It was created in order to integrate the 
protection of human rights provided by the ECHR with further provisions focusing on 
social rights.119 As reported by Harris, in the 1990s the CoE developed an amended 
version of the European Social Charter (RevESC), 120  opened to signatures on the 3rd 
of May 1996 and entered into force on the 1st of July 1999.121 However there are still 
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member-states that have not ratified it. 122 Therefore, the first version of the Charter 
applies to them. 
The two versions of the ESC contain a series of principles imposing that medical 
services are organised in a way that respects the autonomy and rights of all their users. 
In this regard, they echo both the spirit of the CRPD and of those theories such as the 
social model of disability, which advocate for a less medicalised approach to chronic 
conditions. Such provisions can be cited in judgements by national courts and also by 
the ECtHR as an interpretive parameter of ECHR norms, serving at the basis for 
claiming the entitlement to a more respectful care also in the case of people living with 
dementia. On their basis the Committee for Social Rights can also undertake 
monitoring actions through non-binding reports on collective complaints, state reports 
or interpretive declarations.123  
With regard to the first kind of documents the Committee, in the context of 
disability, has issued, for the moment, only few decisions in relation to cases regarding 
the right to education of mentally disabled children, so the potential of such tools in 
the field of legal capacity and healthcare is still unexploited.124 However, important 
principles regarding medical treatment of mentally disabled people and older 
individuals are contained in some state reports and interpretive declarations.125 In 
relation to them, De Schutter and Sant’Ana note how, though not binding, they can be 
are very promising tools in order to promote the dialogue between CoE and national 
governments, in search of solutions which permit to enhance the level of protection of 
social rights.126 Indeed, such documents are the product of an intense activity 
characterised by the exchange of information and opinions between ECSR and single 
member-states. Therefore, also in the field of treatment decisions of individuals living 
with dementia they may be precious in creating a shared European repertoire of good 
practices and in helping to develop holistic solutions that fit into the context of a 
specific Member State.127 
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Healthcare services and healthcare decisions  
 Relevant provisions to the right to make treatment decisions of people living with 
dementia are contained in Article 11 ESC and RevESC (the right to protection of 
health), Article 13 ESC and RevESC (the right to social and medical assistance), 
Article 14 ESC and RevESC (the right to benefit from social welfare services) and 
Article 23 RevESC (the right of elderly persons to social protection). Here, the Charter 
focus on social rights leads to put attention on the services and contextual conditions 
which are essential in order to truly guarantee the right to autonomy and freedom of 
choice of individuals. In this regard, the ECSR gives indications on the kind of social 
support needed in order to permit an adequate exercise of autonomy and advocates for 
a broader approach to healthcare, which takes into account not only the aim of curing 
the disease, but also the general wellbeing of the person.  
Article 11 in both versions of the ESC, binds Member States to take measures not 
only to cure illnesses, but also to put in place structures which are responsible for 
providing advice on healthcare issues. In this regard, Article 13, which also has the 
same formulation in the older and the revised version of the Charter, focuses on the 
conditions necessary for such a holistic approach to be realised. In this context, it 
obliges Member States to guarantee to everyone a good standard of care (Article 13(1)) 
and to assure that they receive advice and support necessary in order to prevent, 
remove or alleviate personal and family want. This kind of provisions, that put 
emphasis on the necessity of support in case of illness, have a strong relevance to the 
area of treatment decision-making of people living with dementia. Indeed, as we have 
seen, the reason why carers and medical professionals fail to listen to the person and 
to support them in deciding on their care is often due to the fact they are overburdened, 
or they do not have enough time, or they lack adequate facilities and tools.128 
In addition, Article 13(2) ESC and RevESC states that people receiving social and 
medical assistance ‘shall not, for that reason, suffer from a diminution of their political 
or social rights’. In relation to this provision, the Committee of Social Rights has noted 
how it implies that discriminations against individuals receiving assistance must be 
eradicated and that existing provisions on equality and non-discrimination should be 
interpreted so to avoid that material living conditions, social status or any other 
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circumstances may become a reason for restriction with regard to human rights.129 
Unfortunately, despite this statement, the Committee has judged as compliant with 
Article 13(2) ESC and RevESC a number of Member States which retain quite old-
fashioned legislations on legal capacity and that result in limiting the right to autonomy 
of people typically interested by healthcare procedures such as older people and 
individuals living with cognitive impairments.130 However, the formulation of the 
Article seems to leave room for an interpretive stream which derives from such a 
provision the implicit obligation of not depriving even a person with a serious mental 
impairment of their capacity to express their wishes on care. In effect, Article 13(2) 
ESC and RevESC, could be used by associations, through the system of collective 
complaints, in order to push the Committee to establish the principle according to 
which the necessity of a certain medical treatment is not a sufficient reason to impose 
it, even to a mentally disabled person such as an individual living with dementia. 
In this regard are also relevant the provisions contained in Article 14, remained 
unchanged in the revised version of the ESC, which recognise the right of every person 
to benefit from social welfare services. The right to welfare services is crucial when 
dealing with rights of people such as those living with dementia even in relation to 
questions strictly regarding medical treatment. Indeed, in this area health and social 
care are so intertwined to be often very difficult to be distinguished.131 Moreover, in 
relation to this Article, the European Committee of Social Rights has affirmed that 
effective and equal access to social and welfare services implies that ‘any decision 
should be made in consultation with and not against the will of the client’, ‘remedies 
shall be available in terms of complaints’ and ‘a right to appeal to an independent body 
in urgent cases of discrimination and violation against human dignity’ must be 
granted.132 Therefore, even under the ERC, the will of the person is regarded as central 
and should be respected as much as possible.  
Starting from Article 23 RevESC, the Committee has developed useful principles 
in relation to legal capacity of older people, which apply also to the many older 
individuals living with dementia. Indeed, Article 23(1) obliges State Parties to adopt 
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appropriate measures to enable older people to remain full members of society. 
Starting from this provision the Committee clarifies that it implies that such individuals 
shall suffer no ostracism or deprivation of their legal capacity on the basis of their 
age.133 In Conclusions 2003 on France, the ECSR admits that older people may have 
problems in exercising their legal capacity. These difficulties, however, should be 
overcome, according to the Committee, by providing ‘procedures for assisted 
decision-making’.134 The ECSR Digest also clarifies that such provisions should be 
read in connection with those contained in Articles 11, 12 and 13 ESC and RevESC, 
issuing, in this way, one of the clearest declarations in favour of a model of legal 
capacity based on supported decision-making contained in a CoE document.135  
In this context, the Committee, in Conclusions 2013 on The Netherlands, reports 
an example of good practice in the field of healthcare in relation to the case of people 
living with dementia.136 Indeed, it commends a series of projects, carried on by the 
Dutch government, such as the National Programme on care for the elderly, the 
Dementia Delta Plan, the Ambient Assisted Living Joint Programme, and the ‘Visible 
link’ programme.137 In this context the Committee notes that, also thanks to such 
projects, care services in Holland appear to be ‘integrated into mainstream care 
wherever possible’.138 Moreover, it stresses that, from the report presented by the 
national government, emerges that ‘a programme aimed at providing integrated multi-
agency, demand-driven care for dementia patients began in March 2008’.139 
To sum up, the principles affirmed in Articles 11, 13, 14 and 23 RevESC, have a 
notable potential in creating the conditions for a model of legal capacity and treatment 
decisions based on supported decision-making also in the field of healthcare. However, 
the reports and declarations of the Committee of Social Rights on this matter are still 
rather limited in number. As already said, this body has not yet had the opportunity to 
deal with collective complaints in the area of treatment choices of people living with 
dementia. Moreover, apart from some exceptions, in many state reports and 
interpretive declarations the Committee fails to take a specific position with regard to 
how healthcare services should be organised in order to really allow also people living 
                                                          
133 ECSR, Digest, above, 147. 
134 ECSR, Conclusions 2003, France, 186. 
135 ECSR, Digest, above, 147. 






with cognitive impairments to express their will on care. Nonetheless, the way in 
which relevant ESC and RevESC are formulated and the powers of the Committee 
leave definitely open the possibility for such kinds of statements to be issued in the 
future.   
 
Human Rights Commissioner and CPT reports 
A contribution towards creating the conditions for a full exercise of the right to 
decide in the case of treatment decisions of disabled people like individuals living with 
dementia can come from the reports of the European Commissioner of Human Rights 
and the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (CPT) issued on the basis of their 
country visits.140 Such documents have generally the function of providing a 
systematic analysis of the most crucial human rights issues, in relation to a specific 
country or a specific topic, and to provide an organic set of indications on how to 
improve the level of protection of human rights in a certain area.141 In general, as 
already seen, the reports of both the Commissioner and the CPT play an important role 
in the development of dialogue with Member States on human rights issues.142 Also, 
because they originate from first hand inspections, they can be quite effective in 
shading light on what is exactly problematic in the policies, legislations and practices 
of a country also with regard to legal capacity.  
In his report entitled ‘Who gets to Decide’ the European Commissioner for Human 
Rights offers a systematic analysis of the situation of European national legislations 
and transnational regulations with regard to the right to legal capacity of people with 
psychosocial disabilities.143 The report, prepared with the help of experts in the field, 
affirms how too many national legislations still admit forms of substituted decision-
making or plenary guardianship, provoking the automatic loss of rights by the person 
(sections 2.1 and 2.2). In addition, it stigmatises the frequent lack of support based 
alternatives to traditional guardianship (section 2.3). Therefore, in the part dedicated 
to recommendations to Member States the Committee openly advocates for 
abandoning the traditional liberal concept of personhood in favour of a more relational 
vision. Moreover, it requires the implementation of new regulations based on 
                                                          
140 On the powers and functioning of these two bodies see above Section 2. 
141 In relation to the Commissioner see Sivonen, above, 19-28. See also Weber, above. In relation to the 
CTP see Kicker, above, 48-63. 
142 See sections 2.5 and 2.6. 
143 CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, Who Gets to Decide, above. 
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supported decision making (section 5.1). In this context, the Commissioner recognises 
the difficulty of putting in place legal measures truly based on support, avoiding hidden 
forms of old-style guardianship. In order to facilitate the identification of the 
appropriate forms of support he indicates two examples of good practices. The first is 
that of the personal ombudsmen, taken from Swedish law. The Ombudsmen is a body 
dedicated to the protection of the rights of vulnerable individuals, which intervenes 
without need of formalities, at the simple request of the person. The second example 
is that of networks of support, taken from Canadian law, which permits to a person to 
nominate in advance a group of people with the duty to assist them in case they develop 
a physical or mental impairment. Such principles are reaffirmed by the Commissioner 
on Human Rights also in the state report on Norway.144 Here, the Commissioner, while 
commending the government for having ratified the CRPD, stigmatises the fact that 
the national legal capacity regulation is still too much based on substituted decision-
making. 
An important principle, with regard to legal capacity and medical treatment has 
been affirmed also in the Annual report 2010 of the European Committee for the 
Prevention of Torture.145 In this context the Committee states that  
 ‘Patients should, as a matter of principle, be placed in a position to give their 
free and informed consent to treatment. The admission of a person to a 
psychiatric establishment on an involuntary basis should not be construed as 
authorising treatment without his consent’.146   
 
Therefore if the person has not been put in the position of giving his or her free 
and informed consent and is not adequately assisted in the decision-making process, 
the treatment has to be considered as torture.  
 
                                                          
144 CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, Commissioner’s report following his visit to Norway, , 
published on 23 January 2014, 13, in < 
https://wcd.coe.int/com.instranet.InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImag
e=2751937&SecMode=1&DocId=2272542&Usage=2> accessed 3 March 2016. 
145 CTP, Annual Report 2010, in < http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/annual/rep-21.pdf> accessed 3 March 
2016. 
146 Ibid, paragraph 41. 
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6. The Oviedo Convention and the Draft Protocol on 
Involuntary Treatment 
 
The Oviedo Convention 
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the 
Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine, also known as 
the Oviedo Convention, is the first international binding instrument specifically 
dealing with issues of bioethics and bio-law.147 It is the result of the drafting work 
carried on by the Steering Committee on Bioethics (CAHBI), now Committee of 
Bioethics (DH-BIO), established in 1992 by the Committee of Ministers.148 The text 
of the Convention was finally adopted by the Committee of Ministers on the 19th 
November 1996 and opened for signatures in Oviedo, Spain, on the 4th April 1997. So 
far it has been signed by 35 states and ratified by 29.149 As noted by Adorno the 
Convention is a binding instrument aiming at establishing general principles which 
have to be specified by additional protocols.150 
The implementation of the Oviedo Convention is essentially left to States Parties. 
Indeed, this treaty does not establish a proper monitoring body.151 Moreover, Article 
                                                          
147 On the Convention see, in general, MAM de Wachter, ‘The European Convention on 
Bioethics’(1997) 27 Hastings Center Report 13; HR Abbing, ‘The Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine. An Appraisal of the Council of Europe Convention’ (1998) 5 European Journal of Health 
Law, 377; BR Kern, ‘Die Bioethik-Konvention des Europarates: Bioethik versus Arztrecht?’ (1998) 11 
Medizinrecht 485; HL Schreiber, ‘The  European  Bioethics Convention : Legal Aspects’ in A. Schauer, 
H.-L. Schreiber, Z.  Ryn, J Andres (ed), Ethics in Medicine, (Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht 2001), 242; R 
Adorno, ‘The Oviedo Convention: A European Legal Framework at the intersection of Human Rights 
and Health Law’ (2005) Journal of International Biotechnology Law 133; E Doppelfeld, ‘Council of 
Europe in the field of Bioethics: the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and other legal 
instruments’ (2008) 34 Intensive Care Medicine 939. 
148 The process started with the Resolution No. 3, addressed to the Committee of Ministers by the 17th 
Conference of European Ministers of Justice, which took place in Istanbul, on the 5th-7th June 1990. The 
invitation contained in the Resolution was adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly with the 
Recommendation 1160(1991) and finally put in practice with the creation of the Steering Committee 
by the Committee of Ministers in 1992. On this aspect see Council of Europe, ‘Explanatory Report to 
the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine’ in < 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=090000
16800ccde5> accessed 23 February 2016.   
149 For information on signatures and ratifications see <http://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-
list/-/conventions/treaty/164/signatures?p_auth=ioBwhIyI> accessed 23 February 2016. 
150 Adorno, above, 134-135. V Bellver Capella, ‘Pasos hacia una bioética universal: el Convenio 
Europeo sobre Derechos Humanos y Biomedicina” in CM Romeo Casabona (ed), El Convenio de 
Derechos Humanos y Biomedicina. Su entrada en vigor en el ordenamiento jurídico español (Comares, 
2002) 55 notes that the Convention tries to establish the level of protection that European governments 
agree to be essential, but that each state party has the right to approve stricter regulations. 
151 As emerging from DH-BIO, above, 3-8, the DH-BIO cannot assess the compliance of member-states 
and cannot receive complaints by governments or individuals. 
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29 Oviedo Convention, only permits to Member States and the DH-BIO to request 
advisory opinions to the ECHR.152 However, infringements of the Oviedo Convention 
may be brought in front of the European Court of Human Rights if they imply also a 
violation of the ECHR.153 This situation may occur quite frequently, as already from 
the Preamble it emerges how the Oviedo Convention is essentially seen as specifying 
the rights affirmed in the European Convention of Human Rights. In addition, Article 
23 Oviedo Convention affirms the duty of State Parties to provide adequate judicial 
protection in relation to the provisions of the Convention.154 Therefore, national judges 
are called to base their judgements on the Convention norms, interpreting existing 
national regulations in the light of such principles. Indeed, as affirmed by Adorno, 
some provisions such as those concerning the right to information on medical 
treatment may be considered enough detailed to be self-executing and to be the basis 
for claims in terms of civil or administrative liability, without requiring further actions 
by the government or parliament.155  
 
The Oviedo Convention and Consent to Treatment 
As affirmed by de Wachter, the provisions on consent to treatment are considered 
one of the major achievements of the Oviedo Convention.156 Such regulation includes 
important principles on treatment decisions of mentally disabled people, which still 
are at the centre of a wide debate and may be relevant also in the case of people with 
dementia.157 
Article 5(1) Oviedo Convention states that ‘an intervention in the health field may 
only be carried out after the person concerned has given free and informed consent to 
it’ while Article 5(2) clarifies that the person themselves ‘shall beforehand be given 
appropriate information as to the purpose and nature of the intervention as well as on 
its consequences and risks’. In addition, Article 5(3) affirms that ‘the person concerned 
may freely withdraw consent at any time’. 
Article 6 Oviedo Convention, entitled ‘protection of persons not able to consent’ 
deals specifically with the problem of treatment decisions of mentally disabled people 
                                                          
152 Council of Europe, ‘Explanatory Report’, above, paragraph 165. 
153 See Adorno, above, 136. 
154 See Adorno, above, 136. 
155 Adorno, above, 135-136. See also C de Sola, ‘El Convenio de Bioética entra en vigor en España’ 
Diario Médico, 3  October 2000. 
156 De Wachter, above, 13. 
157 See onwards. 
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in general. In this context, Article 6(1) states that ‘an intervention may only be carried 
out on a person who does not have the capacity to consent, for his or her direct benefit’. 
Article 6(3) affirms that ‘where, according to law, an adult does not have the capacity 
to consent to an intervention because of a mental disability, a disease or for similar 
reasons, the intervention may only be carried out with the authorisation of their 
representative or an authority or a person or body provided for by law’ and that in such 
circumstances ‘the individual concerned shall as far as possible take part in the 
authorisation procedure’. Article 7 specifies that a mentally disabled person may be 
administered an intervention aimed at curing their mental impairment without consent 
provided safeguards are in place such as supervisory, control and appeal procedures, 
and without such treatment, serious harm is likely to result to the person. 
In general, the regulation of the Oviedo Convention, on the one hand, may appear 
problematic as it admits that a representative may decide for the person and that, in 
some circumstances, an intervention may be carried on without the explicit consent of 
the individual interested. However, on the other hand, it affirms that even a person 
unable to consent has to be involved as much as possible in the decision concerning 
his or her medical treatment. Therefore, as also noted by Paskalev and Vidalis, the 
formulation in broad terms of the norms of the Oviedo Convention leaves room for 
interpretations which can be in line with the more recent principles of the CRPD. 158 It 
is all down to how State Parties and CoE institutions will intend to specify such 
principles in additional protocols.  
 
The Draft Additional Protocol 
Unfortunately, the most recent initiatives in this area seem not to go in the right 
direction, as shown by the draft of additional protocol entitled ‘Working document 
concerning the protection of human rights and dignity of persons with mental disorder 
with regard to involuntary placement and involuntary treatment’ (Draft Additional 
Protocol) recently released by the Committee on Bioethics.159 Such working document 
has been at the centre of a wide debate especially among activists.  
                                                          
158 A Pascalev and T Vidalis, ‘Vague Oviedo: Autonomy, Culture and the case of previously Competent 
Patients’ (2001) 24 Bioethics 145. 
159 The document is available at < 
http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/healthbioethic/Activities/08_Psychiatry_and_human_rights_en/INF(2015)7
%20Protocole%20psy%20E.pdf> accessed 23 February 2016. 
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The Draft Additional Protocol is made up of twenty articles, divided in six 
chapters. The first chapter clarifies the object and scope of the document and Chapter 
II, entitled ‘general provisions’ reaffirms the principle of legality of the measures 
related to involuntary treatment and involuntary placement (Article 3), the principles 
of necessity and proportionality (Article 4), the rights of the individual to choose a 
person of trust and to be assisted by a lawyer (Articles 6 and 7), and the right to receive 
adequate care and being treated in an appropriate environment (Articles 8 and 9). 
Chapter III deals specifically with the ‘criteria for involuntary placement and 
involuntary treatment’. In this regard, Article 11 states that involuntary treatment may 
be used only if the person’s mental condition represents ‘a significant risk of serious 
harm to his or her health and his or her ability to decide on treatment is severely 
impaired’. The measure must be avoided if other alternatives and less intrusive options 
are available (Article 11(1)-ii). The procedure for involuntary treatment is regulated in 
Chapter IV. This Chapter affirms that the necessity of involuntary treatment and 
involuntary placement shall be justified in the light of a medical report (Article 12(1)) 
and shall be established through a judicial decision based on medical evidence and 
taking into account the opinion of the person concerned (Article 12(2)). The decision 
should state the maximum period beyond which the measure shall be reviewed. Article 
15 establishes that such measures should be terminated when, according to the doctor 
in charge of the person care, the criteria set in Article 11 are no longer met. Article 16 
provides that people subject to involuntary placement and/or treatment may request a 
review of their measures by applying to a court (Article 16(1)).  
Finally, Chapter V, affirms the right of the person under involuntary treatment to 
be informed about their rights and to communicate with their lawyer, representative 
and person of trust (Articles 17 and 18). Chapter VI obliges State Parties to keep 
records for all people under involuntary placement or involuntary treatment (Article 
19), and to ensure that compliance with the provisions of the Additional Protocol are 
subject to independent monitoring (Article 20). 
In the end of 2015, the DH-BIO launched a public consultation on the Draft 
Additional Protocol inviting comments from individuals, NGOs and institutions from 
all the fields concerned, which closed on the 15th of November of the same year.160 In 
                                                          




occasion of the public consultation and also after it closed activists, but also CoE 
bodies expressed concerns on the document. In this regard the CoE Commissioner for 
Human Rights affirms in his report that ‘he cannot subscribe too many of the basic 
assumptions underpinning the draft Additional Protocol and has serious misgivings 
about the compatibility of the draft’s approach with the UN Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities’.161 The first point of concern, is already that the draft 
seems to consider human rights violations in the context of involuntary placement and 
involuntary treatment as mainly due to gaps in national legislations and provisions 
regarding safeguards.162 However, the Commissioner, in light of the experience 
acquired during his visits to many Member States, notes how even when such 
safeguards exist they often prove ineffective in practice.163 Indeed, in many contexts 
the rights of the person are ‘ routinely violated while respecting the letter of existing 
legal safeguards, including some that are very similar to those proposed in the draft 
Additional Protocol’.164 
In addition, both the Commissioner and the NGOs which sent observations on the 
Working Document point out that it appears strongly influenced by a medicalised 
vision of disability which makes it in contrast with the CRPD. In this regard, the entry 
by the European Network of National Human Rights Institutions (ENNHRI) notes how 
the Draft Additional Protocol ‘only addresses how a person’s “mental disorder” affects 
their abilities and does not recognise the importance of attitudes and culture relating 
to the use of forced treatments’.165 Instead, as noted by Mental Health Europe (MHE), 
adopting the model proposed by the CRPD would lead to question the same legitimacy 
of such measures.166 On the contrary, the Draft Additional Protocol seems to admit 
that, in case of mental impairment, involuntary treatment is justifiable. 
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161 CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Comments of the Council of Europe Commissioner for 
Human Rights on the “Working document concerning the protection of human rights and dignity of 
persons with mental disorder with regard to involuntary placement and involuntary treatment’, 1, in 
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162 Ibid, 1-2. 
163 Ibid, 2. 
164 Ibid, 2. 
165 ENNHRI, ‘Comments of the CRPD Working Group of the European Network of NHRIs (ENNHRI) 
on the Draft Additional Protocol to the Oviedo Convention’, 1, in < 
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With regard to more specific norms, MHE, observes, in relation to Article 12(1) 
Draft Additional Protocol, that by requiring that the assessment of the person is made 
only by one doctor, this Article does not guarantee that the involuntary treatment is 
managed in an impartial way by the people around the interested individual.167 
Moreover, the Commissioner for Human Rights affirms, with regard to Article 12(2) 
Draft Additional Protocol, that it does not guarantee an adequate involvement of the 
person in the treatment decision.168 In fact this Article provides that the opinions of the 
person shall only be ‘taken into account’. This provision seems to allow the 
representative of the person to make independent decisions and leaves the door open 
to forms of substituted decision-making. Moreover, the Commissioner notes how the 
procedure for reviewing a measure of involuntary treatment, regulated in Article 16, 
requiring the intervention of a judge, seems too complex and may result in an obstacle 
for the exercise the right of appeal by a mentally disabled person.169 Finally, the report 
by EU PERSON project notes how the Draft Additional Protocol puts insufficient 
attention on alternatives to involuntary treatment based on supported decision-making. 
Indeed, it observes, Article 5 Working Document refers to alternatives only in abstract 
terms. On the contrary it should clarify what forms of support may be used in this 
context, insisting on the necessity of employing existing networks of support and 
providing some examples of good practices.170   
     
7. Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, CoE institutions have at their disposal a series of powers and 
mechanisms which can allow them to play an important role in the promotion of CRPD 
principles and of an approach to legal capacity based on supported decision-making 
also in relation to treatment decisions of people living with dementia. In particular, 
they can contribute to promote the principles of the Convention among Member States, 
professionals and common citizens through recommendations, awareness raising and 
dissemination of good practices, they can clarify and enforce such provisions through 
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ECtHR case law and they can work in partnership with national governments to put in 
place the conditions for such principles to be really respected and extensively applied 
in practice. 
However, the potential of such mechanism is still quite unexploited. Indeed, they 
are still rarely used to advance new rules or practices with specific regard to healthcare 
choices of people with dementia. For this reason, it is necessary that activists and 
scholars put pressure on CoE bodies to really take action in this field and that they 
continue to highlight how CoE powers can be important factors in promoting change. 
In addition, some documents emanated by the Council of Europe, such as the Draft 
Additional Protocol on involuntary placement and treatment and certain decisions of 
the ECtHR, still refer to quite an old fashioned approach to legal capacity, sending a 
confusing message as to what the real position of the CoE on such matter is. Therefore, 
there is also the need of a more serious internal debate, which really clarifies the policy 
aspects which the organisation as a whole should push forward and that guarantees 





The EU and Treatment Decisions of People living with 
Dementia 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The European Union (EU) is an economic and political organisation established 
in 1957 and grouping 28 European countries.1 Its main goal consists in promoting 
peace, prosperity, pluralism, equality and justice through the cooperation and 
integration of its Member States and citizens.2 In this regard, EU institutions are also 
recognised relevant competencies in the fields of health, disability and equal 
opportunities, in relation to which they have quite significant legislative and 
monitoring powers.3 Moreover, having at its disposal a budget of about 145billion 
euros per year, 4 the EU has the capacity to financially support policies and processes 
of change, through a variety of funding schemes.5 For these reasons, it can play a 
valuable role also in the area of treatment decisions of people living with dementia, 
contributing to improve the current system and to promote the principles of the CRPD. 
This chapter studies how EU powers and policy initiatives can be used to promote 
the legal capacity and the right to choose of people living with dementia in relation to 
healthcare decision-making. In this way, it contributes to answer the thesis research 
                                                          
1 I take this definition from the presentation page on the EU's official website EU, ‘The EU in brief’ 
<https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-in-brief_en> accessed 9 March 2017. Precisely, EU 
Member States are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Malta, The Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK 
(see <https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/countries/member-countries_en> accessed 9 March 
2017). Following the results of the referendum which took place on 23 June 2016 the UK is starting the 
process for leaving the Union (see <www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/eu-referendum/about> 
accessed 9 March 2017).   
2 Articles 2 and 3 Treaty on the European Union. For general information on the origins, evolution, 
scope, structure and field of action of the EU see the organisation website <https://europa.eu/european-
union/index_en> accessed 9 March 2017. 
3For an overview on the powers of European Institutions see D Edward and R Lane, Edward and Lane 
on European Union Law (Edward Elgar 2013), 105-111, 128-135 and 177-278. On the role of EU 
institutions in monitoring the implementation of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities and in promoting the right to decide of people living with dementia see further Sections 2 
and 3. 
4 For general information on the EU budget and how it is used see < https://europa.eu/european-
union/topics/budget_en> accessed 9 March 2017. 
5 For a general overview of EU funding schemes and projects see < https://europa.eu/european-
union/about-eu/funding-grants_en> accessed 9 March 2017. 
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question by looking at how also the Union can play a meaningful role in clarifying the 
Convention principles, promote their application among governments and European 
citizens and favour the development and circulation of promising practices in the field 
of supported decision-making, complementing in this way the action of the Council of 
Europe. Indeed, in recent years, the EU has shown a significant commitment in this 
sense, being the first regional organisation to ratify the Convention.6 Moreover, it has 
emanated important policy documents such as the European Disability Strategy 2010-
20207 and the ‘European Initiative on Alzheimer’s Disease and other Dementias’.8 
Also in this case, the analysis starts from these and other existing EU materials and 
initiatives developed in the area of mental disability, dementia policy, aging and 
health, to then try to understand what more can be done for the future. Similarly to 
Chapter 5 my research mainly relies on doctrinal analysis, employing the canonical 
rules of legal interpretation to shed light on the normative content and implications of 
the various legal and policy documents. Content analysis is used in the cases in which 
a source limits to describe a certain initiative, rather than dictate rules or guidelines, 
so that the document acts as a ‘testimony’ of what happens in practice.  
The Chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of 
relevant EU competences and powers in the area of disability and dementia rights, 
aging and health. In this context, emphasis is put on the limitations and potential of 
each institution action for producing concrete change. Section 3 analyses the relevant 
general policies for the promotion of autonomy of people living with dementia 
developed at an EU level. In this regard, it concentrates on situating the issues at the 
centre of this work in the complex fabrics of EU strategies regarding disability, aging 
and health. Section 4 focuses on how the EU is acting to further implement the 
principles of the CRPD and on how it is engaging with the Committee on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities. In this context, it analyses in particular what mechanisms 
are or can be put in place to guarantee a constant dialogue between EU institutions and 
                                                          
6 Council Decision 2010/48/EC of 26 November 2009, concerning the conclusion, by the European 
Community, of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities [2010] OJ  L 
23/35. 
7 Commission, ‘European Disability Strategy 2010-2020: A Renewed Commitment to a Barrier-Free 
Europe’ (COM(2010) 636 final 15 November 2010) <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/ ?uri=CELEX:52010DC0636&from=en> accessed 1 April 2017.  
8 Commission, ‘European Initiative on Alzheimer’s Disease and other Dementias’ (COM (2009) 380 
final, 22 July 2009) <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52009DC0380&from=EN> accessed 1 April 2017. For a complete 
overview of the initiatives undertaken by the EU in the field of dementia see further Section 3. 
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Member States and the Committee. It also studies what actions the Union has or should 
undertake in order to comply with the requests of the Committee itself. Section five, 
concentrates on the role played by the EU in promoting the development and 
dissemination of promising practices in the field of supported decision-making, with a 
particular focus on the healthcare sector. In this regard, it puts particular emphasis on 
how innovation programmes funded by the Union can contribute to the development 
of quality dementia training for professionals and more effective support techniques 
for the person living with this condition. The Conclusion emphasises how the action 
of EU institutions has significant potential to produce change in the field of treatment 
decisions of people living with dementia, though such potential is still vastly 
unexploited. 
 
2. The EU: Powers and Potential  
 
EU competences, legal capacity and treatment decisions  
The functioning and institutional architecture of the EU is regulated by the Treaty 
on European Union (TEU)9 and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU).10 Article 5(2) TEU affirms that ‘the Union shall act only within the limits of 
the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the 
objectives set out therein’ (principle of conferral). Competences not conferred to the 
Union remain with the Member States. In relation to the CRPD this means that the EU 
can promote the implementation of the Convention only in the areas in which it has 
the competence to do so and within the powers given to it by its fundamental treaties. 
Such a limitation is recognised by Article 44 CRPD, which obliges regional 
organisations parties of the Convention declare in their instruments of formal 
confirmation or accession the extent of their competences in this regard. In compliance 
with such a provision, the EU Council has emanated the Decision 2010/48/EC of 26 
November 2009 authorising the formal confirmation (equivalent to ratification) of the 
CRPD, deposited on 23 December 2010, and containing, in Annex II, the Declaration 
of Competence.11 The declaration restates what already affirmed in Articles 3 
(exclusive competences of the Union) and 4 TFEU (shared competences), as well as 
                                                          
9 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union [2012] OJ C 326/13. 
10 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/47. 
11 Council Decision 2010/48/EC, above, Annex II. 
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in other Articles of the Treaties such as Article 19 TFEU, regulating the EU action in 
the area of anti-discrimination. Therefore, paragraph 1 of the Declaration clarifies that 
the EU has exclusive competence in the regulation and management of its own 
administration, and in the areas of state aids, commercial policy, competition within 
the internal market and the customs union.12  
Paragraph 2 of the Declaration of Competence states that the Union shares 
competence with Member States in relation to combating discrimination on the ground 
of disability (but also age, gender, sexual orientation, race, origin and religion), free 
movement of goods, persons, services and capitals, agriculture, transports, internal 
market, equal pay for men and women, trans-European network policy and statistics. 
In areas of shared competence both the EU and Member States may adopt legally 
binding acts.13 Article 2(2) TFEU states that, in this context States can exercise their 
normative power ‘to the extent the Union has not exercised its competence’. So 
national governments should act only after EU institutions have failed to do so. In 
reality, as pointed out by Schütze, praxis shows that the latter have often legislated at 
the same time of communitarian bodies.14  
As noted by Craig, in order to understand the real scope of EU action in matters 
of shared competence we have to look at the rules regulating each specific area.15 For 
example, in the context of anti-discrimination, Article 19 TFEU seems to confer to the 
Union the power to combat all the main factors at the basis of inequality in a potentially 
indefinite range of situations. However, the procedure prescribed in order to adopt 
legislative measures in this context, giving prominence to the role of national 
representatives, has proven to be a significant limitation to the EU potential in 
promoting equality.16 Moreover, the EU Court of Justice case law has clarified that the 
provisions of Article 19 provide a legal basis only for anti-discrimination actions, not 
extending to initiatives promoting equality of opportunities.17 With regard to the EU 
                                                          
12 The areas of exclusive competence of the Union include the monetary policy of countries of the ‘Euro 
zone’ and the conservation of marine biological resources and fisheries, that however are not relevant 
to the questions interested by the CRPD. 
13 P Craig, ‘EU Competences’ in D Patterson and A Södersten (eds), A Companion to European Union 
Law and International Law (Wiley 2016), 84. 
14 R Schütze, European Union Law (Cambridge University Press 2015), 239. 
15 Craig, above, 85. 
16 On this topic see further in this Section.  
17 E Ellis and P Watson, EU Anti-Discrimination Law (2nd ed Oxford University Press 2012), 16. Such 
an interpretation has been affirmed by the EU Court of Justice, among others, in the cases C-13/05 
Chacón Navas v Eurest Colectividades SA [2006] ECR i-6467; C-411/05 Palacios de la Villa v 
Cortefiel Servicios SA [2007] ECR I-8531. 
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competence in social policy, referred to in Article 4(2) letter b, Title X TFEU confines 
the action of Union Institutions to the field of employment and workers’ rights, giving 
them in most cases just the power to complement the measures undertaken by national 
governments, rather than passing legislative acts.18 With specific regard to the CRPD, 
the EU Competence Declaration also specifies that the Union has competence in the 
implementation of the Convention principles when they affect previous European 
rules.19 
In addition to such provisions, Articles 5 and 6 TFEU confer to the EU the 
competence of carrying out supporting, coordinating or supplementary actions in a 
range of other areas. As noted by Schütze, the precise content of such competences is 
difficult to identify.20 However, a point on which scholars agree, is that in this context 
measures cannot be put in place with the specific scope of directly modifying and 
harmonising Member States legislations.21 As explained by Craig, in this context the 
EU is called to put forward various actions in order to support the realisation of the 
objectives set by the Treaties in relation to each substantive area. For example, 
initiatives may take the form of funding of best practices, periodic monitoring or 
evaluation.22  
Also in this case, in order to understand the role played by EU Institutions in 
practice, it is necessary to look at provisions and praxes in single competence areas. 
The use of measures encouraging the exchange of information, the dissemination of 
best practices and the setting of minimum standards and technical rules is advocated 
by Article 153(2) TFEU for the field of social policy, referred to by Article 5(3) as an 
area of coordinating competence. In this regard, the Union promotes advancements in 
social protection and inclusion through the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), a 
soft law mechanism put in place at the Lisbon EU Summit in 2000 and subsequently 
developed throughout the various phases of European political evolution.23 Such a 
                                                          
18 Anyway, this does not prevent especially the EU Commission from playing a potentially significant 
role in the field of social policy through policy documents and soft law, or the allocation of strategic 
funds. 
19 Council Decision 2010/48/EC, above. 
20 Schütze, above, 242-243. 
21 Ibid, 243. 
22 Craig, above, 86. 
23 For an overview on the Open Method of Coordination see European Parliament, ‘The Open Method 
of Coordination’ (European Parliament Research Service 2014) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-AaG-542142-Open-Method-of-Coordination-
FINAL.pdf> accessed 26 March 2017. See also E Szyszczak, ‘Experimental Governance: The Open 
Method of Coordination’ (2006) 12(4) European Law Journal 487; M Daly, ‘EU Social Policy after 
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mechanism is applied in different ways depending on the policy area, but it is always 
characterised by the fact that, as the use of legally binding instruments and sanctions 
is excluded, it is based essentially on voluntary collaboration and political pressure. In 
this context, the Council sets out policy goals, which have to be pursued by Member 
States and whose realisation is evaluated against agreed indicators and benchmarks. 
The results emerging from various States are then compared and assessed against each 
other through reports, normally issued by the Commission, encouraging all Member 
States to apply the best practices.24 Through this mechanism the EU has put in place 
initiatives to improve European benefit systems and to promote extensive access to 
quality personal care.25 
The OMC is employed also in the context of human health, indicated as an area of 
supporting, coordinating and supplementary competence by Article 6, letter b) TFEU. 
In this sector it has led to the development of a range of initiatives in the field of aging 
and dementia such as the already mentioned Joint Action for Mental Health in 
Europe26 or the European Initiative on Alzheimer’s Disease and other Dementias.27 
However, in this area, following a number of cases of the EU Court of Justice affirming 
the necessity of uniform standards and rights for European citizens moving abroad for 
medical treatment, the Union passed a legislative act entailing harmonisation of 
national laws such as Directive 2011/24/EU on the application of patients’ rights in 
cross-border healthcare.28 This act, though emanated primarily under Article 114 
TFEU regarding the single market, which gives the legal basis legitimising it,29 
constitutes an important precedent of EU action based on binding instruments in the 
sector of healthcare.  
                                                          
Lisbon’ (2006) 44 Journal of Common Market Studies 461; M Buchs, New governance in European 
Social Policy: the open method of coordination (Palgrave Macmillan 2007).  
24 Szyszczak, above, 486-488. European Parliament, ‘The Open Method’, above, 2. 
25 See for example Commission, ‘Joint Report on Social Protection and Social Inclusion’ 
(COM(2005)14 final 27 January 2015) < http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0014&from=EN> accessed 26 March 2017. For a 
constantly updated list of EU initiatives in the sector of social policy see < http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/summary/chapter/employment_and_social_policy/1709.html?root=1709> accessed 26 
March 2017. 
26 <www.mentalhealthandwellbeing.eu/the-joint-action> accessed 9 March 2017. 
27 European Commission, ‘European Initiative on Alzheimer’s’, above. 
28 European Parliament and Council Directive 2011/24/EU of 9 March 2011 
on the application of patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare  [2011] OJ L 88/45. For an analysis on 
the EU competence in the sector of health see W Sauter, ‘Harmonisation in Healthcare: The EU Patients’ 
Rights Directive’ [2011] TILEC Discussion Paper No. 2011-030 1, 2-11 < 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1859251> accessed 28 March 2017. 
29 Anyway, the Preamble of the Directive refers also to Article 168 TFEU, concerning the EU 
competence in the field of health. 
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Anyway, policy areas such as health also overlap with other fields, covered by 
shared competences such as that of anti-discrimination. Therefore, legally binding 
provisions concerning the quality of health and social care or the centrality of the 
person wishes with regard to treatment decisions of individuals such as people living 
with dementia, in this context may well be put in place through legislative measures 
under Article 19 TFEU.30 However, even when the EU action remains on the level of 
policy and soft law it can contribute to the promotion of rights and principles such as 
that of the CRPD. In this regard, though scholars have emphasises the limitations 
deriving from the non-bindingness of actions ex Articles 5 and 6 TFEU, the level of 
strategic policy is the one through which organisations like the EU put in place organic 
and comprehensive long term programmes without which single legislative acts, 
normally much more limited in scope, would not come into being. The potential role 
of cooperation and EU policy-making in promoting the principles of the CRPD is 
stressed also by paragraph 3 of the EU Declaration of competence. 31 However, the 
declaration limits to cite the Union’s action in the field of employment, education, 
economy and social cohesion, failing to mention the work done in the field of health. 
The list of competences reported above does not include legal capacity. Therefore, 
as stated by the initial report of the EU to the Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities, the Union has no specific powers in this area.32 However, this does not 
mean that its institutions cannot play a role in the promotion of the legal capacity and 
the right to decide on medical treatment of individuals living with dementia.  
The European Disability Forum, in its alternative report to the Committee on the 
rights of persons with Disabilities, argues that competences such as that in the areas of 
equality or health may justify actions of EU Institutions with regard to legal capacity 
and consent to treatment.33 In relation to equality, the Mental Disability Advocacy 
                                                          
30 An example of this is the Draft Antidiscrimination Directive Commission, ‘Draft Antidiscrimination 
Directive’ (COM(2008) 426 final 2 July 2008) < https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008PC0426:EN:HTML> accessed 30 March 
2017 which constitutes an attempt to issue binding antidiscrimination provisions in a variety of areas, 
which include also health and disability. However, the pathway towards the approval of the directives 
is at the moment at a stand-still point. 
31 Council Decision 2010/48/EC, above, paragraph 3. 
32 EU, ‘Initial Report under Article 35 UNCRPD’ (UN 2014), 40 <https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G14/232/64/PDF/G1423264.pdf?OpenElement> accessed 30 March 
2017. 
33 European Disability Forum, ‘Alternative Report to the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities’ (EDF 2014), 27 
<https://www.dropbox.com/s/88lg96uknfgy8ps/2015%2003%2004%20EDF%20Alternative%20repor
t%20final%20ACCESSIBLE.pdf?dl=0> accessed 30th March 2017. 
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Centre (MDAC) notes that the EU Disability strategy affirms the commitment of the 
Union to combat discrimination based on disability.34 In this context, the power of 
combating discrimination conferred to the Union by Article 19 TFEU can be seen as 
including the necessity to act in order to promote changes in current national legal 
capacity legislations which, in light of the CRPD, appear discriminatory against 
disabled individuals. In the field of health, the EU, has emphasised, in its initial report 
to the UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, that it has the 
competence to ‘carry out actions to support, coordinate and/or supplement the actions 
of Member States’.35 In this regard, the MDAC notes how people with mental 
disabilities, being deprived of their legal capacity are deprived of the right, guaranteed 
to everyone else, to have access to healthcare tailored to their needs. 36 Therefore, in 
their work towards promoting the right to health the Union should consider issues of 
consent, including the right of disabled individuals such as people living with dementia 
to choose or reject medical interventions. In light of these considerations, the EU 
appears to have quite a wide array of powers to make an impact in promoting the right 
to decide on medical treatment of individuals living with dementia, though such 
powers are not yet used to the full because of restrictive interpretations with regard to 
the rules regulating the Union competences and because of the lack of a proactive 
political initiative of its Member States and Institutions with regard to disability rights 
and legal capacity. 
 
3. EU Policies on Disability, Dementia, Health and Aging 
 
Communications, Resolutions, Conclusions and healthcare choices of people living 
with dementia 
Also due to the competences limitations seen above, the most used channel by the 
EU to promote principles such as those proposed by the CRPD and to concretely 
engage with the Convention and its Committee is that of strategic policy plans. Like 
the Council of Europe, also the European Union can contribute on the one hand to the 
promotion of the values and principles of the Convention among citizens and Member 
                                                          
34 MDAC, ‘Legal Capacity in Europe. A Call to Action to Governments and to the EU’ (MDAC 2013), 
36 <http://mdac.info/sites/mdac.info/files/legal_capacity_in_europe.pdf> accessed 30 March 2017. 
35 EU, ‘Initial Report’, above. 
36 MDAC, above, 38. 
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States, by reaffirming them in official policy documents and advising governments on 
how such provisions can be translated into specific rules and practices. In this regard, 
it can also put in place awareness raising actions, favour the creation of training 
programmes and contribute to the circulation of promising practices. The specific 
instruments employed in this case are mainly Commission Communications, European 
Parliament and Council Resolutions and Conclusions of the Council. 
Communications are documents issued by the Commission and directed to the 
European Parliament and the Council. 37 They summarise the position of the Union’s 
executive body on a certain issue and the actions it intends to undertake in that area.38 
In this regard they can contain both indications concerning actions that the 
Commission will undertake autonomously and proposals regarding measures to be 
adopted by the Council or the Parliament. These documents do not necessarily reflect 
the position of the plurality of Member States, as they are issued by a body which is 
not direct expression of national governments. However, they have a considerable 
authority and prestige as they come from the Institution which represents the will of 
the European Union in itself.39  
European Parliament and Council Resolutions summarise the position of each of 
the two bodies with regard to a certain issue, containing also proposals to other 
institutions.40 Same nature have the Council conclusions, which formalise the 
agreement of the members of the Institution on a certain topic at the end of a session.41 
Also these documents have a substantial authority as they report the position 
respectively of the organ expressing the voice of European citizens and of the one 
reuniting the representatives of all the Union’s Member States.42 
                                                          
37 See < https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/?fuseaction=helpcote> accessed 9 September 2018.  
38 Ibid. 
39 Council, ‘Code of Conduct between the Council, the Member States and the Commission setting out 
internal arrangements for the implementation by and representation of the European Union relating to 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’, 2010/C 340/08, paragraph 
6, confirms that the Commission is the organ that expresses the position of the Union also in matters 
concerning disability. 
40 N Moussis, Access to European Union. Law, Economics, Policies (22nd ed Intersentia 2016), 45; 
Council, ‘Council Conclusions and Resolutions’ < https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/council-
eu/conclusions-resolutions/> accessed 9 September 2018. 
41 Moussis, above, 45; Council, ‘Council Conclusions’, above. 
42 Indeed, the European Parliament is made up of members directly elected by European citizens, while 
the Council is composed by representative of each of the EU Member States. On the composition of 
these two institutions see Schütze, above, 151-184. 
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As it was happening with CoE Recommendations and Resolutions, also these 
policy documents have no binding force.43 However, because of the authority of their 
issuing bodies, they can still exert a strong political influence on other institutions of 
the Union. In this regard, Communications, Resolutions and Conclusions are often at 
the start of policy processes that lead to concrete policy actions and may result even in 
new legislation. Moreover, they can also be used as interpretative documents in 
national and European litigation,44 or be an instrument of political pressure towards 
Member States in the hands of NGOs but also and most importantly by European 
Institutions themselves. In this regard, a specific characteristic of these documents is 
that the provisions contained in them can be promoted through the Open Method of 
Coordination, which, as already seen, permits to set precise benchmarks against which 
the efforts of states may be measured, and implies regular and frequent monitoring, 
permitting to keep constantly high the attention on a certain issue. In addition, 
compared for example, to the CoE, the European Union has a comparatively greater 
availability of funds that can be used to sustain the proposed policy actions even with 
concrete financial investment in order to promote good practices and actively 
incentivise behaviours.45   
The EU has released a series of policy documents relevant to the area of consent 
to treatment of individuals living with dementia. Specifically focusing on disability 
and the promotion of the principles of the CRPD is the Commission Communication 
on the European Disability Strategy 2010-2020.46 In addition, important documents 
have been released with regard to aging and even specifically in relation to dementia. 
They are the Communication (2009)47 and the Resolution (2011)48 on a European 
initiative on Alzheimer's disease and other dementias, and the Conclusions containing 
the Guiding Principles on Active Aging. 49    
                                                          
43 Moussis, above, 45; Council, ‘Council Conclusions’, above. 
44 Moussis, above, 45-47. 
45 On this point see further Section 5. 
46 Commission, ‘European Disability Strategy’, above.  
47 Commission, ‘European initiative on Alzheimer’s Disease’, above. 
48 European Parliament, ‘European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2011 on a European initiative 
on Alzheimer's Disease and Other Dementias’ (2010/2084(INI)) 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+TA+P7-TA-2011-
0016+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN> accessed 1 April 2017. 
49 Council, ‘Council Declaration on the European Year for Active Ageing and Solidarity between 
Generations (2012): The Way Forward’ (16592/12 SOC 948 SAN 289, 7 December 2012). 




   
Promoting the principles of the CRPD  
 The promotion of inclusion, autonomy and rights of individuals such as people 
living with dementia appears in many respects a central goal in the strategic policies 
brought forward by the European Commission. This emerges already in the context of 
Europe 2020, the overall European strategy for the decade in course focusing on 
fostering development and prosperity throughout the Continent.50 It focuses on 
creating the conditions for a smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.51 In 
Communication COM(2010) 2020, which launched the strategy, this essentially 
translates into measures for sustainable economic growth and development.52 
However, other initiatives have shown the Commission’s willingness to interpret this 
general policy commitment in a wider way, which includes the promotion of disability 
and old age rights.  
In this regard, the European Disability Strategy outlines a series of actions with 
the aim to ‘empower people with disabilities so that they can enjoy their full rights, 
and benefit fully from participating in society’53 and specifies that ‘full economic and 
social participation of people with disabilities is essential if the EU’s Europe 2020 
strategy is to succeed in creating smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’.54  In this 
context, the Disability Strategy contains at least one important statement relating to 
the right to legal capacity. Indeed, in section 3 (Equality), it states that the EU will 
promote through supporting and supplementing actions, ‘the conformity of Member 
States legislation on legal capacity with the UN Convention’.55 This line of the 
Strategy appears significant for a number of reasons. First of all, it makes clear that 
the policies of the Union and Member States on equality and legal capacity must 
comply with CRPD provisions such as Article 12. In this regard, it establishes another 
link directly connecting EU and CRPD level, incorporating the principles of the 
Convention and the interpretive statements released by its Committee as an evaluative 
                                                          
50 For an overview on Europe 2020 see <http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe-2020-in-a-
nutshell/index_en.htm> accessed 1 April 2017. 
51 Commission, ‘Europe 2020. A European Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive Growth’ 
(COM(2010) 2020), 3 
<http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/COMPLET%20EN%20BARROSO%20%20%20007%20-%20Europ
e%202020%20-%20EN%20version.pdf> accessed 12 April 2014. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Commission, ‘European Disability Strategy’, above, section 2. 
54 Ibid, section 1. 
55 Commission, ‘European Disability Strategy’, above, 7. 
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framework of EU policies in this area. Moreover, it recognises that promoting legal 
capacity of disabled people is an essential step towards the wider goal of assuring 
equality for all European citizens, a task which, as already seen, is explicitly attributed 
to it by its Fundamental Treaties. In this sense, this statement may be used as a basis 
to advance the interpretive vision according to which the EU competence in the area 
of anti-discrimination could legitimise even some (limited) legislative and 
harmonising action directed towards reforming national legal capacity legislations 
facially discriminatory against disabled people. This position seems to be advocated 
also in the EDF shadow report which affirms that ‘equal recognition before the law 
falls directly within this competence as persons with disabilities are often denied or 
restricted their legal capacity on the basis of disability based discrimination’.56 
Therefore, such a provision opens up the possibility for a quite effective action of the 
Union also with regard to the promotion of the right to decide on medical treatment of 
people living with dementia. 
However, at the moment, this aspect does not seem to have yet being given 
thorough attention by commentators and EU Institutions. In this respect, though 
valuable, the EU Disability Strategy fails to provide clear details on the implications 
of adopting a CRPD oriented approach to equality and legal capacity and on what 
national legislations must specifically provide for in order to comply with Article 12 
CRPD. In effect, as of now the Union has not emanated any specific act, 
recommendation, communication or report urging Member States to align their 
legislations to Article 12 and indicating the concrete ways in which they should do 
this. In addition, also section 7, on health, rather focuses on access to healthcare and 
rehabilitation, not providing indications with regards to the rights of the person and 
consent to treatment.  
Clearer indications on the rights to make decisions, even dictated with specific 
regard to the case of people living with dementia, come from documents in the area of 
policies on aging. These provisions are relevant to people living with this condition as 
dementia is a dynamic which stands at the intersection between disability and age. 
Here, already the EU Guiding Principles on Active Aging advocate for the necessity 
of keeping ‘older women and men involved in decision making, particularly in the 
areas that directly affect them’.57 More specific affirmations on individuals living with 
                                                          
56 EDF, above, 27. 
57 Council of the European Union, ‘Declaration Active Ageing’, above, 10. 
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cognitive impairments are contained in section 2.3 of the European Initiative on 
Alzheimer’s Disease and Other Dementias (2009).58 The Initiative recognises that ‘the 
image of Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias in European society is a negative 
one, often associated with fear and helplessness’ and urges the creation of ‘a European 
Network for rights and dignity of people with dementia, which should formulate 
recommendations on dignity, autonomy and social inclusion’.59 The European 
Parliament Resolution of 2011 on Alzheimer’s and other dementias emphasises how 
‘there is a stigma attached to Alzheimer’s and the general attitude and approach to 
dementia is ‘still the wrong one’ as it is still characterised by a negative attitude 
towards people living with this condition. For this reason the Resolution ‘emphasises 
that the dignity of people with Alzheimer’s needs to be preserved and the stigma and 
discrimination against them needs to be eliminated’. Therefore, these two documents 
contain powerful statements against one of the dynamics which, as seen in Chapter 1, 
are among the greatest obstacles to the right to choose on medical treatment of people 
living with dementia: the stigma and prejudice which sees them as incapable 
individuals devoid of their self, instead of people with rights.  
With specific regard to legal capacity, the Communication on the EU dementia 
initiative notes how at a certain stage of their condition, people living with dementia, 
because of their impairment, may be no longer able to manage completely alone and 
need help in deciding on matters such as medical treatment. In this regard, it 
emphasises that ‘assistance could be provided by a guardian/lawful representative’ but 
it is ‘imperative’ that the person is allowed ‘to articulate his or her preferences’.60 This 
statement is important in the context of treatment decisions of people living with 
dementia because it indicates support and ‘assistance’ as the way to overcome possible 
issues relating to their cognitive impairment. It still refers to guardianship as a possible 
means of support, but emphasises that the guardian’s action must put at the centre the 
will of the person. In this regard, following a line adopted also in the context of the 
Council of Europe, though using a potentially controversial term, the EU Dementia 
Initiative indicates to national governments how they can use normative mechanisms 
already present in their legislation to implement supported decision-making.  
                                                          





The reported affirmations issued by the Commission and the European Parliament 
surely play a significant role in keeping up the attention of governments and citizens 
on the problems regarding decision-making of people living with dementia, advocating 
for an approach to legal capacity which is rights and support oriented. However, also 
in comparison with CoE strategic policies, the EU has not really embraced the task of 
clarifying how principles such as those affirmed by Article 12 CRPD may translate 
into specific rules. In this regard, it would be highly desirable if the Union would play 
in the future a more active role in this area. Indeed, because of the possibilities for 
continuing monitoring and benchmark setting offered by policy mechanisms such as 
the Open Method of Coordination, it might be particularly effective in pushing for 
specific changes in national legislation on legal capacity and decisions on medical 
treatment.  
 
Awareness raising, research and training 
An area in which the EU appears to be taking more decisive action is that regarding 
the promotion of awareness and knowledge on the CRPD and the issues relating to 
decision-making of individuals living with cognitive impairments, especially through 
research and training for professionals. The positive aspect of such initiatives is that 
many of them are conceived in relation to people living with dementia, providing tools 
precisely focusing on the problems emerging in this case. In this way, they contribute 
to remove the prejudice against individuals living with dementia which characterises 
the approach of many professionals and common members of society towards these 
people and that, as seen in Chapter 2, is one of the first barriers to their right to decide 
on medical treatment. 
The European Parliament Resolution on Alzheimer’s and other dementias 
encourages Member States to develop campaigns for the general public on the various 
aspects of living with this condition and to improve professionals’ awareness, 
especially on three different components such as diagnosis, treatment and appropriate 
support.61 However, until now the Union, through the Commission, has mainly 
focused on professionals rather than the general public. Examples in this sense are a 
series of events organised with the support, also in terms of financial contribution, of 
the EU, such as the thematic conference ‘Mental Health and Well-being in Older 
                                                          
61 European Parliament, ‘Resolution of 19 January 2011’, above.  
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People – Making it Happen’ (Madrid 28-29 June 2010), which contained some 
sessions and presentations on stigma and building resilience through services provided 
by society.62 
Promising initiatives have also been promoted by the EU through the involvement 
of NGOs in the field of dementia policy, and through the creation of networks of 
professionals in the field.63 In this regard, the NGO Alzheimer Europe established the 
European Dementia Ethics Networks, funded through a grant of the German Ministry 
of Health and by the EU-Health Programme. 64 Such a Network is now an irreplaceable 
means for promoting the right to decide and supported decision-making in treatment 
decisions of people with dementia among European national governments and public 
opinion. Indeed, the association coordinating it groups together the largest national 
charities in the field of dementia care and policy, which are putting in place often quite 
extensive initiatives in order to fight stigma and spread a culture of respect and 
empowerment towards people living with dementia. Moreover, especially in recent 
years, Alzheimer Europe has embraced a serious commitment towards putting at the 
centre of its action people living with dementia and their opinions.65 This is evident 
also from the conference of the association, held in Copenhagen between the 30 
October and the 2 November 2016, whose programme was hosting many presentations 
delivered by people living with dementia and the first plenary session entitled ‘A 
Rights-based approach to Dementia’ was opened by the president Tina Leonard with 
a presentation entitled ‘Putting People with Dementia First’.66 In recent years, the 
Ethics Network has issued a number of reports, shedding light on the reality faced by 
individuals living with dementia and their carers and pushing for the implementation 
of the principles affirmed in the EU Dementia Initiative also in relation to care 
decisions.67 The materials issued in this context include the 2009 report on advance 
                                                          
62 For a summary and programme of the event see EU, ‘Mental Health and Well-Being in Older People 
–Making it Happen’ (2010) < 
https://ec.europa.eu/health/sites/health/files/mental_health/docs/ev_20100628_report__en.pdf> 
accessed 1 April 2017 
63 Commission, ‘Implementation report on the Commission Communication on a European initiative 
on Alzheimer's disease and other dementias’ (SWD(2014) 321 final 16 October 2014), 13-15 < 
http://ec.europa.eu/health//sites/health/files/major_chronic_diseases/docs/2014_implreport_alzheimer
_dementias_en.pdf> 1 April 2017. 
64 <http://www.alzheimer-europe.org/Ethics> accessed 14 April 2017. 
65 < http://www.alzheimer-europe.org/> accessed 14 April 2017. 
66 For information on the programme and papers delivered at the conference see < 
http://www.alzheimer-europe.org/Conferences/Previous-conferences/2016-Copenhagen> accessed 14 
April 2017. 
67 See < http://www.alzheimer-europe.org/Ethics/Ethical-issues-in-practice> accessed 14 April 2017. 
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directives and personhood in dementia68 or the 2014 report on ethical dilemmas faced 
by carers and people living with dementia.69 
The EU initiative on Alzheimer’s Disease and other Dementias has also resulted 
in the ALzheimer COoperative Valuation in Europe (ALCOVE) Joint Action, a 
programme funded through the EU Health Programme 2008-2013 in the context of the 
Union’s supporting and coordinating competence in the field of health, to which 
nineteen Member States and some NGOs voluntarily took part with the aim of 
elaborating common principles and exchanging promising practices.70 One of the 
seven ‘Working Packages’ (streams) of the programme focuses on ‘Rights, Autonomy 
& Dignity of People living with Dementia’ (WP7).71 In this context, at the conclusion 
of the programme, in 2013, a report has been released containing a number of 
principles and recommendations on autonomous decision making in dementia with a 
particular focus on care decisions.72 The praiseworthy aspect of this report is that it 
adopts as a starting point a rights approach to autonomy and legal capacity clarifying 
that ‘the respect given to a person’s right, choices and preferences is crucial’.73 
Moreover, it points out some of the main dynamics which provoke the exclusion of 
people with dementia from the choices regarding themselves. In this regards it 
emphasises that people living with dementia are often confronted with a presumption 
of incompetence as ‘before the person has even spoken, his or her words are marked 
by a systematic devaluation’, while ‘the opposite approach should be promoted’ and 
individuals with dementia should always be presumed capable and incapacity should 
not be automatically deduced from a dementia diagnosis.74 The report also notes how 
the ‘precautionary principle’ and an attitude exceedingly focused on avoiding risks is 
                                                          
68 <http://www.alzheimer-europe.org/Ethics/Ethical-issues-in-practice/2009-Advance-directives-and-
personhood> accessed 14 April 2017. 
69 < http://www.alzheimer-europe.org/Ethics/Ethical-issues-in-practice/2014-Ethical-dilemmas-faced-
by-carers-and-people-with-dementia> accessed 14 April 2017. 
70 Commission, ‘Implementation Dementia Initiative’, above, 13. The Member States participating in 
the action are Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, United 
Kingdom. For an overview of the ALCOVE initiative see < http://www.alcove-project.eu/> accessed 
13 April 2017. For a synthesis on how EU Joint Actions in the field of health are structured see < 
https://ec.europa.eu/health/programme/policy_en> accessed 13 April 2017.  
71 <http://www.alcove-project.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=13&Itemid=122> 
accessed 13 April 2017. 
72 ALCOVE, ‘Rights, Autonomy & Dignity of People living with Dementia’ (ALCOVE 2013) < 
http://www.alcove-project.eu/images/synthesis-report/ALCOVE_SYNTHESIS_REPORT_WP7.pdf> 
accessed 13 April 2017. 
73 Ibid 75. 
74 Ibid 76. 
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too often adopted, threatening the person’s ability of being in control of his or her 
life.75 In this regard, the report issues a very clear statement against one of the 
behaviours of healthcare professionals and carers which, as seen in Chapter 2, create 
more problems in relation to treatment decisions of individuals living with dementia. 
In this regard, also thanks to its nature of public document adopted by the EU, the 
report has a significant potential to directly influence the approach of people working 
in this area, improving substantially the situation of individuals living with dementia 
with regard to the right to make healthcare choices. 
However, if we consider the specific recommendations expressed in the document, 
it appears still trapped in an old fashioned approach to legal capacity based on 
substituted decision-making. Indeed, it mainly focuses on mental capacity assessment 
and on how it needs to be carried out, accepting that in many situations the person can 
be deprived of his or her legal capacity. In fact, it simply affirms that ‘when the person 
living with dementia is not able to decide alone, the selected healthcare proxy should 
be involved’.76 It is true that, in this context, it is stressed that the proxy has to 
reconstruct the will of the person, rather than decide on the basis of the person’s best 
interests.77 However, the report seems to disregard the fact that, before reaching that 
stage, there are many less invasive support techniques that can be put in place in order 
to involve the individual in the decision.78 In this regard, the European Network of 
(Ex-) Users and Survivors of Psychiatry (ENUSP) notes how the entire approach of 
the EU to legal capacity appears too compromised with the old model based on 
substituted decision-making and compulsory treatment, and that even with regard to 
many significant affirmations contained in policy documents there is a doubt of how 
much real change they produce in reality.79   
 
  
                                                          
75 Ibid 76. 
76 Ibid 77. 
77 Ibid. 
78 On such support techniques see further Chapter 7. 




xvfWfQVhZpSTcp8w&sig2=uWaii4M6jTN7uAHo7bjsqg> accessed 30 April 2017. 
182 
 
4. The EU engagement with the Committee on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities 
 
The study of EU strategic policies on disability, aging and dementia shows also 
how, in order to comprehend the potential of the Union’s action with regard to the 
promotion of the right of people living with dementia to decide on medical treatment, 
it is essential to analyse what mechanisms are or can be put in place that provide an 
open and direct channel of communication between the EU and the Committee on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities. In this regard, the point is guaranteeing that such 
mechanisms assure as much as possible a pervasive penetration and prompt 
implementation of international principles on legal capacity in the geographical area 
governed by the EU. A good starting point in order to understand the issues on the 
table, is represented by the dialogue between the Commission and the Committee on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in occasion of the EU progress report 
submission on the CRPD. In this section I will focus in particular on the relevant 
statements for the case of healthcare decisions of people living with dementia.  
On a general level, the EU initial report puts emphasis on the fact that, in order to 
favour the cooperation between the Union and Member States and among Member 
States themselves the Commission has created the High Level Group on Disability 
(HLGD, also referred to as DHLG).80 This permanent informal experts’ group, 
working at the service of the European Commission is made of senior experts in 
disability issues nominated by Member States, meets regularly twice a year and issues 
to the Commission annual reports on the progresses in the implementation of the 
CRPD in Europe.81 This is one of the main ways in which the European Union can 
make use, in the context of disability policy, of the political mechanisms based on peer 
pressure which are at the centre of the Open Method of Coordination.82  
Another positive feature of the EU work in the field of disability, emphasised by 
the Initial Report, is the involvement of NGOs and organisations of disabled people. 
Indeed, the HLGD includes a number of such associations, guaranteeing that disabled 
people themselves can play a meaningful role in shaping the agenda of this body and 
                                                          
80 EU, ‘Initial Report’, above, 9. See also the website of the group 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetail&groupID=1259> 
accessed 2 April 2017. 
81 Ibid. 
82 See above, Section 2. 
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in flagging the most urgent issues for them. Moreover, the Union provides financial 
support to many disabled people’s organisations with the aim of strengthening their 
advocacy capacity and their ‘ability to voice the concerns of national member 
organisations at an EU level’.83 As noted by Lawson, European organisations of 
disabled people have played a crucial role in facilitating a rights and social model 
oriented EU disability policy.84 In this regard, the ratification of the CRPD has 
encouraged a more intense involvement with the Convention of associations such as 
the European Disability Forum (EDF) who played a prominent role in the Ad Hoc 
Committee in charge of Drafting the CRPD and within the International Disability 
Alliance (IDA), which has been chaired by the EDF President between 2012 and 
2014.85 In this sense, the fact that such organisations are even financially supported by 
the EU is very positive also with regard to the field of healthcare decisions of 
individuals living with dementia, as it increases the capacity of such associations to 
put in place awareness raising campaigns on the right of these individuals to decide on 
medical treatment and to promote supported decision-making initiatives which can 
take place in various healthcare settings. 
Another element bearing the potential of assuring a consistent compliance of EU 
law and policies with the CRPD is the fact that, the Convention, having been ratified 
by the Union, is part of its legal order, being positioned, in the EU hierarchy of laws, 
immediately after the Fundamental Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights.86 
In this regard, the Union Institutions must always act in accordance with the 
Convention, whose norms prevail over non-compliant secondary legislation which can 
be invalidated by the EU Court of Justice.87 In order to guarantee the respect of the 
Convention the Commission has created an ‘Inter-Service Group on Disability’ 
gathering together members of various departments.88 In addition, the ‘Operational 
Guidance on taking account of Fundamental Rights’ requires an Impact assessment 
                                                          
83 EU, ‘Initial Report’, above, 12-13. 
84 A Lawson, ‘The European Union and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: 
Complexities, Challenges and Opportunities’ in G Palmisano, V Della Fina and R Cera (eds), The 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. A Commentary (Springer 2015), 
69-70. 
85 Ibid. 
86 This aspect is emphasised by EU, ‘Initial Report’, above, 8. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid 11. 
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before the publication of Commission initiatives, in order to check that they are 
compliant also with the CRPD.89  
With specific regard to Article 12 CRPD, the EU notes that it has no competence 
to regulate this area. However it has tried to promote the Convention principles through 
political channels within the HLGD by supporting NGOs and academics working in 
this area, for example by funding the PERSON Project co-ordinated by the National 
University of Ireland and focusing on increasing the capacities of organisations in the 
Balkans to advocate and monitor reforms affecting persons with psycho-social and 
intellectual disabilities.90 
The Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has recognises the value 
of such mechanisms for the promotion of the Convention principles. It has also 
welcomed the inclusion of disability in the European Union Communication on the 
post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals.91 However, it has expressed some general 
concerns.  
First, the Committee notes, in its concluding observations on the EU, that the 
Union has failed to conduct a ‘cross-cutting, comprehensive review of its legislation’ 
relevant to the field of disability and does not seem to have an organic general strategy 
for the implementation of the CRPD.92 In fact, as it has also been seen above, in order 
to draw a general picture of the EU Policies in relation to one form of disability 
(dementia), it is necessary to put together a number of documents. In this regard, even 
the EU Disability Strategy, despite being a good starting point for the development of 
policy actions in this area, is far from taking into account all the principles of the CRPD 
and appears too vague on the specific measures that should be adopted by EU 
Institutions and Member States. 
Partially, linked to this aspect is the preoccupation, expressed by the Committee, 
that the EU Competence Declaration, attached to the Union’s ratification act, does not 
mention all the disability relevant legislative and non-legislative measures put in place 
by the European Union.93 With regard to legal capacity and dementia, for example, it 
                                                          
89 Commission, ‘Operational Guidance on taking account of Fundamental Rights in Commission Impact 
Assessments’ (SEC(2011) 567 final  6 May 2011), 5 and 9 < http://ec.europa.eu/justice/fundamental-
rights/files/operational-guidance_en.pdf> accessed 18 April 2017. 
90 EU, ‘Initial Report’, above, 22.  
91 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ’Concluding Observations on the Initial Report 
of the European Union’, 1 < https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G15/226/55/PDF/G1522655.pdf?OpenElement> accessed 1 May 2017. 
92 Ibid, 2. 
93 Ibid, 3. 
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does not mention the relevant principles contained in the EU Dementia Initiative or 
the Initiative on Healthy Aging mentioned above. In this way, it deprives the 
Committee of the opportunity of providing useful guidance with regard to such 
provisions. 
These issues reflect also in the field of legal capacity. In relation to Article 12 
CRPD, the Committee notes how ‘across the European Union, the full legal capacity 
of a large number of persons with disabilities is restricted’ and urges the EU to ‘take 
appropriate measures to ensure that all persons with disabilities who have been 
deprived of their legal capacity can exercise all the rights enshrined in European Union 
treaties’.94 In this regard, the Union surely faces limitations deriving from the fact that 
the TEU and the TFEU do not recognise its specific competence to issue binding acts 
in the field of legal capacity. However, initiatives already undertaken in the areas of 
disability, aging and dementia, show how the Union can develop meaningful principles 
in this field. 
In response to the concerns expressed by the Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities, the Commission has published, on 2 February 2017, the Progress 
Report on the implementation of the European Disability Strategy.95 Such a report had 
been requested also by the Committee which, in its Concluding Observations on the 
EU, had expressed concerns for the fact that the Union had not yet carried out its mid-
term report on the Disability Strategy.96 In its Progress Report, the EU provides an 
updated list of the legislative measures issued in relation to disability.97 However, it 
fails once again to mention the initiatives cited above concerning people living with 
dementia. Moreover, it does not announce any organic CRPD implementation strategy 
involving all the aspects covered by the Convention. In relation to Article 12 CRPD, 
the report stresses how the Academy of European Law (ERA) is working on providing 
training to lawyers and professionals also on legal capacity.98 However, it does not 
mention any specific action of the EU directed to put pressure on Member States to 
change their legislation or to clarify the sometimes evasive indications contained in 
the Disability Strategy. 
                                                          
94 Ibid, 5. 
95 Commission, ‘Progress Report on the implementation of the European Disability Strategy (2010 - 
2020)’ (SWD(2017) 29 final, 2 February 2017) < 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=89&newsId=2725> 1 May 2017. 
96 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ’Concluding Observations’, above, 2. 
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5. The EU and the Dissemination of Promising Practices 
 
In its concluding observations on the EU, the Committee on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities indicates the area of European Structural and Investment Funds as 
one in which the mark left by the ratification of the CRPD is more evident. In this 
context, it notes how the provisions for the 2014-2020 programming period take into 
consideration the principles of the Convention and focus, among other things, on 
promoting equality, non-discrimination and accessibility for disabled people.99 The 
European Disability Strategy 2010-2020 itself emphasises the necessity to ‘optimise 
use of EU funding instruments for accessibility and non-discrimination’ of disabled 
people.100 The EU Initial report to the UN Committee affirms, with regard to Article 
12 and legal capacity, the commitment of the Union to support projects in this area and 
the diffusion of promising practices.101 
The potential of European funding schemes to contribute to the development and 
exchange of promising practices emerges from the Horizon 2020 programmes.102 As 
stated on the scheme website, this is the largest EU Research and Innovation 
programme with around €80 billion of funding made available over the period 2014-
2020 and has the aim of promoting innovation and development.103 In this context, a 
number of sub-schemes may provide a platform to promote promising practices in the 
field of supported decision making of people living with dementia. The section 
‘Health, Demographic Change and Wellbeing’ focuses, among other goals on 
‘personalising health and care’, supporting ‘older persons to remain active and healthy’ 
and testing ‘new models and tools for health and care delivery’.104 In this regard, the 
EU is supporting the project ‘Patient Empowerment through Predictive Personalised 
decision support’.105 The initiative focuses on developing ‘a personalised decision 
support system for chronic disease management’.106 People with chronic conditions 
                                                          
99 Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilties, ‘Concluding Observations’, above, 1-2. 
100 Commission, ‘European Disability Strategy’, section  2.2.2. 
101 EU, ‘Initial Report’, above, 22. 
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(including individuals living with dementia) are involved in any phase of the project, 
which designs the support system around their needs. The tool developed in this area 
will combine case-based reasoning with predictive computer modelling in order to 
‘offer bespoke advice for self-management by integrating personal health systems with 
broad and various sources of physiological, lifestyle, environmental and social 
data’.107 
The Horizon 2020 funded project ‘Digital Environment for Cognitive Inclusion’ 
focuses on helping older people with cognitive impairments to manage and monitor 
their health through a system combining the action of formal and informal carers and 
the use of digital devices which help the person to understand when some of their 
health parameters signal a situation of potential risk.108 In this way, an older person 
with cognitive impairment will be more able to assess their care needs, increasing the 
possibilities that they contact a care practitioner on time. Funding for similar projects 
is also provided through the ‘Cross-Cutting Activities’ sub-scheme, which includes a 
section on the ‘Internet of Thigs’ applied to healthcare.109 In this context, support is 
granted to research groups and companies developing digital aids for healthcare such 
as tracking devices, digital tools reminding the person to take medications or external 
memory aids. 
More focused on policy is the project ‘Shaping European policies to promote 
health equity’, which concentrates on detecting the obstacles, emerging in various 
European regions, preventing one or more categories of people from receiving quality 
care on an equal basis with others.110 In this context, it has the potential to unveil many 
of the environmental factors which often prevent medical professionals from putting 
in place a really person centred model of care and from engaging in supporting 
decision making with the person also in the case of dementia. 
All these initiatives have a great potential to promote supported decision-making 
for people living with dementia. The financial support provided to them by the EU is 
probably one of the best examples of how a social institution can concretely help 
especially healthcare structures and professionals to be more responsive to the needs 
                                                          
107 Ibid. 
108 For a summary of the project see < http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/197186_en.html> accessed 3 
May 2017. 
109 < https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/h2020-section/cross-cutting-activities-focus-
areas> accessed 3 May 2017. 
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of people living with dementia in relation to treatment decisions. However, such 
funding programmes still tend to focus mainly on one off projects, which may last 
even for several years, but are still destined to end, posing the risk that their positive 




In conclusion, with regard to promoting the right of people living with dementia 
to decide on medical treatment, the EU surely faces limitations deriving from the 
resistance of Member States to a more active role of the Union in this area and from 
the fact that its fundamental treaties do not confer to it the specific power to emanate 
legislative acts in the area of legal capacity. Anyway, initiatives such as the EU 
Disability Strategy or the EU Dementia Initiatives, show that the Union can give a 
significant contribution in this context especially through policy work, and through its 
funding schemes. 
However, the EU does not seem to have fully embraced the spirit of the CRPD in 
relation to legal capacity. Indeed, the policy lines expressed in this context often lack 
clarity, failing to indicate the specific measures that should be put in place by EU 
Member States. Moreover, some declarations issued by EU bodies still seem too 
compromised with an old fashioned, medicalised vision of dementia and mental 
disability. Finally, EU funding schemes in this area are still excessively focus of single, 
one off intervention, instead of aiming at supporting systematic, long term processes 
of change. 
Therefore, it is necessary that activists and legal scholars continue to use the many 
channels of communication opened between EU Institutions and public opinion, in 
order to lobby for the adoption of a more convinced CRPD compliant approach to the 
problem of treatment decisions of people with mental disabilities like dementia and to 









Gerard Quinn affirms, with regard to the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities (CRPD), that the main challenge today is transforming its ‘majestic 
generalities’ into a reality.1 Also in relation to treatment decisions of people living with 
dementia, it is crucial to identify how principles affirmed at an International and 
European level can translate into concrete initiatives. 
Hence, after having analysed relevant provisions of the CRPD on legal capacity 
and consent to treatment and having studied how the Council of Europe and the 
European Union can contribute to promote the practical realisation of such principles, 
this chapter considers promising practices, developed within Europe, which can be 
used to promote the right of people living with dementia to decide on healthcare 
matters and to support them in making their voice heard. In doing this, it makes a final 
step towards answering the research question of this thesis, as it identifies concrete 
initiatives which, embodying the values expressed in Chapter 3 and the spirit and 
provisions of the CRPD can create the conditions to better foster the right of people 
living with dementia to decide on medical treatment. Though starting primarily from 
initiatives developed with regard to choices on medical treatment, it also takes into 
account practices originated in different areas such as independent living, housing and 
banking and which provide inputs that can be used also in relation to healthcare 
choices. 
The aim of this overview is not to provide an exhaustive analysis of all relevant 
initiatives emerging throughout Europe. Rather, it refers to some of them with the 
intent of giving a clearer idea of how a CRPD compliant practice in healthcare 
decisions could look like. Therefore, the principles of the CRPD, of the social model 
of disability, and of Fineman’s vulnerability theory, constitute the evaluative 
                                                          
1 G Quinn, ‘Resisting the “Temptation of Elegance”: Can the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities Socialise States to Right Behaviour?’ in OM Arnardóttir and G Quinn (eds), The UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: European and Scandinavian Perspectives 
(Martinus Nijhoff 2009), 217.  
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framework of this chapter. In order to establish which behaviours and practices are in 
line with the evaluative framework I have compared the content of the documents 
concerning the various interventions with the indications and examples, sometimes 
rather specific, provided by the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
and various Council of Europe and European Union bodies, as to what means of 
support are coherent with the CRPD model of legal capacity.  
The initiatives analysed in this chapter have been selected having in mind the 
barriers to the right of people living with dementia to decide on medical treatment 
studied in Chapter 2 and which are mostly caused by the prejudice of professionals or 
carers, the lack of human, physical or time resources to adequately assist the person, 
and the absence of a framework providing guidance on how to concretely support the 
individual in making healthcare choices. Therefore, I have considered as promising 
those practices which go in the direction of persuading professionals or members of 
the general public that even people living with dementia are often able to choose for 
themselves, or that provide training to medical professionals or caregivers on how to 
navigate choice making in dementia care and better communicate with the person, or 
that indicate a concrete model that could be used to provide the support that the person 
needs for a certain decision or to provide suggestions with regard to analogical or IT 
based tools to assist the person in the decisional process. Particular attention has been 
paid to projects putting at the centre the voice of people living with dementia and 
showing a move from a medicalised approach to this condition.2 For this reason, the 
views of service users and formal and informal carers have been a key element in the 
assessment of the various practices. 
In order to collect relevant material, I started from websites and databases such as 
the portals of Alzheimer Europe3 and the European Foundation Initiative on Dementia 
(EFID),4  the practices database of the ZERO Project,5 and the supported decision-
                                                          
2 These aspects are foundational to the general architecture of the CRPD (see Chapter 4) and to the work 
of scholars and activists who are advocating for the social model of disability in relation to dementia. 
In this regard see Mental Health Foundation, ‘Dementia, Rights, and the Social Model of Disability. A 
new Direction for Policy and Practice?’ (MHF 2015), 4-6 
<www.mentalhealth.org.uk/content/assets/PDF/ publications/dementia-rights-key-
summary.pdf?view=Standard> accessed 12 November 2015. 
3 <www.alzheimer-europe.org/Policy-in-Practice2/National-Dementia-Strategies> and 
</www.alzheimer-europe.org/Policy-in-Practice2/Country-comparisons> accessed 23 October 2016.  
4 See <www.efid.info/eng/awards/> and <www.efid.info/eng/resources/mapping-dfcs/> accessed 16 
February 2017. 
5 <https://zeroproject.org/innovative-practices/> accessed 16 February 2016. 
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making resource library developed by the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU).6 
These collections, constantly updated, can be very helpful for everyone who wishes to 
keep informed on the topics relating to this Chapter. In addition, valuable information 
is contained in the final report of the EU ALCOVE project7 and the documents 
published by the Academic Network of European Disability Experts (ANED).8 Data 
emerging from these sources are complemented with those contained in studies and 
other websites of institutions and NGOs. In order to collect this material I have used 
online search engines (Google and Google Scholar) and platforms such as PubMed 
and HeinOnline. Employed key words included ‘dementia stigma’, ‘mental disability 
stigma’, ‘dementia awareness raising’, ‘mental disability awareness raising’, 
‘dementia training’, ‘shared decision-making dementia’, ‘supported decision-making 
dementia’, ‘mental capacity advocacy’, ‘dementia advocacy’. A range of service 
providers have been considered including government bodies, health authorities, NHS 
Trusts, hospitals, care homes, charities and NGOs.  In my work I relied mainly on 
documents written in English, German, Italian, French and Spanish. When it has been 
necessary to read material in other languages I have asked native speakers to translate 
to me essential passages, but this could have not enabled me to have access to the full 
range of materials published in these languages. Therefore, there will inevitably be 
projects which I am not aware of, as they have not been included in International 
reports or are mentioned in documents not written in the aforementioned languages. 
This does not diminish the value of this research which is in nature illustrative rather 
than exhaustive. 
In summarising the promising practices emerging from such a research, the 
Chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 2, it focuses on actions targeting the general 
public which can contribute to challenge prejudice against people living with 
dementia. Section 3 analyses projects promoting a more positive perception of 
dementia among relatives and informal carers of people living with this condition. In 
addition, it considers practices aiming at fighting dementia related self-stigma. Section 
4 focuses on training programmes directed at providing guidance to doctors, nurses, 
social workers, and other professionals on how to interact with people living with 
                                                          
6 <www.aclu.org/other/supported-decision-making-resource-library?redirect=supported-decision-
making-resource-library> accessed 16 February 2017. 
7 See <www.alcove-project.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=9&Itemid=118> 
accessed 23 October 2016. 
8 < www.disability-europe.net/> accessed 6 November 2014. 
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dementia and how to ensure that they are supported to make autonomous decisions. 
Section 5, analyses projects and studies shedding light on the potential of supported 
and shared decision-making in relation to care decisions of people living with 
dementia. In this context, it considers the strategies adopted in order to explain 
information to the person. Section 6 considers techniques used to overcome difficulties 
of communication with the person, to interpret the person’s will and to remind then 
information they may not recall. In this context, it also refers to projects using IT and 
new technologies. Section 7 provides a brief overview on the actions puts in place by 
authorities and NGOs in order to assure that people living with dementia receive an 
adequate level of support. In this context, I will also focus on the role of independent 
advocacy associations. The Conclusion emphasises once again how these practices can 
give an idea of how the vision of healthcare decision-making in dementia care can be 
translated into concrete behaviours and briefly reflects on how they can be further 
improved and spread. 
         
 
2. Awareness raising and anti-stigma actions for the general 
public 
 
As seen in Chapter 2, the negative impact of prejudice on the autonomy of people 
living with mental impairments like dementia is confirmed by a number of studies.9 
For this reason, fighting stigma and making the general public aware of what living 
with dementia means seems the first step to promote the person’s decisional power. 
Researchers and people with this condition identify the messages which should be 
spread in this regard.10 In particular, they emphasise the necessity of convincing people 
                                                          
9 The EU Fundamental Rights Agency notes that, because of stigma, mentally disabled people tend to 
be denied the right to choose where and how to live. FRA, ‘The Fundamental Rights of Persons with 
Intellectual Disabilities and Persons with Mental Health Problems’ (FRA November 2010), 1 < 
http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/1292-Factsheet-disability-nov2010.pdf> accessed 12 
January 2017. SM Benbow and D Jolley, ‘Dementia: Stigma and its Effects’ (2012) 2 
Neurodegenerative Disease Management 165, 169 note that the tendency to see individuals living with 
dementia as ‘child-like incapable’ leads to their voices not being heard. For a wider analysis on the 
impact of prejudice, preconceptions and stigma in treatment decisions of people living with dementia 
see Chapter 2. 
10 In this regard a summary is provided by NL Batsch and MS Mittelman (eds), World Alzheimer Report 
2012. Overcoming the Stigma of Dementia (Alzheimer’s Disease International 2012), 9-10 < 
https://www.alz.org/documents_custom/world_report_2012_final.pdf> accessed 13 January 2017.  
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that life with dementia can still be meaningful, that individuals in this situation are 
often able to understand the reality around them and that they have preferences which 
should be respected.11  
Such themes are at the centre of many national dementia strategies. For example, 
the Dementia Plan for Flanders 2016 states: ‘we want people with dementia to "be part 
of society" […]. We want them to feel that they are […] able to lead the life they 
want’.12 The Finnish National Memory Programme 2012-2020 emphasises how ‘what 
it is needed is an attitude check to allow people with cognitive problems and dementia 
to be included in society […] and to make decisions about their lives independently’.13 
The Italian Dementias National Plan (Piano Nazionale Demenze) affirms that ‘a 
person with a dementia diagnosis shall not be automatically considered incapable of 
exercising his or her right to choose’.14 These statements can significantly contribute 
to advance a culture of respect for people with dementia and their autonomy. Indeed, 
they are included in government documents setting out the official approach which 
should be followed at least by all public service providers.  
However, it is also necessary to assure that these ideas truly penetrate in society, 
so that everyone has them in mind when eventually developing dementia or assisting 
a person living with this condition. In this regard, state agencies, charities and common 
citizens throughout Europe are carrying on anti-stigma campaigns, sending the general 
message that dementia does not ‘empty’ the person of their self and of the abilities 
necessary for a meaningful social life. For example, the Slovak Alzheimer Society 
(Slovenska Alzheimerova Spolocnost) is running the project ‘Together against 
                                                          
11 Ibid. These themes emerge also from the analysis contained in Chapter 2. 
12 Vlaamse Regering, ‘Continuing to build a dementia-friendly Flanders together. Updated Dementia 
Plan for Flanders 2016 – 2019’ (Vlaamse Regering 2015), 15 <www.alzheimer-
europe.org/content/download/125432/784052/file/Flanders%20dementia%20strategy%202016-
2019%20(English).pdf> accessed 23 October 2016. 
13 Finnish Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, ‘National Memory Programme 2012-2020. Creating 
a ”Memory Friendly” Finland’ (MSAH 2013),  11 <www.alzheimer-
europe.org/content/download/40967/269054/file/Finland%20National%20Memory%20Programme%
202012-2020.pdf> accessed 23 October 2016.  
14 Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, ‘Piano Nazionale Demenze’ (Accordo 135/CU all A, Governo 
Italiano 2014), 7 
<www.salute.gov.it/portale/news/p3_2_1_1_1.jsp?menu=notizie&p=dalministero&id=1836> 
accessed 3 November 2016. Similar statements are contained in other dementia strategies such as that 
of Norway (Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services, ‘Dementia Plan 2020. A More Dementia 
Friendly Society’ (MHCS 2015), 17-18 < 
www.regjeringen.no/contentassets/3bbec72c19a04af88fa78ffb02a203da/dementia_-
plan_2020_long.pdf> accessed 1 December 2016) and the one of Ireland (Department of Health, ‘The 
Irish National Dementia Strategy’ (Dep of Health 2014), 15 < http://health.gov.ie/wp-
content/uploads/2014/12/30115-National-Dementia-Strategy-Eng.pdf> accessed 23 January 2017).    
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Dementia’, having produced leaflets and a website with informative material on what 
having dementia means. 15 In addition, it organises a series of talks named ‘Days of 
Open Mind’.16 Similar initiatives take place, among others, in Austria,17 Belgium,18 
Norway,19 Italy20 and the UK.21 In Germany, the Deutsche Alzheimer Gesellschaft has 
created, in 2007, a website called ‘Alzheimer and You’, which aims to increase the 
awareness of young people in relation to dementia.22 The website contains videos, a 
forum, quizzes and suggestions on books and poems about this condition. As part of 
the website launch, the Gesellschaft organised a competition for youths aged 14-21, 
who have been invited to submit creative works on their experiences with dementia.23 
The willingness of spreading a positive idea of this dynamic is also at the basis of the 
website ‘Dementia Positive’, which has the aim of ‘celebrating the strengths, creativity 
and insights of people living with dementia’.24 It is run by a former teacher and a 
clinical psychologists from Stirling (Scotland) and contains information on events, 
books and artistic material produced by or regarding people with dementia.25 
Among these campaigns particularly promising is the one launched by the First 
Dementia Plan for Flanders 2010-2014 with the slogan ‘Forget Dementia. Remember 
the Person’ (‘Vergeet dementia. Onthou mens’).26 The first point is that it is directly 
promoted by the government, showing a long-term commitment at a state level. 
                                                          
15 For an explanation of the project in English see < http://alzheimer-europe.org/News/Members-
news/Monday-14-March-2016-Slovakia-reports-on-its-campaign-Together-against-dementia> 
accessed 1 December 2016. See also the website of Slovak Alzheimer Society <www.alzheimer.sk> 
accessed 1 December 2016. 
16 The Society annual report 2015 shows how the number of participants in the campaign is constantly 
growing. Slovenska Alzheimerova Spolocnost, ‘Vyrocna Sprava’ (SAS 2015), 14 < 
http://www.alzheimer.sk/media/110046/vyrocna.sprav.2015.def.pdf> accessed 13 January 2017. 
17 See the campaign run by Aktion Demenz < www.aktion-demenz.at/demenz-geht-uns-alle-
an/plakate/> accessed 17 February 2017. 
18 See the talks’ series organised by Ligue Alzheimer < www.alzheimer.be/activites/conferences/cycles> 
accessed 17 February 2017. 
19 <http://nasjonalforeningen.no/tilbud/demensvennlig-samfunn/> accessed 17 February 2017. 
20 See the campaign recently launched by the Health Ministry 
<www.salute.gov.it/portale/temi/p2_6.jsp?lingua=italiano&id=170&area=salute%20mentale&menu=
azioni> accessed 17 February 2017. 
21 Examples can be found on the websites of Alzheimer Society UK < 
https://www.alzheimers.org.uk/info/20016/our_campaigns/242/campaign_reports> or Alzheimer’s 
Scotland < http://www.alzscot.org/campaigning> both accessed 17 February 2017.  
22 More than 100 entries were received for the contest. See < www.alzheimerandyou.de/> accessed 25 
November 2016. 
23 A brief summary of the project in English may be found in Batsch and Mittelman (eds), above, 59. 
24 See <www.dementiapositive.co.uk/> accessed 25 November 2016. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Vlaamse Regering, ‘Naar een dementievriendelijk Vlaandere. Dementieplan Vlaanderen 2010 -2014’ 
(Vlaamse Regering 2011) < http://www.jovandeurzen.be/sites/jvandeurzen/files/dementieplan2010-
2014.pdf> accessed 13 January 2017. The new Plan 2016-2020 provides for the continuation of this 
project. See Vlaamse Regering, ‘Continuing to build 2016’, above, 10. 
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Moreover, it stands out for the wide variety of communication means that it uses in 
order to reach the highest possible number of people, proposing ‘destigmatising 
counter-frames or different ways of looking at dementia that better reflect reality’.27 In 
this context, surveys carried out in 2015 by the Flemish Dementia Expertise group 
show that now 80% of the respondents think that people living with dementia can still 
enjoy life, while 70% see them as full individuals with wishes and feelings.28 
Moreover, 1 of 3 respondents think dementia is not the end of one’s life, even though 
55% of participants admit that it causes losses in identity and personality.29 The 
positive opinions of individuals taking part in the project, give an idea of how this 
campaign is playing a crucial role in developing such levels of awareness.30  
 
 
The initiative consists of leaflets, posters, books, videos, exhibitions, talks and 
cultural events conveying a positive idea of dementia. Moreover, a website has been 
created with resources for people who work in the field of dementia care or who want 
to make their own campaign.31 They include stories of people living with this condition 
and their carers, statements of politicians or intellectuals, practical information for the 
person and their carers. The website has also a database of pictures showing people 
                                                          
27 Ibid. 
28 Flemish Minister of Welfare, Public Health and Family and Flemish Dementia Expertise, ‘Cijfers en 
feiten over dementie’ (Vlaamse Regering 2015), 2 < 
http://jo.vandeurzen.cdenv.be/sites/jvandeurzen/files/Cijfers%20en%20feiten%20over%20dementie_0
.pdf> accessed 13th January 2017.   
29 Ibid, 2-3. 
30 For a collection of such opinions see <http://onthoumens.be/in-de-media> accessed 13 January 2017. 
31 See <www.onthoumens.be> accessed 12 November 2016. 
Figure 1 Image from the 'Vergeet Dementia. 
Onthou Mens Campaign' (translation ‘You 
may have Alzheimer but we have you’) 
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living with dementia in everyday life, intended to help challenge stereotypes. The fact 
that some of these materials comes from people living with dementia themselves is a 
particularly positive feature of the initiative. In fact, it complies with the principles of 
the social model of disability as it assures that the messages spread are in tune with 
what primary stakeholders think.  
The active role played by people living with dementia is also a praiseworthy 
characteristic of the campaign ‘Forget the Stigma’ launched by Alzheimer Society 
Ireland in 2015. It consists of leaflets and posters with slogans such as ‘I have 
dementia, I am still me’. It includes video ads shared through social media, inviting 
people to learn ‘the facts of the condition, listening and empathising, and linking in 
with those with dementia to prevent isolation’. 32 
 
 
In addition, the charity has launched a new YouTube Channel entitled ‘Alzheimer 
Talks’ (AlzTalks), containing videos of people living with dementia who tell their 
experience with the condition.33 Here people living with dementia are even more 
protagonist than in the Flemish project, as they appear in person in the vast majority 
of materials, telling their experience and showing how much they are conscious of 
                                                          
32 Alzheimer Society of Ireland, ‘Forget Stigma Campaign Press Release’ (Alzheimer Society Ireland 
2014), 1 <www.alzheimer.ie/Alzheimer/media/SiteMedia/Forget-The-Stigma-National-Press-
Release_1.pdf> accessed 25 November 2016. For further information on the campaign see the website 
of the society <www.alzheimer.ie/Get-Involved/Campaigning/Past-Campaigns/Forget-the-
Stigma.aspx> and its YouTube channel < 
www.youtube.com/channel/UCjdO3TY6WWZybV6p_AEvQYg> both hyperlinks accessed on 25 
November 2016. 
33 See <www.alzheimer.ie/Get-Involved/Campaigning/Current-Advocacy-Campaigns/Alz-
Talks.aspx> and < www.youtube.com/c/alztalks> both accessed 25 January 2017. By this date the 
channel had been viewed by 8.677 YouTube users. 
Figure 2 Posters from the ‘Forget the Stigma Campaign’ 
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their condition. This makes the messages of the campaign more powerful and difficult 
to ignore. A similar project is run by Dementia NI in Northern Ireland and supported 
by the Government and Health Ministers.34 TV ads and documentaries on dementia 
are also produced by Alzheimer Croatia.35.    
As noted by Smith, stigma is a relational dynamic which originates from a 
combination of factors which may not be intercepted by campaigns targeting the 
general public.36 Therefore, while posters and ads can produce the ‘background noise’ 
essential for every change of mentality, they may not be enough to generate concrete 
change.37  In this context, agreeing in principle with the declarations printed on a leaflet 
may be relatively easy, while really believing them may be a rather different matter. 
Therefore, initiatives based on talks, like those organized by the Slovak Alzheimer 
Association or Ligue Alzheimer (Belgium) offer a better chance to directly engage with 
people and making them aware of the biases they may not know they have. 
Among these programmes, the UK Dementia Friends and Dementia Champions 
project appears to be the most extensive, successful and well structured, involving 
around 1.5 million people.38 This initiative is part of the Dementia Friendly 
Community Programme launched in 2015 by Alzheimer’s Society UK.39 The precise 
aim of this action is to achieve a better understanding of dementia within society and 
promoting a more positive attitude towards people living with this condition40 through 
                                                          
34 See <http://dementiani.org/index.php/component/k2/item/39-dementia-ni-members-help-to-launch-
still-me-campaign> and <www.youtube.com/channel/UCqigMiyLjh0Lf980zWoeAmA> both accessed 
25 November 2016.   
35 <www.alzheimer.hr/tv-emisije/> accessed 22 February 2017. 
36 M Smith, ‘Anti-stigma Campaigns: time to change’ (2013) The British Journal of Psychiatry 49, 50.  
37 Ibid, 49, shows, in relation to anti-stigma initiatives in the field of mental health, how they may not 
only fail to produce a decrease in the number of discrimination cases, but also make it grow.  
38 See the EFID summary <https://ec.europa.eu/eip/ageing/commitments-tracker/d4/creating-dementia-
friends-and-dementia-friendly-communities_en> accessed 17 February 2017. The project is described 
as an outstanding anti-stigma campaign in the report commissioned and developed by Mental Health 
Foundation, ‘Mapping Dementia-Friendly Communities across Europe’ (EFID 2016), 29 <www.nef-
europe.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Mapping_DFCS_across_Europe_final.pdf> accessed 17 
February 2017. The value of the initiative is recognised also by foreign Alzheimer Associations. In this 
regard the chair of Alzheimerfoereningen (Denmark) has explicitly recognised, in her speech at the 
Alzheimer Europe Conference 2016 in Copenhagen that ‘the Danish Alzheimer Association has in fact 
been both impressed and inspired […] by the way in which the dementia friend concept is developed 
and unfolded in England’ see <http://alzheimer-europe.org/Conferences/Previous-conferences/2016-
Copenhagen/Videos-and-photo-gallery/Opening-ceremony/Birgitte-Voelund> accessed 17 February 
2017. 
39 Alzheimer’s Society, ‘Building Dementia-friendly Communities: A Priority for Everyone’ 
(Alzheimer’s Society 2015) < 
www.alzheimers.org.uk/site/scripts/download_info.php?downloadID=1236> accessed 10 March 2016. 
40 For a short summary on the structure and scope of the project see 




the creation of a network of ‘dementia friends’ and ‘dementia champions’.41. In order 
to become a ‘dementia friend’ it is sufficient to watch the video posted online and then 
attend a one hour session in which dementia champions and people living with the 
condition explain what dementia is, what are the challenges of living with it and how 
everyone can help the person in facing such challenges.42 In order to become a 
‘dementia champion’ it is necessary to attend a one day induction event.43 Single 
induction sessions provide training on the principles of person centered care in 
dementia, the way in which one can understand the personality and feelings of the 
person and on the techniques through which the latter can be involved in the decisions 
about their life.44 So far there are around 10,500 dementia champions in the UK.45 The 
more promising aspects of the programme are its interactive nature and the fact that it 
provides the participants with an articulate ‘education pathway’ in which their skills 
are recognised by a certificate of ‘dementia friendship’ and ‘dementia 
championship’.46 Moreover, those who take part are inserted in a network of friends 
and champions through which they receive constant inputs and information.47 
These projects appear to give a valuable contribution to dismiss the still frequent 
idea that people living with dementia lack a sense of self and cannot express their 
opinions, which is one of the great barriers to their involvement in decision-making 
also in relation to medical treatment.48 However, they often seem to not make enough 
clear the link between respect of the person and promotion of their right to decide. 
Indeed, often they fail to state clearly that respecting the person with dementia means 
also promoting their rights and especially their power to decide. As stressed by 
Thornicroft, this issue is common to many anti-stigma campaigns in the field of mental 
health,49 and causes the paradoxical situation according to which, despite the 
proliferation of initiatives, people living with dementia feel sometimes ‘used’ in a 
                                                          
41 <www.dementiafriends.org.uk/> accessed 14 January 2017. 
42 Ibid. 
43 <www.dementiafriends.org.uk/WEBArticle?page=what-is-a-champion#.WInNOIXXLIU> accessed 
14 January 2017. 
44 < www.dementiafriends.org.uk/WEBArticle?page=champions-training#.WInNX4XXLIU> accessed 
14 January 2017. 
45 < www.dementiafriends.org.uk/WEBArticle?page=what-is-a-champion#.WInNOIXXLIU> 
accessed 14 January 2017. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 See A Jaworska, ‘Respecting the Margins of Agency: Alzheimer’s patients and the capacity to value’ 
(1999) 28 Philosophy and Public Affairs 105. See also Chapter 2. 
49 G Tornicroft, Ignorance+Prejudice+Discrimination=Stigma (MHF 2006), 18. 
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patronizing and tokenistic way by associations that claim they are working for 
including them.50 Therefore, though they show a substantial progress, the campaigns 
cited above appear still partly influenced by the old medicalised approach to dementia. 
Indeed, messages of respect and inclusiveness tend still to be framed in the language 
of welfare/care rather than that of empowerment/rights. 
In this regard, a pioneering role in spreading a human rights approach to dementia 
is played by Dementia Alliance International.51 This NGO based in America but 
operating also in Europe has adopted the motto of the disability movement ‘Nothing 
about us, without us’.52 With this spirit, since the World Health Organisation’s First 
Ministerial Conference on Dementia held in Geneva in March 2015 the association 
has been advocating for the effective application of the CRPD to people living with 
dementia.53 In this context, it considers as its main mission that ‘people living with 
dementia should be empowered to use their undisputed right of access to this and to 
other relevant UN Human Rights Conventions, including a future Convention on the 
Rights of Older Persons’.54 The activity of the association is of great importance even 
in the field of decision-making. Indeed, it’s among the very few which has embraced 
with decision a full disability and human rights approach to dementia and it is run 
directly by people living with dementia. In this regard, it is developing campaigns 
characterized by the fact of being entirely designed with and by people living with 
dementia, putting emphasis on recognising the rights and autonomy of these 
individuals, and stressing that all decisions in this field require the person’s 
involvement. In order to spread these messages and raise awareness on the CRPD, 
Dementia International Alliance has published various leaflets, videos and informative 
documents, including the guide ‘The Human Rights of People Living with Dementia: 
from Rhetoric to Reality’.55 This publication clearly indicates how promoting the 
power to decide also on matters such as medical treatment is essential for really 
including people living with dementia in the society.56 In addition, it organises talks, 
                                                          
50 K Swaffer, What the Hell is going on with my Brain? (Jessica Kingsley 2014), 40. 
51 <www.dementiaallianceinternational.org/> accessed 23 January 2017. 
52 Ibid. 
53 < http://www.dementiaallianceinternational.org/human-rights/> accessed 23 January 2017. 
54 Ibid. 
55 DAI, ‘The Human Rights of People Living with Dementia: from Rhetoric to Reality’ (DAI 2016) < 
http://www.dementiaallianceinternational.org/human-rights/> accessed 23 January 2017. 
56 Ibid, 11. 
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dementia cafes in which people living with this condition can share their experiences, 
and blogs written by people living with dementia.  
The activity of Dementia Alliance International, provides an example of what all 
dementia awareness raising campaigns should be about. For this reason, it is a shame 
that its initiatives have not yet reached the scale and pervasiveness of the ones run, for 
example, in Flanders, Ireland, or by Alzheimer’s Society UK. Moreover, no 
government has so far really embraced their approach. It would be extremely 
beneficial for people living with dementia if, putting together the strengths of the 
projects mentioned here, it would be possible to promote extensive campaigns through 
leaflets, TV programmes and ads that use creatively all the means offered by modern 
media, but really focus on rights and empowerment.     
Besides that, there is the need of providing for systematic evaluation which clearly 
indicates if the path followed by the various associations is the right one. Indeed, in 
relation to many of the projects cited above there is a lack of data on how each of them 
has concretely contributed to challenge prejudice. Findings collected by Alzheimer’s 
International show how generally the exposition of people to information campaigns 
can be quite effective in demolishing their preconceptions.57 In this context, some 
people living with dementia, recognise that the situation ‘it’s getting better’ and ‘more 
people with dementia are being asked for their opinion’.58 However, many other 
individuals living with this condition still tend to be marginalised and subject to 
commiseration, ignoring behaviour and even abuse.59 The criticism brought forward 
by associations such as Dementia Alliance International is quite indicative of how the 
situation is still far from ideal. This appears even truer if one recalls that according to 
some studies, the impact of awareness raising campaigns in the field of mental health 
can appear quite dubious.60 In this regard, activists and researchers are questioning the 
usefulness of concentrating excessively on campaigns, risking to waste precious 
resources that could be employed to put in place more concrete measures in favour of 
mentally disabled people.61 Moreover, empirical studies show how stigmatising and 
ignoring behaviour towards individuals living with dementia originates from the 
                                                          
57 Batsch and Mittelman (eds), above, 13. 
58 Ibid, 27-29. 
59 Ibid, 24-32. 
60 See SE Estoff, DL Penn and JR Toporek, ‘From Stigma to Discrimination: an Analysis of Community 
Efforts to Reduce the Negative Consequences of Having a Psychiatric Disorder and Label’ (2004) 30 
Schizophrenia. Bulletin 493. 
61 L Sayce, From Psychiatric Patient to Citizen revisited (Palgrave 2016), 107. 
201 
 
challenging relational dynamics emerging in concrete cases.62 Therefore, the point 
often seems more offering support in the specific situation rather than focusing on 
educating people. 
 
3. Actions challenging relatives’ prejudice and the person’s 
self-stigma  
 
As shown by the Alzheimer Disease International report on stigma and dementia 
also the behaviour of family members is often influenced by prejudice and negative 
attitudes towards the condition.63 Relatives of people living with dementia can feel 
ashamed of their beloved ones and think that the person, because of their condition, is 
incapable of understanding or deciding on anything.64 This attitude is, most of the time, 
unconscious and is the result of general attitudes and expectations embedded in 
societal structures and values.65 Nonetheless, it has a significant impact on the person’s 
self-confidence and ultimately on their right to make decisions.66  
In order to address this issue, in a number of European countries hospital boards, 
health authorities and charities have developed guides for relatives of people living 
with dementia. These materials include tips on how to have a more positive approach 
to relational and emotional challenges relating to the management of this condition 
and how to communicate with the person.67 They are often written by experts but, 
especially when published by private associations, they include, among the authors, 
also people with dementia, family members and activists. To this category belongs, for 
example, the advice page on the website of Alzheimerforeningen (the Danish 
Alzheimer association). This webpage recognises that ‘in this situation it is natural that 
you could have a [negative] reaction. All the people who have a beloved one with 
dementia experience emotional difficulties’ and ‘it takes time to accept and 
                                                          
62 KL Smebye, M Kirkevold and K Engedal, ‘How do Persons with Dementia participate in Decision 
Making related to Health and Daily Care? A multi-case study’ (2012) 12 BMC Health Services Research 
241. 
63 NL Batsch and MS Mittelman (eds), above, 24-25. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid, 10-11. 
66 Ibid, 9-11 and 24-25. For a deeper analysis on how the attitude of family members impacts on the 
autonomy of people with dementia see above Chapter 2. 
67 The various communication strategies developed within medical and non-medical practice are 
analysed more in detail in Sections 5 and 6. 
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understand’.68 Therefore, it encourages family members to seek assistance, be open 
and talk to people they trust about their issues.69 A similar webpage, developed by 
Alzheimer Austria, urges family caregivers to ‘promote for as long as possible the 
autonomy of the person concerned and provide them with the possibility of 
choosing’.70 Its German correspondent, developed by the Deutsche Alzheimer 
Gesellschaft (German Alzheimer Society) states that: ‘patients must be accepted as 
they are. You cannot change them. Relatives should learn to perceive and take into 
account the needs and wishes of the patients’.71 
These advices have the merit of putting emphasis on the necessity of being 
respectful and promoting the freedom of choice of the person. However, because of 
the way in which they are expressed, they appear still trapped in a medicalised vision 
of dementia. Indeed, individuals with this condition are often still referred to as 
‘patients’. Moreover, the tone of some statements gives the impression that adopting a 
certain attitude towards the person is more a question of being professional and diligent 
in one’s care duties, rather than building a meaningful relationship. In this context, 
conceding that negative reactions are normal in such a situation may have the 
undesired effect of confirming to some people that dementia is indeed a mainly tragic 
and hopeless state and that the only thing to do is simply being polite and carrying on. 
Therefore, while such declarations may change the negative attitudes of some 
relatives, in other cases they may cause an increase in the levels of dependence and 
domination to which the person is subject. In this regard, a vast literature in the field 
of disability studies and psychiatry, shows how it is easy to end up in situations in 
which the person’s autonomy is apparently encouraged but substantially impeded by 
the fact that they feel intimidated.72 
                                                          




accessed 14 January 2017.   
71 <www.deutsche-alzheimer.de/angehoerige/umgang-und-beschaeftigung.html>. Brochures with 
similar advice are provided, for example, by Ligue Alzheimer (Belgium) <www.alzheimer.be/infos-et-
medias/ressources>; Italian local governments and hospitals such as Regione Emilia Romagna, ‘Non so 
cosa avrei fatto senza di te. Manuale per i familiari delle persone con demenza’ (SSR Emilia Romagna 
2013) <www.ctr.it/back_end/files_news/1612.pdf> and Istituto di Cura Santa Margherita Pavia, 
‘Manuale per i caregiver di persone affette da Malattia di Alzheimer’ (ASP Pavia 2008) 
<www.asppavia.it/shared/binary/24/Manuale%20per%20i%20caregiver.pdf>; and by the Finnish 
website <www.muistiliitto.fi/fi/aivot-ja-muisti/esitteet/>. All websites accessed 14 January 2017.  
72 See for example JI Chalton, Nothing About Us without Us (University of California Press 2000). The 
effects of familial and professional deference in the case of people living with dementia are analysed 
also by Smebye, Kirkevold and Engedal, above. 
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The same problem emerges in relation to the courses for family members of people 
living with dementia organised by various charities. An example are the sessions 
within the already mentioned UK Dementia Friends project, in which families of 
people living with this condition are encouraged to take part.73 Training events are also 
provided by the Alzheimer Federation Italy (Federazione Alzheimer Italia),74 the 
association ‘Approccio Capacitante’ (Capacitating Approach)75 and some local 
organisations.76 However, though many of these courses still tend to concentrate on 
medical aspects of dementia and personal care, there are sessions focused on relational 
and emotional questions. For example, the courses proposed by CPL Servizi (Verona) 
include a session on ‘Relatives of Persons with Dementia: Difficulties and Emotions. 
Techniques of Emotion Management’.77 Moreover, some events provide training on 
how to assist the person in everyday communication and empower them to make 
choices.78  
The positive characteristic of these courses is that through them charities and 
relatives of people living with dementia engage with relational problems relating to 
this condition. In this context, it is surely a good thing that here participants, instead 
of simply being passive recipients of indications written on a leaflet, can actively 
discuss the problems they face. Unfortunately, these courses do not normally include 
the presence of people living with dementia, which could be very helpful in order to 
give to attendees a deeper understanding of the questions at the centre of discussion.79 
In addition, on the websites advertising them a medicalised language still tends to be 
                                                          
73 See above Section 3. 
74 See < www.alzheimer.it/index.html> accessed 23 January 2017. 
75 See < http://www.formalzheimer.it/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1> accessed 23 
January 2017. 
76 See for example the websites of Alzheimer Italia Bari < www.alzheimerbari.it/event/corso-di-
formazione-per-familiari-prendersi-cura-del-malato-di-alzheimer-ogni-giorno/>; Associazione 
Familiari Alzheimer Pordenone Onlus <www.alzheimer-pordenone.org/attivita/programma-lua-
2009/>; CPL Servizi Onlus Verona < www.cplservizi.it/corso-famigliari-di-malati-di-alzheimer-
difficolta-ed-emozioni/> all accessed 23 January 2017. 
77 <www.cplservizi.it/corso-famigliari-di-malati-di-alzheimer-difficolta-ed-emozioni/> accessed 23 
January 2017. See also the sessions provided by Alzheimer Bari < www.alzheimerbari.it/event/corso-
di-formazione-per-familiari-prendersi-cura-del-malato-di-alzheimer-ogni-giorno/> accessed 23 
January 2017. 
78 < www.formalzheimer.it/index.php?option=com_frontpage&Itemid=1> accessed 23 January 2017. 
For an explanation of specific communication techniques to support people in the decision-making 
process see Section 6.  
79 There are some limited and still sporadic exceptions. For example the events of the Dementia Friends 
Project involve sometimes people living with dementia. Also the courses of Alzheimer Bari sometimes, 
but still very rarely, are opened to people livig with dementia. See < www.alzheimerbari.it/event/corso-




used and it seems that these events are more about ‘managing’ the person than 
empowering them. Finally, there are no data available on the concrete impact of such 
initiatives on the behaviour of family members of people living with dementia.  
In this regard a more promising project has been developed by the English Tide 
association, a UK based private network of dementia carers. 80  This organisation runs 
various initiatives which use ‘stories sharing’ to promote a better understanding of the 
life experience of the person living with dementia. The aim of such initiatives is to 
‘educate, empower and enable in order to encourage and embrace relationships built 
on empathy’. 81 The website of the group provides also a database of experiences which 
show how story sharing permits to understand that in interacting and making choices 
with people living with dementia there is more to be considered than their cognitive 
impairment.82 Such practices are praiseworthy because they put at the centre the 
experience of people living with dementia and encourage the person to tell their life 
experience. Moreover, it prioritises the development of meaningful human 
relationships between the person and their carer. Finally, and most importantly, here 
the family member can actively seek guidance on the issues he/she faces from his/her 
beloved one with dementia. 
In one experience report, for example, a person with dementia describes his love 
for nature, how he likes to walk outdoors and explains that he considers essential for 
his life the relationship with his family.83 Another report shows how story sharing has 
helped a dementia advocate to know more about the concerns of her cared for in 
relation to his problems of motility and communication.84 Relatives who took part in 
the initiative found it very helpful. For example, one of them said ‘what difference has 
LSW (Life Story Work) made? It’s changed me a lot already. […] It makes [my mum] 
feel good about herself. […]. It’s given me positivity’.85 An advocate involved in the 
project noted how story sharing can be helpful for her work in relation to decision-
making:  
                                                          
80 < www.tide.uk.net/> accessed 23 January 2017. 
81 <www.lifestorynetwork.org.uk/> accessed 26 October 2016. 
82 <www.lifestorynetwork.org.uk/in-my-words/> accessed 26 October 2016. 
83 GA Moss, ‘A life story’ < http://www.lifestorynetwork.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2015/04/George-Moss-Life-Story.pdf> accessed 24 January 2017. 
84 J Kendall, ’Case Study from Dementia Advocacy Network’ < 
http://www.lifestorynetwork.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2014/02/Case-Study-Dementia-
Advocacy-Network.pdf> accessed 24 January 2017. 
85 Anonimous, ‘Time Flies’ <http://www.lifestorynetwork.org.uk/wp-





‘advocates recognise the value of knowing something of a person’s past – when 
language and speech are affected as they are in someone with dementia, we rely 
on the past to tell us something of the person’s values and beliefs, what was 
important to them and therefore what might still be important. […] I was 
intrigued to know more about Gordon […]. I was passionate about doing 
something that would help others who might come into his life to know him and 
to value him […]’.86 
 
Positive narratives are also at the centre of some publications by the Alzheimer 
Society of Finland targeting younger family members of people living with dementia. 
These fictional books for children, containing colourful illustrations, try to explain to 
their young readers the personal, emotional and relational dynamics related to 
dementia and memory loss.87  
  
Figure 3 Two pages from Merihevosten saari. Olipa kerran kaukana, kaukana täältä aivan erityinen saari... 
(Translation: Sea horses island. Once upon a time far, far away from here a very special island ...) 
 
The Deutsche Alzheimer Gesellschaft provides a service of counselling for 
relatives and people with dementia, in which these individuals receive personalised 
advice on specific issues they may encounter in their everyday life.88 Counselling 
services are also run by other charities around Europe such as, to name but a few, 
Hrvatska udruga za Alzheimerovu bolest (Croatian Association for Alzheimer's 
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Disease),89 Alzheimer Italia,90 or Aktion Demenz (Austria).91 Alzheimer Gesellschaft 
organises also ‘groups of self-help’ for relatives of people living with dementia which 
are used by participants to ‘talk about their worries, fears and despair, but also to give 
mutual support, suggestions and tips and replenish the energy storage’.92  
Self-help groups like the German ones appear grounded on the concept of peer 
support. This practice consists in two or more people, who share the same life 
experience, providing emotional and practical help to each other.93 Traditionally, it has 
been employed in the field of mental health services in order to fight stigma, 
discrimination and isolation and to support the journey of the person towards recovery. 
In this context, one of many successful initiatives is the ‘Next Steps Project’ (Ireland) 
which, through support groups, aims at providing ‘individualized support to people 
with intellectual disabilities so that they can live a life of their choosing.’94 The good 
results achieved through this practice are extensively documented by medical 
literature.95 
These practices are applicable and have been applied to the field of dementia. 
Here, UK charities are at the forefront. Indeed, a number of them, use extensively this 
tool to support not only carers but also people living with dementia.96 The promising 
characteristic of these practices is that they are means for providing support and advice 
in the specific situation. Therefore they are well placed to tackle what are the concrete 
causes from which stigma originates in the single case.   
In the majority of cases, peer support is carried out in groups in which people 
living with dementia take part and that meet regularly (e.g. once a week). Here 
participants can exchange thoughts about their experience of living with the disease, 
their personal problems and even discuss their choices. In this regard, Health 
                                                          
89 <www.alzheimer.hr/savjetovaliste/> accessed 23 January 2017. 
90 <www.alzheimer.it/contatti.html> accessed 23 January 2017. 
91 < http://www.aktion-demenz.at/angebote-fuer-betroffene.html> accessed 23 January 2017. 
92 <https://www.deutsche-alzheimer.de/angehoerige/entlastungsangebote.html> accessed 23 January 
2017. 
93 S Mead, D Hilton and L Curtis, ‘Peer Support: A Theoretical Perspective’ (2001) 25 Psychiatric 
Rehabilitation Journal 134. 
94 See < https://zeroproject.org/practice/national-federation-of-voluntary-bodies-providing-services-to-
people-with-intellectual-disabilities-ireland/> accessed 23 February 2017. 
95 I Davidson et al, ‘Peer Support among Individuals with Severe Mental Illness: A review of the 
evidence." (1999) 6 Clinical Psychology: Science and Practice 165. 
96 See for example the projects run by the Health Innovation Network South London < www.hin-
southlondon.org/system/resources/resources/000/000/095/original/HIN_Interactive_Toolkit_Septemb
er_15_LIVE.pdf>; Alzheimer Scotland < www.alzscot.org/services_and_support/peer_support>; 
Dementia without Walls < dementiawithoutwalls.org.uk/thinking-differently-about-dementia/peer-
support/>. All websites accessed 20 January 2017.  
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Innovation Network (HIN) South London provide a range of peer support services, in 
order to fit different needs. Their ‘Peer Support for People with Dementia Resource 
Pack’ leaflet explains the spirit of dementia peer support and how this works in practice 
emphasizing how they are ‘proposing a whole system approach’ which meets the needs 
of the whole population of people with dementia’.97 The components of this system 
include: 
• Specialist peer support, usually for a time-limited period 
• Dementia cafes where people can meet others who are in a similar situation on 
a more informal basis 
• Community groups 
• A network of Dementia advisers or navigators who are able to support people 
with dementia.98 
 
The success of these initiatives and the usefulness of peer support is demonstrated 
by the feedback coming from people living with dementia themselves. For example, a 
person from one of the groups in Oxfordshire explained how comfortable she felt in 
the group: ‘we’re all in the same boat and we don’t need to worry who is listening’.99 
A man from one of the groups run by HIN said that ‘you feel as you’ve got more 
freedom’, while a woman said ‘you know, we have hakes and pains and we can see it 
and you could say, well you can do this, you can do that’.100 A facilitator involved in 
the same project declared ‘as well as laughing together and developing friendships 
they [people living with dementia] can also develop strategies because they are the 
people affected by dementia, that’s how they can learn from each other.’101 
The issue of self-stigma is also at the centre of the Finnish National Memory 
Plan.102 In this context, the Finland Ministry of Social Affairs and Health has launched 
a website containing various kinds of materials.103 These include short brochures 
aimed at explaining to the person and their carers the symptoms of the condition and 
                                                          
97 HIN, ‘Peer Support for People with Dementia Resource Pack. Promoting peer support opportunities 
for people with dementia’ (HIN 2015) < http://www.hin-
southlondon.org/system/resources/resources/000/000/095/original/HIN_Interactive_Toolkit_Septemb
er_15_LIVE.pdf> accessed 20 January 2017. 
98 Ibid. 
99 < http://dementiawithoutwalls.org.uk/thinking-differently-about-dementia/peer-support/> accessed 
20 January 2017. 
100 < https://vimeo.com/123402358> accessed 20 January 2017. 
101 <https://vimeo.com/138857697 accessed 20 January 2017. 
102 Finnish Ministry of Social Affairs and Health, above, 11. 
103 See < www.muistiliitto.fi/fi/etusivu> accessed 25 November 2016. 
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various care strategies, a collection of stories and a ‘dementia glossary’. Interestingly, 
it comprises also a detailed section on the person’s rights, emphasising how it is the 
duty of everyone to listen to the individual and to respect their will. With regard to 
treatment decisions, this contributes to build first in the person, then in the relatives, 
the consciousness and confidence to resist situations in which doctors or nurses, 
following a paternalistic approach may try to put aside the wishes of the individual.104 
 
 
4. Training for professionals  
 
The importance of specific training for doctors, nurses and carers is emphasised 
by many national dementia strategies. For example, the Norwegian Dementia Plan 
2020 states that ‘it is important not only to know about dementia oneself, but also that 
others have the necessary knowledge’.105 The Swiss National Dementia Strategy 
similarly notes that dementia-specific professional skills play a crucial role in 
guaranteeing an adequate standard of care to the person.106 In this regard, with the 
authority typically characterising official documents of the Health Ministry, the plan 
urges medical professionals to adopt an ethically sensible and autonomy centred 
approach also when they are dealing with people living with dementia.107 
However, as noted by Kinderman,108 in order to assure that doctors nurses and 
other practitioners really promote the autonomy and the right to make decisions of the 
person it is crucial that they are provided with specific guidance on how to act in 
concrete situations. In this regard, the kind of training delivered to professionals in the 
area of healthcare decisions needs to cover two aspects. On the one hand, it has to 
transmit the idea that people living with dementia, if adequately supported, are often 
able to participate in the decisional process. On the other hand, it needs to provide 
                                                          
104 Ibid. 
105 Norwegian Ministry of Health and Care Services, above, 24.  
106 Federal Office of Public Health and Swiss Conference of the Cantonal Ministers of Public Health, 
‘National Dementia Strategy 2014 – 2017’ (FOPH and SCCMPH 2014), 11 < www.alzheimer-
europe.org/content/download/72425/451359/file/Swiss%20national%20dementia%20strategy%20201
4%20-%20summary.pdf> accessed 1 December 2016. 
107 Ibid. 
108 P Kinderman, ‘Embedding a Human Rights Based Approach to Dementia Care’ (University of 
Liverpool and Mersey Care NHS Trust 2014), 3 <https://njl-
admin.nihr.ac.uk/document/download/2007729> accessed 26 January 2017. 
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specific instructions on what are the appropriate means of support in a certain situation 
and how they should be implemented.109 
The first channel through which such notions can be acquired by doctors, nurses, 
lawyers or social workers is through articles published in academic and professional 
journals. These publications are read regularly by healthcare and legal staff and play a 
valuable role in spreading new ideas among them. In this regard, the last two decades 
have seen a significant increase in the literature challenging the old prejudice that 
people living with dementia are completely unable to express indications on their 
care.110 Moreover, recent years have seen the publication of studies offering guidance 
on how to concretely assist the person living with dementia in deciding on their care.111 
Another way to provide training is through the organisation of courses and 
seminars. The Italian Dementia Plan provides for inserting, in the national training 
pathway for GPs, training on dementia and the management of problems of 
communication also in relation to consent to treatment.112 This is a very important 
provision, as the training pathway for GPs (‘Specializzazione in medicina generale’) 
is compulsory for all the graduates that want to become family doctors and will be the 
first person to be approached by individuals living with dementia in need of care. In 
addition to this, the Italian Observatory on Dementias (Osservatorio Nazionale sulle 
Demenze), local authorities and charities organise regularly conferences and training 
sessions on these topics in which the staff working in hospitals and care units has to 
take part in order to collect the credits necessary for being confirmed in their working 
position.113 Similar Provisions are contained also in the Spanish Plan for 
Neurodegenerative Diseases which urges local authorities to implement a programme 
of continued training for hospital staff on how to handle problems relating to the 
management of person centred dementia care.114 In addition, besides government 
actions, charities and NGOs throughout Europe have a rich calendar of activities in 
which medical and legal professionals regularly take part. It is not possible to name all 
                                                          
109 The importance of these elements emerge from reports by NGOs such as Nuffield Council on 
Bioethics, Dementia: Ethical Issues (Nuffield 2009), 35-94. 
110 These works are cited extensively throughout this thesis. Here I will only cite the particularly 
representative article by Jaworska, above. 
111 These works are analysed in Sections 5 and 6. 
112 Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri, above, 7.  
113 See <http://www.iss.it/demenze/index.php?lang=1&anno=2016&tipo=42> and <www.alzheimer.it 
/corsi.html> both accessed 3 November 2016. 
114 Ministerio De Sanidad, ‘Estrategia en Enfermedades Neurodegenerativas del Sistema Nacional de 
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of them here. Just as an example, I recall some of the largest and most well-known 
associations such as Alzheimer Europe,115 the Foundation Roi Baoudoin (Belgium),116 
Alzheimer Society UK,117 Associazione Assostegno (Italy),118 Alzheimer Gesellschaft 
(Germany). 119  
Especially the initiatives developed by the Italian and the Spanish Health 
Ministries appear praiseworthy as in these cases attendance to courses is compulsory 
for all medical practitioners. However, the sessions dedicated on supported decision-
making are still too limited in terms of time.120 Moreover, no one of the programmes 
cited so far contemplates the involvement of people living with dementia. In this 
regard, the field of training for professionals in dementia appears as the one in which 
the principles of the social model of disability are the furthest from being implemented. 
The focus here is still very much on curing the person rather than respecting their 
rights. 
A positive exception is represented by the French Espace éthique Maladies neuro-
dégénératives (the Ethical Space for Neurodegenerative Diseases). 121  The Espace has 
been created by the French Plan for Neurodegenerative Diseases. The plan focuses on 
the management of ethical problems related to medical treatment and dementia. In this 
regard, it dedicates one section to ‘Faire des droits de la personne et de la réflexion 
éthique un levier de la conduite du changement’ (Using the Person’s Rights and 
Ethical Debate as Means of change), referring to dementia as a ‘medicosocial’ problem 
and to the necessity of training carers especially on how to promote the autonomy of 
the person, as long as raising public awareness on dementia rights.122 For this reason, 
it has created a permanent forum which, through regular meetings, has the aim of 
promoting especially among medical practitioners a serious discussion and a better 
understanding of the reality which people living with dementia experience.123 In this 
                                                          
115 <www.alzheimer-europe.org/> accessed 2 December 2016. 
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context, medical professionals learn how to handle ethical problems and how to 
promote the right to decide of the person living with dementia, through the debate with 
colleagues and service users.124 These kinds of initiatives are very valuable for 
increasing the centrality of the person in medical care. Indeed, they involve primary 
stakeholders in the debate. In addition, mechanisms like the Espace étique offer 
precious opportunities for care workers to discuss their problems and dilemmas with 
colleagues and feel more supported.  
A promising example of training programme outside the context of healthcare is 
the one developed in the UK by the Liverpool Housing Trust (LHT) in cooperation 
with Dementia Action Alliance, a group formed mainly by people living with 
dementia.125 This project originates from the increased consciousness that many 
applicants or tenants have dementia or similar cognitive impairments. Therefore, the 
initiative aims at training staff to identify the kind of assistance needed by these 
individuals and to ensure that they receive the right type of support in order to maintain 
their own independence.126 The programme includes courses conducted by members 
of Alzheimer Action Alliance on how to recognize the symptoms of dementia, how to 
deal with difficulties of behaviour or communication and raising awareness on the fact 
that people living with dementia are human beings with the right of being helped in 
carrying on their lives.127 In addition, people from the Alliance assist the Trust staff in 
their everyday work, providing advice on how to deal more effectively with dementia 
related problems that may come out.128 This is a very praiseworthy characteristic of 
the project. Indeed, here training is provided with regard to specific situations, giving 
the possibility to explore the concrete and sometimes unexpected issues which 
characterize everyday practice in every sector. 
   
5. Supported decision-making techniques 
 
The ‘Handbook for Parliamentarians on the Convention on the Rights of Persons 
with Disabilities’ refers to supported decision-making as the action put in place by one 
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or more individuals who explain a series of issues to the person or, when necessary, 
interpret their words and behaviour in order to identify their preferences.129 These two 
components of assistance/explanation and interpretation emerge from the various 
initiatives focusing on helping mentally disabled people in general and people living 
with dementia in particular to exercise their legal capacity. 
In this regard, relevant practices have been emerging in various contexts. 
Healthcare is one of the sectors in which a higher number of projects has been 
developed on a European scale.130 Indeed, as already seen in Chapter 1, because of 
their old age, people living with dementia need often medical assistance. Moreover, 
decisions in this field are often ethically sensible, inducing doctors to make every 
attempt to seek the person’s opinion.131 Practices in this area are generally referred to 
under the label ‘shared decision-making’.132 Nonetheless, interesting ideas come also 
from projects focusing on non-medical decisions. It is the case of initiatives developed 
within the context of ‘dementia friendly community’ programmes. This concept refers 
to actions aiming at removing the obstacles preventing people with dementia from 
living a fulfilling life and be included in society.133 In this context, for example, 
valuable projects have been developed with the aim of assisting the person in doing 
shopping or managing their bank account.  
With regard to healthcare, associations of medical professionals like the European 
Association for Palliative Care (EAPC) and the UK Royal College of 
Ophthalmologists (RCO) have issued official guidelines on shared decision-making in 
dementia. These documents are a very positive step towards a better promotion of the 
right to decide on medical treatment of individuals living with this condition. Indeed, 
for the first time authoritative bodies, with whose directives medical professionals are 
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required to comply, state clearly that people living with dementia should be supported 
and involved in the decisional process rather than substituted. The recommendations 
on shared decision-making by the EAPC, which is made of practitioners and common 
citizens from 48 European countries and associations from 32,134 are contained in a 
wider guide on the treatment of older people and people living with dementia. 135 In 
this context, eleven scenarios and fifty seven recommendations are identified.136 
Among them, particularly relevant are those emphasising how the person and their 
family members have to be involved in the decisional process on medical treatment 
(recommendation 2.2).137 Moreover, the document affirms that perceived problems of 
care should be seen from the person’s perspective, prioritising relational aspects as 
much as care ones (recommendation 2.1).138 Finally, it asks the doctor to inform, 
educate and emotionally support family members, in order to avoid that their sense of 
burden and stigma impacts negatively on the person (scenario 9).139 Similar principles 
are affirmed by the RCO. 140 In this context, the College requires all ophthalmology 
departments to make sure they have members of staff specifically trained in 
communicating with people living with dementia (quality statement 1).141 In addition, 
it encourages professionals to work in partnership with carers or advocacy services, to 
explain information in a way that is understandable to the person and to make sure that 
they are following the reasoning (quality statement 2).142 Finally, it urges departments 
to provide individuals living with dementia with longer appointments and the 
possibility of rescheduling the session if that day they seem agitated or lost (quality 
statements 3 and 4).143  
While acknowledging the potential of the declarations cited so far, it has to be 
admitted that formal documents clearly in favour of shared decision-making in 
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dementia care do not seem to have been issued by other professional bodies. Moreover, 
also in the cases reported above language (e.g. the use of the word ‘patient’) shows 
how the medical model is still exerting its influence. Also, though they are developed 
taking into account the opinions of service users, people living with dementia are not 
involved in the drafting of these documents. Finally, there are still no official data on 
how many doctors and nurses are applying the principles under discussion and how 
they really work in practice.  
In this regard, an idea of how such statements may be implemented is given by the 
experiences of équipes from Dutch,144 British,145 Norwegian146 and Italian147 hospitals 
and nursing homes.148 All These experiences make use of support networks made up 
by the person, their relatives and the doctor, following what recommended by the 
EAPC. Anyway, though the fact that they are taking place is an encouraging signal, 
studies such as the review published by Miller, Whitlatch, and Lyons show how these 
practices are still not widespread and they often encounter the scepticism and prejudice 
of medical professionals.149  
Among these initiatives, particularly promising is the one carried on by Mariani et 
al, in a Dutch and an Italian Nursing home.150 It stands out because it uses the action 
of each member of the support group in order to balance and complement that of the 
others.151 In addition, it considers also the impact of the social and cultural 
environment. Finally, it includes a structured preliminary training session for 
healthcare professionals. Indeed, the staff of the two structures involved was invited 
to take part in a communication skills course featuring elements of role-playing 
technique.152 Then, they had to conduct discussion sessions with people living with 
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dementia and their relatives and draft an agreed care plan for the person.153 In this 
regard, the role of the family caregiver is described as really important in 
understanding the needs of the person. However, especially in the Italian context, there 
is often the risk that the family caregiver tries to substitute themselves to the person.154 
In this regard an Italian professional affirms: 
‘During some interviews, the family caregivers supported us and suggested 
issues to discuss. We have learnt a lot from them […] but sometimes family 
caregivers want to substitute themselves to the residents, and answer in their 
place. This does not facilitate the discussion with residents.’155 
 
In these cases the care professional may counterbalance the disruptive action of 
the relative, as explained by another Italian nurse: 
 
‘During one interview, the family caregiver wanted to focus on a topic that was 
different from the question addressed to the resident. However, the resident kept 
repeating the same answer, meaning that for her the topic was important. Thus, 
the psychologist reassured the resident, who consequently started feeling more 
at ease, and that she had a leading role in the situation. In fact, [at the start of the 
interview] the resident was really agitated and had spasms, whereas, at the end, 
she was quiet and peaceful. The family caregiver then understood that the topic 
was important for her mother’.156 
 
The risk of undue interference and the importance of the balancing role of each 
member of the network is emphasised also by Smebye, Kirkevold and Engedal in 
relation to the Norwegian context.157 The researchers show how there are situations in 
which doctors and professional carers fail to challenge the preconceptions of family 
members.158 In this regard, an issue characterising all the experiences analysed so far 
is that the support network does not include an independent advocate, which promotes 
the will of the person in situations where professionals and family members share 
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interests which are conflicting with that of the individual living with dementia. The 
opposite problem has come out in the Dutch context. Here it has emerged how 
sometimes family members are not willing to be involved in the support network, 
frustrating the process.159  
Anyway, with regard to the British context, Livingston shows that when the 
discussion within the support network is conducted properly and everyone is involved, 
the result can be quite satisfactory.160 In this context, a relative of a person living with 
dementia affirmed: 
 
‘We weren’t in agreement with each other…whether to have an heart 
operation…with hindsight…it was the right decision…he decided…it made his 
mental abilities much worse, but physically, he’s much better.’161  
 
With regard to specific support techniques, according to medical literature on shared 
decision making explanation and simplification are among the most important actions 
to achieve a meaningful communication with the person interested by a certain 
treatment decision.162 In this regard, a promising practice is the one developed in 
Norway by Smebye, Kirkevold and Engedal.163 They have developed a shared 
decision-making procedure which provides that family members actively explain the 
information to the person and indicate how they have to proceed. The Norwegian 
researchers report that: 
 
‘Family carers and professional caregivers ensured that persons were informed 
and checked to make sure that they understood what the information meant in 
their situation. […] Stating possible alternatives in a clear and concrete manner 
was at times necessary. Failing memory was compensated with aids/props to 
make options clearer. Narrowing the range of available choices because of 
limited powers of concentration and deliberation reduced confusion and 
promoted autonomous decision making’.164 
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The opinions of caregivers involved in the experience show that often these 
techniques lead to an improvement of the ability of the person to decide on medical 
treatment.165 However, there are also cases in which, despite the aid provided, the 
person appears not capable of understanding what disclosed, as the cognitive 
impairment is too extensive.166 
Projects inside and outside the healthcare sector focus on providing accessible 
information to the person. This sort of practice is endorsed also by the Committee on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities who, among the possible forms of supported 
decision-making mentions providing information in an understandable format.167 The 
importance of accessibility in healthcare information is emphasised also by ANED in 
various national reports, on the accessibility of health information and data for 
mentally disabled people in general.168  
In this context, a praiseworthy initiative is the one promoted by the Dementia 
Engagement and Empowerment Project (DEEP), which published a guide on how to 
write ‘dementia friendly information’.169 This guide appears a very valuable tool in 
order to understand how to support people living with dementia in making decisions. 
It provides a clear list of what characteristics make a document more accessible. In 
addition, it is drafted by people living with dementia themselves, making sure that the 
principles affirmed really match the needs of service users.170 In this regard, tips 
provided by DEEP include presenting information ‘logically, one piece at a time’, 
keeping language simple, writing concisely and using quotations and examples in 
order to help the person understand the main points.171 In addition, they suggest to 
make use of pictures, distinguish sessions by using different colours, and prefer bold 
to italics.172 
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Similar indications emerge from the NHS Accessible Information Standard.173 
This document ‘aims to make sure that people who have a disability, impairment or 
sensory loss are provided with information that they can easily read or understand’.174 
Its provisions have to be applied by ‘all organisations that provide NHS care or adult 
social care’.175 In this context, in relation to mentally disabled individuals, the 
Standard’s Implementation guide includes communication tips such as, for example:  
 ‘Identify yourself clearly […]  
 Keep your face and lips visible […] 
 Use gestures and facial expressions to support what you are saying. 
 If necessary, repeat phrases, re-phrase the sentence or use simpler words or 
phrases.  
 Use plain, direct language and avoid using figures of speech […]  
 Check if the person has understood what you are saying.’176 
 
The guide also states that it is crucial to keep on the person’s record a note of their 
communication needs and of all the conversations between them and their doctors so 
that such exchanges of information are easier to recall when needed. These records 
have to be made available to the person.177  
This initiative undertaken by NHS England appears really promising. Indeed, the 
above mentioned Accessible Information Standard is binding for all service providers 
under the NHS England.178 Therefore, it stands good chances to be applied extensively 
in hospitals throughout the country.179For this reason, it represents an example which 
should be followed by other health authorities in Europe.  
Outside the healthcare sector the goal of providing accessible services and support 
for people living with dementia is pursued also by Lloyds Bank within its Disability 
and Dementia friendly policy. In this context, apart from aids specifically concerning 
banking services, the company provides support means which can be used also in other 
contexts. These include, providing informative material on single products which is 
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understandable by a person with dementia, disclose openly when a certain product is 
not appropriate for people living with this condition or suggesting to the person where 
to get further assistance if they are trying to go for a potentially dangerous choice.180 
An important provision is the commitment to review constantly the support means the 
bank offers in light of the feedback from clients with dementia, in order to respond to 
emerging needs.181 
 
6. Supported decision-making and management of 
communication problems  
 
As shown by a number of studies, problems of communication are among the main 
practical barriers to support in decision-making of people with dementia.182 In this 
context, particularly difficult to handle appear the memory lapses that the person 
shows and the fact that he or she often struggles to find the right words.183 Another 
relevant issue is the fluctuation of the person’s cognitive abilities and the fact that 
he/she tends to change his/her opinions.184 
In order to address such issues, a number of researchers have been focusing on 
how to build a more effective dialogue with the person, which can be carried on 
continuously day after day. Muramoto stresses how the progressive nature of dementia 
requires a vision of treatment decisions as a process which goes on for several years 
and during which the person’s memories fade away.185 The researcher, proposes that 
this loss of memories is counteracted through the action of the relatives and close 
friends of the individual with dementia, who can act as ‘an external memory’, 
reminding him/her the elements he/she does not remember anymore.186 This idea 
appears quite promising as it suggests a specific use of networks of support in order to 
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solve one of the most urgent issues emerging in everyday practice. The study cited 
above does not report empirical data or practical experiences. However, this use of 
networks of support emerges in some of the experiences I have been referring to in 
previous sections. For example, one of the facilitators from the peer support network 
organised by HIN South London, stresses how the network is often used by the person 
to recall information and experiences.187 In addition, Smebye, Kirkevold and Engedal 
report an episode, from their experience in a Norwegian nursing home, in which the 
carer acts as a reminder for the person in relation to daily personal care, saying, for 
example: 
 
‘It is Friday today and on Fridays we have an agreement about showering. Look 
at your plan for the week written on your board. Come let me help you!’188 
 
Apart from that, the idea of ‘external memory’ has inspired many practices which 
use analogical or digital memory aids. Clark and Chalmers show how it can be very 
helpful that the person keeps a notebook, so he/she can record experiences, facts and 
notions, and can retrieve the information when needed. This arrangement is 
recommended by studies and charities.189 Some private companies are starting to sell 
memory bank DVDs for people with dementia, on which the person or his/her relatives 
can record notions that need to be remembered.190 Similar aids are developed in the 
area of telecare, in which products such as watches or other digital tools are sold in 
order to remind the person of taking medications or going to appointments with his/her 
GP.191 
Information technology permits to go even beyond simply sending reminders. 
Some groups of researchers have developed IT tools for supporting people with 
dementia in the decision-making process using. For example, an equipe of Dutch 
experts have developed DEcideguide, ‘an interactive web tool (in development) that 
case managers can use in facilitating shared decision making in care networks of 
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people with dementia’.192 It consist in a chat room in which the person with dementia 
can freely interact with other members of his/her support network, an application 
through which the members of the network can discuss the different stages of a certain 
decision, and a tool which permits to the person to isolate and analyse his/her feelings 
on certain aspects of his/her choice.193 This programme can be very helpful, especially 
in case of younger people with dementia who have more familiarity with IT, in order 
to guarantee a constant interaction of the person with his/her support network.194 The 
team which created this tool is still working in order to make it more accessible, 
following the advice of users themselves, who suggested to simplify the graphic 
interface and the language used.195 
 
 
As stresses by Fritschy, Kessels  and Postma, the technological aids mentioned 
above open very promising perspectives especially with regard to the goal of providing 
better assistance to people living alone or in isolated areas.196 In particular, they can 
be of great help in relation to treatment decisions, as they can be used by the person to 
record his/her will on medical treatment or his/her opinions on certain medications. 
However, they are often expensive and require a level of technological literacy which 
often people with dementia do not have because of their age.197 A possible way to 
solve this problem could be, of course, trying to modify the interface of such tools. 
This solution, for example, has been tried with success in the case of people with 
cerebral palsy by Confederación ASPACE and Vodafone Spain Foundation.198 In this 
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context, hardware and apps have been developed which permit to enter text through 
voice or adapted keyboards (with pictograms, enlarged keys, etc.).199  
In addition to such issues, we need to consider that many of these applications 
imply the storage a huge amounts of sensible data, requiring to seek previously the 
consent of the person. As shown by Batchelor et al, making sure that a person with 
dementia, especially in an advanced stage is really in the position to consciously 
consent to the use of his/her personal data could be extremely challenging200  
Other researchers and charities are focusing on solving communication problems 
by creating a better environment for the person. Giampieri, in relation to his experience 
with older people in an Italian hospital, stresses that supported decision-making may 
also consist in trying to overcome possible difficulties of communication.201 In this 
context, doctors, nurses or relatives have to identify the moments in which the person 
appears more lucid, making him or her feel at ease during the conversation and 
assisting him/her with words or concepts that may not come immediately to mind. In 
fact, one of the main source of difficulties when trying to communicate with a person 
with dementia and obtaining from him/her a decision on medical treatment is the 
psychological pressure that the individual feels.202 
On how to manage the communication with the person with dementia concentrate 
some projects outside the area of healthcare. For example, Alzheimer Scotland has 
recently launched a programme aimed at making shops around the country more 
dementia-friendly.203 In this context it has issued instructions to retail shops on how to 
favour the information exchange with the individual.204 Such guidelines have been 
elaborated in cooperation with people with dementia, their carers and medical experts, 
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on the basis of everyday life experience.205 In this regard the association recommends 
the following steps: 
‘1 Speak clearly. Speak clearly, calmly and slowly to allow the person time to 
understand information. Use simple short sentences and avoid direct questions. 
Keep choices to a minimum and don’t raise your voice. […] If the person finds 
it difficult to find a word, then you could suggest one… but be careful not to 
interrupt or finish the sentence for them! 
2 Body language. People with dementia may find it difficult to understand what 
is being said but can be quick to interpret the message on people’s faces and may 
still be aware of body language. Smile warmly, make eye contact, make sure you 
are at the person’s level, use a friendly tone and respect personal space. 
3 Listen. Listen carefully to what the person has to say, giving plenty of 
encouragement, whilst looking out for other clues of what they might be trying 
to communicate. 
4 Show respect and patience. Adapt what you are saying if the person with 
dementia does not understand it. Allow them time to find the words to tell you 
what they want. Don’t rush and try to go at their pace. 
5 Noise. A person with dementia may have difficulty listening if there are a lot 
of different noises around them. Reduce unnecessary noise or move to a quieter 
area. 
6 Lighting. Make sure the lighting is sufficient so the person with dementia can 
see you and everything around them clearly. Turn up the lights or move to a 
well-lit area.’206 
 
At the moment there are no surveys reporting the opinions of people with dementia 
in these projects. However, in relation to the Scottish project, material relating to the 
development of the initiative in some communities show that that shop owners 
consider it a successful and helpful initiative.207 Moreover, the fact that the number of 
retail companies that decide to join the project can be considered as a confirmation of 
the satisfaction of customers with dementia. 
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Giampieri focuses also on the aspect of the interpretation of the person’s will. 208 
In this context the role of the supporter would consist in trying to resolve possible 
contradictions in the person’s statements, even by asking him or her for further 
clarifications. Moreover, he or she may also be required to identify the utterances 
which do not have to be taken into account, being the result of misunderstandings or 
moments of distress.209 Finally, the work of the interpreter may also include taking 
into account statements of the person not regarding directly the treatment decision that 
may nonetheless be useful for reconstructing the person’s opinions.210 These sort of 
aid is in line with the general principles of shared decision-making, in particular with 
that of shared decision.211  
Smebye, Kirkevold and Engedal, describing some of the promising practices 
observed in their research summarise quite well how all these techniques fit together 
in shared decision-making with people with dementia: 
 
It was typical that there was an exchange of information and a questioning and 
answering pattern in the dialogue. Helpers who were aware of how important it 
was to ensure the flow of information, enquired about the person’s views, 
checked to make sure they understood the information and waited for answers. 
Questions were also used to remind persons of their options’.212 
 
7. Monitoring of the quality of support and protection from 
undue influence 
 
Scholarly works and experience in everyday care practice show that supported and 
shared decision-making are valuable means to promote the autonomy of people with 
mental disabilities like dementia, but, if not correctly applied, can turn into forms of 
hidden substituted judgement or undue influence.213 Therefore it is crucial to put in 
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place strategies to assure the person is adequately supported and that his or her will is 
always put at the centre of the decisional process. 
In this context, in many European countries there are authorities with the specific 
role of monitoring what happens inside care settings also with regard to consent to 
treatment. One of these is the English Care Quality Commission (CQC).214 The 
Commission is the independent regulator of health and adult social care in England. 
Also thanks to its local divisions spread throughout the country it constantly monitors 
GPs, hospitals, care homes and other care services providers, collecting feedback sent 
directly from service users and having the power of inspecting care structures.215 The 
main goal of this body is ensuring that care services comply with fundamental 
standards of care which include the respect of person centred care principles, of the 
dignity of the person and of his or her autonomy and consent.216 The CQC plays an 
important role on holding accountable service providers for their failures in promoting 
the autonomy of mentally disabled people. In this context, through its periodical 
reports, it constantly stigmatises situations in which the voice of individuals with 
cognitive impairments like dementia is not given adequate consideration in choices 
regarding healthcare.217 However the structural characteristics of this monitoring 
mechanism make it a good tool to promote improvements on a macro-level and in the 
long term, rather than preventing single situations of abuse, which normally are 
reported by the CQC once they have already happened. 
A valuable means in order to react to situations in which the person’s will is 
disregarded is independent advocacy. This concept, widely employed in mental health, 
refers to a series of actions aimed at promoting and defending the rights and dignity of 
mentally disabled individuals.218 This service is often provided by charities and NGOs 
which, apart from running awareness-raising and anti-stigma campaigns intervene in 
single situations in order to advocate for the person interests when they are at risk of 
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being neglected. However the role may be played also by a trusted family member. 219  
An advocate can be appointed by the person, or, in certain cases provided by the law, 
ex officio.220 Within the context of mental health one of the many associations 
providing this service is ‘Mind’ a British organisation which, through its local groups 
spread around the UK, provides volunteer advocates to people with any mental or 
cognitive impairment.221 
An independent advocacy service addressed also to people with dementia is run 
by Leeds based Advonet.222 This organisation provides advocates on request of the 
person or his/her family members or friends. These individuals make sure that the 
people they assist ‘have a voice’ making sure that when ‘they are speaking themselves 
are heard’ and that ‘the rights and the likely preferences of people who can’t speak for 
themselves re respected’.223 In this context the goal of every advocate is making sure 
that people with dementia: 
‘•play a full part in decisions about everyday matters affecting their lives; 
•play a full part in major life decisions, for example, about moving home; 
•obtain outcomes that they want; 
•prevent outcomes that they do not want; 
•ensure their needs are met; 
•protect their rights and secure their entitlements; 
•promote their wellbeing; 
•improve their quality of life’.224 
 
In order to provide more incisive assistance to people with dementia in case of 
abuses many charities run a helpline service. In this context, people with dementia, 
their relatives and their carers may contact an association specialised in dementia care 
in case of emergencies or because mistreatment is taking place.225 The call centre then 
gives to the person the indications he or she needs and in case sends volunteers to deal 
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with the situation. In Europe services like this are run, to name but a few, by Deutsche 




From the overview contained in this chapter a picture emerges characterised by 
light and shadow. In various European countries governments, hospitals, care homes, 
charities and citizens seem to increasingly understand the necessity of supporting 
people with dementia in being included in society and in deciding on their medical 
treatment. In this regard, we can see a relatively significant number of initiatives being 
developed throughout the continent. However, despite the encouraging trend, the 
coverage of such practices is still far from being extensive. In fact, they are often 
limited to single care structures or local areas.  
This perception may be in part due to the practical and language limitations of this 
research, disclosed in the Introduction. However, the existence of this patchwork-like 
scenario is also confirmed by other studies and international reports.229 
To be more precise, with regard to anti-stigma actions targeting the general public, 
relatives of people with dementia and people with dementia themselves, we can find 
successful campaigns in a vast number of European countries. However, they often 
fail to stress that including the person in society implies also respecting his or her 
decisions on medical treatment. Finally, still too few awareness raising campaigns in 
relation to dementia stress the importance of the UNCRPD. 
In relation to training programmes for dementia care professionals, it is positive 
that governments and charities are putting increasing efforts in their development. 
Moreover, training programmes appear still too focus on medical aspects and often fail 
to include sessions in which participants can actually discuss with people with 
dementia. 
In the area of specific support techniques, practices developed inside and outside 
the healthcare sector propose really interesting ideas. However, the occasions in which 
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such proposals are actually applied in practice are still quite rare. Moreover, especially 
in the context of technological aids there are still obstacles to their diffusion on a vast 
scale. 
Finally, on the problem of guaranteeing the quality of supported decision-making, 
the adopted measure still appear too weak in many states also because the use of tools 
like independent advocacy still tend to be limited to countries in Northern Europe such 
as England. 
To sum up, though it’s positive that increased effort is put into promoting the 
dignity and autonomy of people with mental disabilities like dementia, we should 
continue to stress the necessity to build on existing promising practices and most 







1. Introduction  
 
This thesis has attempted to analyse the barriers faced by individuals living with 
dementia in exercising their right to decide on medical treatment, and to study how 
they can be overcome or attenuated through an alternative model of healthcare 
decision-making, which moves away from the approach characterising current 
legislation, policies and practices, which is still based on substituted and surrogate 
decision-making.  
In this regard, it has adopted a vision of the person living with dementia which, 
building on the ideas of the social model of disability and of Fineman’s vulnerability 
theory, focuses on what society and the people around the individual can do to promote 
their right to decide. Indeed, from this point of view, dynamics of disability and 
vulnerability are seen as caused not so much by the person’s impairment, but rather by 
the way society accommodates or fails to accommodate their needs. For this reason, 
also in relation to treatment decisions of individuals living with dementia it is 
necessary to adopt an approach based not on deprivation of the capacity to decide, but 
rather on the responsibility of state and society to actively engage in creating the 
necessary conditions for the person to fully express their will.  
Starting from this perspective, the thesis has explored how Article 12 CRPD 
provides a normative framework embodying such values and a model of legal capacity 
and decision-making which permits to overcome the barriers faced by people living 
with dementia in deciding on medical treatment. Then it has studied how the action of 
regional organisations such as the Council of Europe (CoE) and the European Union 
(EU) can contribute to promote the principles of Article 12 CRPD among Member 
States and citizens and how initiatives emerging in national jurisdictions can give an 
idea of how these provisions can be translated into concrete practices.   
Through the analysis of principles, policies and practices developed at an 
International, European and national/local level, this work has demonstrated that a new 
legal policy and practice approach to healthcare decision-making, based on the 
recognition of the person’s capacity to consent and on supported decision-making, 
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allows to remove or greatly attenuate the barriers preventing people living with 
dementia from exercising their right to decide on medical treatment. However, this 
work has also shown how much more needs to be done by European regional 
organisations, governments, healthcare structures, professionals and informal carers to 
realise the principles of Article 12 CRPD. Indeed, CoE and EU institutions have issued 
a series of documents advocating for the implementation of Article 12 principles in 
relation to people living with mental conditions and cognitive impairments. However, 
the indications contained in such sources often lack the necessary level of detail on 
how such provisions should translate in terms of specific rules. Moreover, recent 
initiatives such as the Draft Additional Protocol on Involuntary Treatment and 
Involuntary Commitment to the Oviedo Convention on Human Rights and 
Biomedicine, appear to take a step backwards compared to the innovations proposed 
by the CRPD, thus sending confusing messages to policy makers and professionals. 
Finally, though the CoE and the EU offer useful channels for spreading promising 
practices and providing training to medical professionals, they often seem unable to 
sustain such initiatives with adequate economic contributions. In addition, when funds 
are available, mostly through the EU, they are instead allocated to temporary projects 
which are useful in spreading new ideas and ways of working with people living with 
dementia, but lack the necessary continuity to promote a long term change of approach. 
Promising practices are also emerging in single European countries but also here they 
tend to appear still as isolated initiatives carried out by good-willed professionals and 
activists, which often lack systematic support from the state or other social institutions. 
This chapter provides a final overview of the arguments developed in the thesis 
and of its main messages. Therefore, Section 2 summarises how the various chapters 
contribute to answering the study research question. Section 3 identifies the main final 
messages of the thesis. Section 4 then focuses on what it has not been possible to 
explore in this work, providing some recommendations for future research. Finally, 
the Conclusion further underlines the overall message emerging from the thesis.  
 
2. Answering the research question  
  
The thesis has addressed the problem of how to create the conditions for people 
living with dementia to make decisions about their medical treatment, by indicating as 
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a solution a model of legal capacity based on a more inclusive vision of the individual 
such as that proposed by Article 12 CRPD and by looking at how such a model can be 
realised through the action of CoE and EU institutions and through promising 
initiatives developed at a national level.  
Chapter 2 has made a first step towards addressing the research question, 
identifying the barriers faced by people living with dementia in exercising their right 
to decide on medical treatment. In this regard, it has shown that while the person’s 
impairment plays a role in creating such obstacles, what really prevents people living 
with dementia from deciding on medical treatment are contextual factors rather than 
their impairment. Indeed, these individuals are often subject to stigma, prejudice and 
negative attitudes which induce doctors, relatives and carers to automatically disregard 
their opinions even when they appear well grounded and articulate. In addition, 
conversations on care choices are often conducted in a way that does not take into 
account the specific characteristics and needs of people living with dementia, so that 
the person struggles to participate in conversations with doctors and carers. Such 
problems appear to be partially aggravated by the current legal approach to capacity 
to consent and healthcare choice-making. Indeed, in all European countries, legislation 
still subordinates the possibility to make valid healthcare decisions to the presence in 
the person of a set level of mental capacity, increasing in this way the risk that people 
living with a condition like dementia are deprived of their right to choose. In addition, 
the emphasis on mental capacity leads to see all decision-making issues arising in this 
context as caused by the person’s brain, providing no basis for addressing their needs 
for support and adjustments. Finally, with regard to the last stages of dementia, current 
legal approaches propose tools such as advance directives, surrogate decision-making, 
substituted and best interests judgement which can often be paternalistic, morally 
controversial and difficult to apply in practice.  
Chapter 3 claims that the inadequacy of current legal, policy and practice 
approaches to healthcare decision-making of people living with dementia is mainly 
due to the fact that they are based on a too narrow and exclusive vision, which sees 
such individuals as by definition incapable and devoid of their self. In doing this they 
ignore how many of these people, despite their condition, appear able to develop 
opinions, have values, and to live a meaningful life. Therefore, this chapter suggests 
to adopt an alternative view of the person living with dementia informed by the social 
model of disability and by Fineman’s vulnerability theory. The social model looks at 
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disability and chronic conditions such as dementia as dynamics originating from the 
interaction between the person’s impairment and societal barriers, showing how 
policies and practices on disability should shift to focusing on the removal of societal 
barriers impacting the life of disabled individuals. Therefore, it also creates grounds 
for the argument that in relation to treatment decisions of people living with dementia 
the focus needs to be on removing the obstacles preventing the person from making 
choices about their care, rather than on their cognitive deficits. Vulnerability theory 
extends the message of Fineman’s social model with regard to legal personality and to 
the role of the state and social institutions in removing societal barriers oppressing 
individuals in a position of disadvantage. Indeed, it claims that not only disabled 
people or individuals living with dementia, but all human beings are to a certain extent 
vulnerable and incapable due to their fragile bodies and because of the way society is 
organised and poses obstacles to them. Therefore, it is necessary to move away from 
the utopian notion of the perfectly autonomous liberal individual, which still underpins 
our social structure and legal systems, and put at the centre of legal and political 
discourse the vulnerable subject. Adopting this perspective leads to abandon the binary 
distinction between capable and incapable individuals which still characterises 
regulations on healthcare decision-making and which puts people with dementia at risk 
of being deprived of the possibility to choose their care. Instead, it states that state and 
social institutions have to take action in order to remove the societal barriers 
preventing disabled people and individuals living with dementia from exercising their 
right to decide on medical treatment, and to accommodate their needs as much as 
possible. 
Chapter 4 shows how Article 12 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities provides a model of legal capacity which substantially embodies the ideas 
of the social model of disability and of Fineman’s vulnerability theory. In this regard, 
it makes a further step towards addressing the thesis research question as it identifies 
a normative framework which permits to remove or attenuate the barriers faced by 
people living with dementia in exercising their right to decide on medical treatment, 
providing a legal tool to create better conditions for these individuals to make legally 
valid healthcare choices. Indeed, by qualifying legal capacity as an inalienable human 
right and recognising the power to make decisions to all individuals, including those 
with severe cognitive impairments, it issues a powerful statement against behaviours 
in which the opinion of the person living with dementia is disregarded because of 
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stigma, prejudice and labelling. Moreover, Article 12(3), states that if a disabled 
individual like a person living with dementia struggles to make decisions, the preferred 
course of action should be to help the individual through supported decision-making. 
In this regard, it advocates for an ‘active’ approach to legal capacity in which the 
person is supported and empowered in expressing their will rather than being 
substituted by a legal representative or guardian. Article 25 CRPD further clarifies 
how these principles also apply in relation to healthcare choices, as it affirms that 
disabled people such as individuals living with dementia must always be guaranteed 
the right to consent to or refuse a medical treatment and that they should be helped to 
express their will through a communication and consultation style which takes into 
account their needs and specific characteristics. In this way, the Convention provides 
a legal basis for policy initiatives and practices which really address the issues 
emerging in medical and legal practice relating to healthcare decisions of people living 
with dementia, proposing an approach which better enables the person to make their 
voice heard. 
Chapter 5 further contributes to answering the thesis research question by showing 
how the realisation of the messages and provisions of Article 12 CRPD can be fostered 
through the action of the Council of Europe. Such an organisation has already shown 
a commitment to promoting the principles of this Article of the CRPD among single 
citizens and Member States through policy documents such as the CoE Disability 
Action Plan 2006-2015 and Disability Strategy 2017-2023. In these recommendations, 
the Council of Europe issues powerful statements in favour of the respect for the right 
of disabled people to make decisions also in the context of healthcare. Moreover, it 
urges Member States to implement a legal capacity model based on supported 
decision-making. In addition, the CoE has also shown potential to valuably contribute 
to the implementation of CRPD principles through the case law of the European Court 
of Human Rights. The judgements delivered by the Court with regard to legal capacity 
are still limited in number, but show nonetheless how this body can play an 
instrumental role in forcing States to change their legislation also with regard to 
healthcare decision-making. Finally, a significant contribution in supporting the 
implementation of principles such as those of the CRPD can also be given by 
monitoring bodies such as the European Committee of Social Rights, which can 
advocate for putting in place appropriate person-centred health services, and the 
European Commissioner of Human Rights, which, having the power to visit and 
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inspect care facilities, can closely monitor whether such principles are really applied 
in everyday healthcare practice. However, the chapter also shows how recent 
initiatives such as the issuing of the new Draft Additional Protocol on Involuntary 
Treatment and Involuntary Commitment to the Oviedo Convention have posed doubts 
on the seriousness of the CoE commitment towards the realisation of CRPD principles.  
Chapter 6 shows how valuable help in spreading a new CRPD-oriented model of 
legal capacity can also be given by the EU, which in this field can complement the 
action of the Council of Europe. This organisation has also undertaken policy 
initiatives urging Member States to implement the principles of Article 12 CRPD, such 
as the European Disability Strategy 2010-2020. In addition, the EU has released 
documents specifically focusing on the care and rights of individuals living with 
dementia and older people living with cognitive impairments such as the European 
Initiative on Alzheimer's Disease and other Dementias (2009) and the Guiding 
Principles on Active Aging (2011). While EU documents often contain less detailed 
and extensive instructions to Member States compared to those issued by the CoE, 
they include provisions specifically advocating for the right of individuals living with 
dementia and of older people living with cognitive impairments to be supported in 
expressing their will on medical treatment. In addition, these policy documents are 
subject to more structured monitoring processes, so that in the future, EU policy 
initiatives might have an even greater potential than the ones put in place by the CoE 
to generate change in the field of healthcare decision-making by people living with 
dementia. In this regard, what adds strength to the EU’s action is that this organisation 
has a significant financial budget at its disposal which can be used to support promising 
practices promoting the empowerment of disabled people and individuals living with 
dementia in healthcare decision-making.  
Finally, Chapter 7 concentrates on initiatives and promising practices which are 
emerging in single European countries, and, which aim to promote the right of people 
living with dementia to decide on medical treatment and which function to support 
them in expressing their will on such a matter. In this way, it makes a final step towards 
answering the thesis research question as it provides examples of how the principles 
of Article 12 CRPD could potentially translate in practice, identifying concrete means 
to create the conditions to better allow individuals living with dementia to make 
decisions on medical treatment. An initial step which can be undertaken in this area is 
constituted by awareness raising and anti-stigma campaigns spreading a positive 
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image of people living with dementia and advocating for the respect of their right to 
make decisions for themselves, hence diminishing the risk that these individuals’ 
opinions on care are disregarded due to prejudice and stigma. Equally important are 
training programmes for medical professionals and family members put in place by 
health authorities, governments, and private associations which give these 
stakeholders tools and strategies for effectively communicating with people living 
with dementia and how to effectively handle consent procedures involving these 
individuals. A crucial role in concretely enabling people living with dementia to make 
healthcare choices is also played by the various projects and processes put in place by 
European hospitals, care structures, health authorities and charities which utilise 
shared decision-making and analogical or digital aids to support people living with 
dementia in making healthcare decisions. These support means can significantly 
enhance the extent to which a person living with dementia is able to exercise their right 
to make decisions on medical treatment. If not only governments but also organisations 
such as the CoE and the EU, as well as single people involved in the care of individuals 
living with dementia really commit to ensuring a wide and systematic use of these 
means of supported decision-making, it will be possible to realise a model of 
healthcare decision-making which matches with the expectations and innovative 
principles set up in the CRPD and that avoids many of the issues posed by current 
legal, policy, and practical approaches in this area.  
  
3. The Thesis Main Messages  
 
In light of the summary provided in the previous section, four main messages 
emerge from this thesis. The first message recognises the potential of Article 12 CRPD 
and of a vision of the person living with dementia grounded on the social model of 
disability and Fineman’s vulnerability theory to remove or at least attenuate the 
barriers faced by people living with dementia in exercising their right to decide on 
medical treatment. The second contribution emerging from this research is a series of 
indications on how such a model of treatment decisions can translate into concrete 
initiatives and practices. The third message concerns the fact that regional 
organisations such as the CoE,  and the EU, national governments and social 
institutions have a great deal of (still unexploited) potential in promoting a new 
approach to treatment decisions which really empowers the person to fully express 
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their will. However, and this is the fourth message emerging from the thesis, such state 
and social institutions need to do more work in institutionalising the promising 
practices and initiatives emerging in single countries and to provide individuals living 
with dementia, medical professionals, and carers with the physical, human, social, 
ecological and environmental resources necessary to make the Article 12 model of 
legal capacity a reality.  
 
Towards a new approach to dementia and treatment decisions 
This thesis confirms that, as also shown by a number of empirical studies and 
experiential accounts, what really prevents people living with dementia from fully 
exercising their right to decide on medical treatment are contextual factors and barriers 
such as stigma, prejudice, medical consultation styles not taking into account their 
needs, a lack of adequate communication training for carers and medical professionals, 
and legislation on legal capacity and capacity to consent which is focused on 
hypercognitive assessments rather than support. A system based on a conceptualisation 
of people living with dementia which is in line with the social model of disability and 
vulnerability theory such as the one proposed by Article 12 CRPD overcomes such 
barriers.  
Indeed, by affirming that legal capacity is a fundamental right which needs to be 
recognized to everyone and that even individuals living with serious cognitive 
impairments cannot be deprived of their decisional power, this model challenges the 
widespread prejudice informing the conduct of medical and legal professionals, carers 
and relatives, who, assuming the person incapable to consent, tend to automatically 
disregard their wishes. In addition, Article 12 leads to a system which avoids the 
problem of establishing when a person living with dementia becomes incapable to 
consent through discriminatory, controversial, and often impractical mental capacity 
assessments. Indeed, by affirming that ‘persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity 
on an equal basis with others’ it puts these individuals on the same level as others, 
rejecting any distinction between legally capable and incapable people on the basis of 
mental abilities. 
Instead, by requiring that 'States Parties shall take appropriate measures to provide 
access by persons with disabilities to the support they may require in exercising their 
legal capacity' (Article 12(3) CRPD), the Convention advocates for an approach in 
which the person is supported in making their choices by professionals or next of kin 
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who can explain to them elements they may not understand, help them in analysing 
the various nuances and implications of a decision, interpret their statements when 
unclear, create a network of people which monitor potentially abusive behaviours, and 
gather complete information regarding the person's wishes in preparation for the time 
at which they will be unable to communicate with the people around them. The model 
emerging from Article 12 CRPD, which embraces the vision of disability as a social 
construction elaborated by the social model, provides a legal basis for grounding the 
right of people living with dementia to have access to the support means that they need 
to make their voice heard with regard to healthcare. The model also advocates for the 
removal of the barriers they face in making decisions on medical treatment. In this 
regard, the principles of Article 12 CRPD must also be viewed as a call to governments 
and social institutions to be more responsive to the needs of people living with 
dementia, reiterating the ideas of Fineman’s vulnerability theory. Indeed, it also 
requires states and social institutions to actively engage and invest financial resources 
in creating the conditions for these individuals to exercise their right to decide on 
healthcare matters by making sure that care staff is properly trained to communicate 
with people living with dementia, that there are adequate spaces to talk with the person 
about their health care, and that staff of hospitals, care structures, or local practices has 
the time to do so. 
 
Realising a support-based model of treatment decisions in dementia care 
In its second part, the thesis provides a series of indications on what concrete 
actions and practices could be put into place at a European and national or local level 
in order to realise the model of legal capacity and treatment decisions of individuals 
living with dementia emerging from Article 12 CRPD.  
The first type of actions required in this regard are initiatives which ensure that 
people living with dementia are recognised as having the right and the capacity to 
decide on medical treatment at all times and in all environments. A first contribution 
in this sense comes not only from authoritative policy documents such as the CoE 
Disability Action Plan 2006-2015, the CoE Disability Strategy 2017-2023, the EU 
Initiative and European Parliament Resolution on Alzheimer’s Disease and other 
Dementias, but also from some judgements of the ECtHR and several national 
dementia strategies, which contain powerful statements in favour of the right of 
disabled people and people living with dementia to decide on their life and care, and 
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statements demonstrating the need to recognise that they are equal in dignity to others. 
Moreover, awareness-raising and anti-stigma campaigns which are put in place 
especially by charities and NGOs in various European countries, have a crucial role in 
spreading a more positive view of individuals with this condition and in challenging 
the negative prejudice against them. Such initiatives ensure that people living with 
dementia are increasingly viewed as individuals who still have meaningful opinions to 
voice and that, with some help, are often still able to manage their life. Therefore, such 
initiatives also guarantee that lay people, doctors, nurses, carers and legal professionals 
cease to consider people living with dementia as inherently unable to make choices 
about their treatment, avoiding situations in which they are deprived of their capacity 
to consent on the basis of their impairment. 
A second crucial factor in realising a support-based model of treatment decisions 
in dementia care is to make sure that in addition to awareness-raising and anti-stigma 
campaigns, medical professionals, carers, and family members benefit from specific 
training which improves their ability to promote the right of the person to decide on 
medical treatment. In this way, it is possible to guarantee that the people around the 
individual living with dementia are fully prepared to satisfy the person’s needs for 
support and that they will concretely know how to promote their right to decide on 
medical treatment. This will specifically overcome one of the most frequent obstacles 
that people with dementia encounter on making choices for themselves. Such 
initiatives can be put in place by CoE and EU institutions, as well as by governments 
and private organisations. In this regard, it has been shown in Chapters 5.3 and 6.3 that 
the CoE and the EU regularly organise or fund conferences, public events, and 
networks especially dedicated to healthcare and legal professionals which focus on 
themes of disability rights, legal capacity, supported decision-making and rights-based 
approaches in dementia care. Chapter 7.4 showed that some national dementia 
strategies have incorporated sessions on the ethical dimension of dementia care in 
compulsory training pathways for healthcare professionals. Such initiatives provide 
valuable occasions of reflection and exchange on legal problems relating to consent to 
treatment of individuals living with this condition. In addition, Chapter 7.3 showed 
how certain organizations, namely, national charities and NGOs have put in place 
various sensibilisation campaigns, meetings, and discussion groups for carers and 
relatives of individuals living with dementia. Such initiatives accompany the family 
members and people involved in providing support to the person in their journey with 
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their condition and help them to adopt a more positive, empowering approach to 
dementia as well as with providing advice on how to handle the communication and 
relationship with the person. In this way, these campaigns, meetings, and discussion 
groups address another set of barriers which prevent people living with dementia from 
getting adequate support in expressing their will on medical treatment. These barriers 
stem from relatives’ tendencies to discourage the person, their lack of knowledge, or 
their fatigue in handling situations alone for which they are not entirely equipped or 
comfortable. Stigma, frustration, and inefficacy on the part of the relatives ultimately 
lead to their inability to take adequate action when the person living with dementia 
requires it. 
A third crucial level of action entails making sure that the person actually receives 
appropriate support when they are in the situation of having to decide on their care and 
medical treatment. Through its analysis of promising practices developed at a national-
local level, Chapter 7 provided examples of how the person living with dementia can 
be concretely supported in this case. The chapter showed that in some care structures, 
the application of shared decision making in its triadic form including the person, their 
doctors, and their family and friends permits to make use of the network of 
relationships around the individual in order to help them understand information on 
medical treatment and communicate their wishes. It is a tool with which healthcare 
professionals and carers are often familiar and that can be used as a scheme through 
which they may have the possibility to explain relevant information in an accessible 
and simpler manner, reminding the person of elements they may not recall, and guiding 
the person to the exploration of alternatives. Also, this tool allows for the gathering of 
information about the person’s wishes which will be useful in the final stages of their 
condition when they are absolutely unable to communicate with the outside world. 
Next, the network around the person, which may include advocate or members of 
associations for the rights of individuals living with dementia, can also be used to 
ensure and monitor that everyone provides high quality support and to prevent 
situations of abuse and undue influence through mutual supervision of its members. In 
addition, Chapter 7 showed that  guidelines provided by public bodies such as the NHS 
or guides issued by NGOs regarding accessible information standards for disabled 
individuals or people living with dementia can play a valuable role in enabling the 
person living with dementia to voice their opinion on medical treatment. Finally, IT 
tools produced in even greater quantity by specialised companies or research institutes 
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which help the person to navigate decisional processes to keep in touch with their care 
staff and to remember relevant elements for their decision also appear promising. 
The initiatives and tools analysed in this thesis do not exhaust the full range of 
available possibilities with regard to support in decision-making for people living with 
dementia. However, they provide an idea on how regional institutions, governments, 
NGOs and other social bodies may contribute to removing the barriers preventing 
people living with dementia from making choices about their medical treatment and 
how to be more responsive to the needs of these individuals. 
 
The potential of CoE, EU and nation-level actions 
The policy initiatives, legal and policy documents, and promising practices 
reviewed in this thesis show how organisations like the CoE and the EU, national 
governments, NGOs, hospitals, care homes, health authorities, and other social 
institutions have significant potential in attaining positive change in the area of 
treatment decisions of people living with dementia. As shown in Chapters 5 and 6, the 
statements contained in CoE and EU policy documents on disability, dementia and old 
age have played a valuable role in spreading the messages of the CRPD with regard to 
legal capacity, contributing to reform processes in various European countries. ECtHR 
judgements in this area have produced immediate changes in the legal sphere of the 
applicants and have forced governments to change their legislation and practices in 
this specific area. The existence of a body dedicated to the promotion of social rights 
such as the European Committee for Social Rights and the powers of inspection of 
monitoring bodies such as the European Commissioner of Human Rights constitute 
good channels for the cooperation between CoE, governments, local authorities, single 
care structures and other social institutions in creating the conditions necessary for 
adequate supported decision making. Such cooperation channels also enable 
stakeholders to make sure state and social institutions are particularly responsive to the 
needs of individuals living with dementia and really engage in removing the barriers 
preventing these individuals from deciding on medical treatment. In addition, EU 
funding schemes already support projects which provide support to disabled people 
and individuals living with dementia in making everyday life and care decisions. These 
projects have helped spread promising practices which range from awareness raising 
campaigns, to IT-based decisional aids, to shared decision-making and care support 
schemes. Many individuals living with dementia, their family members, and carers 
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who have taken part in the reviewed initiatives put in place by public authorities, 
hospitals, medical teams, and NGOs have confirmed that such promising practices 
have been paramount in enabling the person to decide on their health care. 
However, though these actions signal a positive move towards a model of 
treatment decisions of people living with dementia which is more in line with the 
vision of the social model, Fineman’s vulnerability theory, and Article 12 CRPD, they 
are still far from sufficient to promote a general, structural change of approach in this 
area. Indeed, even though the EU and the CoE have shown a commitment to promote 
the great messages of the Convention, they have not been able to go beyond statements 
of principle or to provide a rigorous roadmap for the implementation of such an 
approach. ECtHR litigation, though constituting a promising channel to achieve 
improvements in individual situations is still scarcely used, as for many potential 
appellants it is a costly mechanism which often requires several years to lend results. 
The not binding nature of the jurisprudence and reports by the European Committee 
for Social Rights and the European Commissioner of Human Rights still pose the risk 
that once the attention triggered by the publication of the document as died down all 
the commitments made by governments, care structures and local professionals vanish. 
Moreover, since these bodies have the task of monitoring complex dynamics in fourty 
seven countries, they often lack the capacity to provide rigorous analyses and adequate 
follow-up to their enquiries. In addition, the potential for change of EU funding 
programmes is hindered by the fact that such resources are almost entirely employed 
for supporting one-time initiatives rather than sustaining long-term processes of 
structural change. Finally, initiatives such as anti-stigma campaigns, training 
programmes, practices utilising supported and shared decision-making in care settings 
are still not widespread, rather appearing as the result of the isolated efforts of good 
willing professionals or officers. In this regard, much more work still needs to be done 
in order to ‘institutionalise’ these promising practices so that every person can benefit 
from them and not only those who happen to live in a certain area or are treated in a 
particularly innovative care structure. 
Furthermore, one of the most striking elements emerging from this study is that 
despite the fact that governments and also regional organisations such as the CoE and 
the EU have shown a willingness to be more responsive to the needs of individuals 
such as people living with dementia, by endorsing and-or ratifying documents such as 
the CRPD, they still do not appear to have completely embraced the mission of putting 
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such declarations in practice. Indeed, no European government has really made a 
serious commitment towards investing the necessary economic resources to provide 
supported decision-making to people living with dementia on a vast scale. However, 
such an investment is a fundamental prerequisite for the realisation of the approach to 
treatment decisions of people living with dementia which is analysed in this thesis. As 
a matter of fact, seen in Chapter 2 shows that one of the main factors preventing these 
individuals from expressing their will on medical treatment is the actuality that medical 
practitioners and formal and informal carers are often not given the resources, 
infrastructure, and time to properly interact with the person and help them in making 
choices by their institutions and governments.  
Unfortunately, at the moment, public health policies in Europe seem to go in an 
opposite direction. Many countries have enforced strict austerity policies which have 
diminished the amount of financial resources available for health and care services, 
putting increasing pressure not only on the staff of hospitals and care structures but 
also on the relatives of people living with dementia. Such policies have caused protests 
and resentment, especially among those with lower socioeconomic status and have 
particularly worsened the situation of individuals such as people living with dementia. 
Realising an approach to legal capacity and treatment decisions really based on 
supported decision-making requires at least the partial reversal of such austerity 
policies. However, this is far from an easy task. Because of the quantitative dimension 
of the ‘dementia phenomenon’, it seems utopian to think that the issues analysed in 
this study can be addressed solely through the investment of public resources. 
Consequently, this thesis also gives attention to practices of supported decision-
making which utilise the action of people who are already involved in the care of the 
person living with dementia, limiting the costs. Nonetheless, it is still crucial that the 
state uses its regulatory power to ensure that possibly scarce resources are used 
strategically and, most importantly, that they are used to empower people living with 
dementia to decide on their care. 
 
A call to action for regional organisations and governments 
In light of the considerations reported above, what emerges from this thesis is also 
a call to organisations like the CoE or the EU and to states to take more decisive and 
incisive action to promote an approach to legal capacity and treatment decisions which 
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is in line with Article 12 CRPD and with the values advocated by the social model of 
disability and by Fineman’s vulnerability theory. 
A first contribution can come from CoE and EU institutions in the form of a 
development of clearer guidelines on how Member States should reform their legal 
capacity legislation. Such guidelines should require the elimination of legal rules 
which reserve the power to make decisions on medical treatment for those with a 
certain mental capacity level. In addition, they should require that national legislation 
explicitly recognises the right of each person to receive the support they need in 
deciding on medical treatment and mandates that before resorting to forms of surrogate 
decision-making, doctors and carers should make every possible effort to explain 
relevant information to the individual and enable them to make the decision for 
themselves. 
CoE institutions and NGOs in the field of disability and dementia advocacy can 
also contribute to further unlocking the potential for change of ECtHR litigation in the 
area of legal capacity and the right to decide of individuals living with dementia. In 
particular, they can provide funding for covering the legal expenses related to bringing 
a case in front of the Court and can enact pro bono schemes in which potential 
appellants receive free legal assistance. Organisations for the rights of disabled people 
and individuals living with dementia can use strategic litigation to develop a body of 
judicial principles and ECtHR precedents which are binding for CoE Member States. 
These organisations can also contribute to the establishment of a new system based on 
supported decision-making in regards to treatment decisions of people living with 
dementia. 
The EU can also improve its action with regard to the promotion of supported 
decision-making. Its work in this area can become more effective and impactful if the 
EU creates more long-term or even permanent funding programmes to support 
national, publicly funded, and high quality healthcare services and supported decision-
making schemes. Such funding would need to be subject to stringent conditions, 
requiring that governments and healthcare structures use it to build capacity and create 
opportunities to help people with dementia in expressing their views on medical 
treatment. The funding should also be accompanied by clear guidelines applicable to 
all care structures and institutions of the Member States, which make sure that uniform 




Not only national governments, but also individual care institutions can contribute 
to put into practice the alternative approach to legal capacity and treatment decisions 
analysed in this thesis by approving reforms that are in line with the provisions of 
Article 12 CRPD. Moreover, they can use national dementia strategies to include more 
extensive sessions on ethical and legal issues related to consent to treatment of 
individuals living with dementia in training pathways for medical and legal 
professionals. However, the most important contribution would be ensuring that 
adequate resources are available to fund the support practices which need to be put in 
place in hospitals and care structures, which would give medical professionals the 
necessary time and space to really sit down and assist the person in developing their 
opinions on medical treatment.   
 
4. Study limitations and directions for future research 
 
This thesis has focused on studying how to create the conditions for people living 
with dementia to exercise their right to decide on medical treatment, adopting the 
perspective of the social model of disability and of Fineman’s vulnerability theory, 
and applying the principles of Article 12 CRPD. Therefore, its main aim has been to 
propose a new general vision which better addresses the issues emerging from practice 
in this area, linking the debate on healthcare choices of individuals living with 
dementia to the ideas of the social model of disability and the ideas of vulnerability 
theory, as well as studying how the principles of the CRPD can play an important role 
in enabling the person to voice their will on care. By highlighting these links, the thesis 
contributes to advancing current research and policy in this area. Indeed, these ideas 
and principles have only quite recently started to be applied to the case of people living 
with dementia. These individuals have often remained at the margins (or have even 
been excluded altogether) of the disability movement and of the great policy process 
resulted in the entering into force of the CRPD. Thus, these individuals remain far 
from a position in which they could fully benefit from the liberating and revolutionary 
potential of its provisions. This work sets out to fill this gap. In order to fill the gap as 
best as possible, the thesis has concentrated on the possible general implications of the 
new model of legal capacity and decision-making proposed by Article 12 of the 
Convention, and on understanding how it could be realised in practice. In doing this, 
the thesis has analysed, without any attempt to be exhaustive, initiatives and promising 
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practices put in place at a CoE, EU and national-local level, which show how the vision 
of the social model, Fineman’s vulnerability theory, and the principles of Article 12 
CRPD can be translated into concrete policies, as well as legal and practice initiatives 
in the field of healthcare decision-making of individuals living with dementia. 
The chosen focus allowed the analysis of how different social institutions and 
levels of governance can play a role in advancing the right of people living with 
dementia to decide on medical treatment and in promoting supported decision-making. 
However, it has not been possible to analyse in depth the nuances and problems 
relating to the implementation of specific provisions and support means in the various 
countries included in this study. Additionally, because the thesis essentially relies on 
white and grey literature written in English or in the main European languages, it is 
possible that practices not mentioned in such documents, or not accounted for in the 
main repositories and databases, or described in reports written in languages not 
known by the author of this work have been missed. 
For these reasons, it is important that more research is conducted which adopts a 
more narrow focus and uses empirical field-based methodologies, so that it may study 
the specific problems faced by people living with dementia, carers and medical and 
legal professionals more closely. In particular, there is a need for studies which involve 
the largest number possible of stakeholders within a certain geographical area, asking 
them to provide a detailed account of the various support techniques used and to 
express their opinions on them. In this way, it will be possible to obtain a complete 
view of what is working and what can be improved with regard to healthcare decision-
making processes for people living with dementia. In this process, special attention 
will need to be paid to countries such as those of Eastern Europe on which we have 
fewer data.  
Another area which requires further research is that of the political, economic and 
social conditions which need to be in place for supported decision-making to be 
realised and in order to guarantee that people living with dementia are fully enabled to 
decide on medical treatment. In this thesis, it has been argued that what often creates 
barriers to the exercise of the right to decide on healthcare matters of people living 
with dementia is that hospitals, care structures, professionals and carers are not given 
the resources and infrastructure necessary to assist the person in expressing their will. 
Because of the significant number of people living with dementia and the scarcity of 
available resources, reversing this situation is not easy. It requires the development of 
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sophisticated and innovative solutions which combine careful policy planning, a mix 
of public and private funding and resources, and an approach to care in which the 
action of healthcare services is complemented with the efforts of informal carers. 
Therefore, there is also a need for more research in areas outside legal studies such as 
health economics, health governance, analysis of health systems, sociology of health, 
which thoroughly analyse the dynamics surrounding consent procedures for people 





Despite being generally considered inherently incapable of making healthcare 
choices, people living with dementia are often able to express their will on medical 
treatment. However, they continue to face barriers in the development and expression 
of said will such as stigma and prejudice, the lack of support means to help them make 
choices, doctors and carers who are not properly trained to respond to their needs, and 
an approach to legal capacity and capacity to consent which tends to deprive them of 
their right to decide instead of providing a legal basis to remove the obstacles which 
prevent them from making decisions. This thesis has argued that by adopting an 
alternative approach to legal capacity and healthcare decision-making which embraces 
the ideas of the social model of disability and of Fineman’s vulnerability theory and 
that is in line with the principles affirmed by Article 12 CRPD, it is possible to remove 
and avoid such barriers. In this regard, it has shown how in some European countries, 
hospitals, care structures, NGOs, and groups of professionals and carers have already 
developed initiatives which are in line with the principles of the CRPD and are making 
considerable impacts in empowering the person to choose on their care.  
Nonetheless, we are just at the beginning of the journey towards a more inclusive 
and empowering model of healthcare decision-making for people living with 
dementia. There is still much work to do in order to ensure that principles such as those 
of Article 12 CRPD are systematically embraced by healthcare institutions, 
professionals, carers and lay people. In this regard, this thesis has argued that not only 
CoE and EU Institutions, but also national governments and local actors have 
significant potential to promote the implementation of such provisions in relation to 
treatment decisions of individuals living with dementia. However, this potential is still 
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significantly unexploited. I hope that this work can contribute to providing ideas on 
how governing bodies and social institutions at a European, national, and local level 
can be more effective in promoting the right of people living with dementia to decide 
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